Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Joel C. Moses
John J. Dziak
Harvey Fireside
Kenneth Grundy
David L. Denny

JULY-AUGUST 1981

CSCE IN MADRID — H. Gordon Skilling

Arab Communism — Arnold Hottinger

Communism and India — Bhabani Sen Gupta

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Problems of Communism

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JULY-AUGUST 1981 VOL XXX

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Cover: Rudolf Battek, a Charter 77 spokesman and human rights activist, whose conviction and sentencing by Czechoslovak authorities came in July 1981, as the Madrid CSCE meeting was about to adjourn. The sign on the shop reads: "1917–1979, the 62nd anniversary. [The Soviet] October [Revolution] opened the way to the progress and happiness of mankind." Photo by Ivan Kyncl/Palach Press.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

CSCE in Madrid
H. Gordon Skilling

The follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which opened in Madrid in November 1980 has afforded significant opportunities to review the performance of individual signatories in implementing the Final Act of the initial Helsinki meeting, but efforts to go beyond such a review have thus far foundered because of differences between East and West over how to do so. The Soviet bloc has pushed for new measures aimed at "military détente" and especially for the convening of a European disarmament conference as a key confidence-building measure. The West has insisted that new confidence-building measures should be binding, militarily significant, and verifiable and that the final document of the Madrid meeting must reflect some concessions on human rights by the Soviet bloc. Whether this impasse can be resolved after the Madrid meeting reconvenes in October 1981 remains to be seen.

Arab Communism at Low Ebb
Arnold Hottinger

Arab communism is at a low ebb of power and influence, the sole exception being in South Yemen, where the Yemen Socialist Party rules in a more or less Marxist fashion. In several Arab countries, there appears to be no organized Communist movement at all. In most of the others, the existing Communist parties are proscribed and forced to lead a clandestine existence. In a few cases, the parties are legal, but they are closely controlled by the ruling regimes. Even some of these have come under persecution in recent years. However, given the difficulties that one-man leadership will probably confront in dealing with contemporary problems in the Arab states and the volatile nature of the Arab world, one may expect new opportunities for Arab Communists to exploit. In responding, they will have to cope with the growing force of Islamic fundamentalism either as enemy or ally.

Communism and India: A New Context
Bhabani Sen Gupta

Since the dramatic defeat of Indira Gandhi's ruling Congress party by a Janata-led coalition in 1977, there have been important, interrelated shifts in relations between India's two major Communist parties, between these and the Indian political system, between the respective Communist groups and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and between India and the USSR and China. Most striking has been the new political cooperation between the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), particularly in opposition to Indira Gandhi since her return to power in January 1980.

* * *

Essay-reviews (over)

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Essay-reviews

Soviet Leaders: Roots of Behavior
Joel C. Moses

Observers differ over the likelihood of significant changes in the style and policies of a post-Brezhnev generation of Soviet leadership. Those employing a structural approach—stressing the continuity of the Stalinist mold in which the present and future Soviet leadership cohorts have moved or will move into positions of power—provide an important reminder that political cunning will be an essential attribute of Brezhnev's successors. At the same time, those who employ system analysis—examining how evolving societal needs generate changes in the skills, perceptions, and policies of leaders—make a good case for anticipating at least modest evolution of the Soviet political system after Brezhnev.

The "Action Arm" of the CPSU
John J. Dziak

The Soviet Union's Committee for State Security (KGB) and its predecessor organs have always been much more than just another security or intelligence organization. As the "action arm" of the party, this service has occupied a special position both as an instrument of control at home and as an executor of policy abroad. The KGB has penetrated every facet of the Soviet system, including the military, and appears today to be in the strongest position it has enjoyed since the death of Stalin. Unfortunately, few scholars have paid the Party-KGB symbiosis the serious attention it merits, despite the availability of open sources on the topic.

Psychiatry and the Soviet State
Harvey Fireside

Recent documentation has given a clearer picture of the ways in which Soviet authorities have perverted psychiatric methods to serve the political purposes of the state. By judging political dissenters turned over to them by security organs to suffer from paranoia or "creeping schizophrenia," official psychiatrists facilitate the commitment of such defendants to mental institutions without opportunity to defend themselves in public trials. Once committed, the dissenters find themselves subjected to manipulation by drugs and psychological pressures. While the international outcry against such abuses has not yielded a change in Soviet practices, it may have sensitized specialists in many countries to the social forces that subvert their discipline.

Moscow, Havana, and Africa
Kenneth Grundy

The USSR and Cuba have achieved some political successes in Africa. Undeniably calculating, the USSR's strategy and tactics have been flexible and pragmatic, even while its general goals and analytic framework have been shaped by a distinct ideological/philosophical mind-set. Future prospects in Africa for the Communist states will depend not only their will and concerns, but also on the attitudes of the Africans.

Doing Business with China
David L. Denny

Although China's foreign trade policy and practices have changed remarkably since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong and the fall of the "gang of four," the changes have tended to lag far behind expectations. Yet, a reading of the recent experiences of those most actively seeking the China market reveals that the Chinese have been consciously groping for acceptable ways of providing essential trade information, decentralizing foreign trade management, reforming the legal structure for trade, and adopting standard international trade practices. One can predict further efforts by Beijing to improve China's complex and cumbersome trade mechanisms, even if progress is likely to be slow.

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CSCE in Madrid

By H. Gordon Skilling

After eight months of negotiations, the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe recessed in July until October 1981. This was the second time that it had resorted to such an escape from continuing impasse. The decision testified to the deadlock of East and West, and it suggested a gloomy outlook for ultimate agreement when talks resume.[1]

This state of affairs is a far cry from the one envisaged by many people in 1975 at the time of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki. Therefore, there is merit in trying to assess how and why the present situation has come about.

The Background to Madrid

In 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was formally adopted in Helsinki, with great pomp and ceremony, by the heads of state of 35 countries—the whole of Europe except for Albania, and the United States and Canada. This voluminous document embodied a consensus, arduously achieved after years of negotiation, which seemed to constitute a "diplomatic equilibrium," satisfying the individual states and the several groupings of states represented.[2] In the Soviet view, Helsinki constituted a recognition of the status quo, both the territorial status quo established de facto after the war (including the formation of the German Democratic Republic) and the political and social status quo of the "socialist" systems of Eastern Europe. Pressed hard by West European countries, the Soviet Union accepted, with some reluctance, other parts of the Final Act setting forth the general principles (including respect for human rights) to govern interstate relations and seeking to improve human contacts—in the belief that these were counterbalanced by the principles of sovereignty and of noninterference in internal affairs. For the West Europeans, the assurance of respect for human rights and the endorsement of sovereignty were important contributions to security and peace and were balanced by the acceptance of the principle of peaceful change of the status quo. The United States, which had acted almost as an observer during the long negotiations, considered the final agreement "a delicately balanced document" [3] that assured security and stability in Europe and opened the way to enhanced cooperation between East and West as a component of worldwide détente. The smaller states, whether neutral, nonaligned, or allied, rejoiced in the unusual recognition granted them as partners in the construction of a peaceful Europe.

At the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977–78, the carefully constructed balance of interests embodied in the Final Act fell apart,[4] revealing the conflicting interpretations and the antagonistic interests of East and West. For the Soviet Union, Helsinki turned out to be a kind of boomerang, for Belgrade focused on human rights and human contacts and paid scant attention to sovereignty or security. True, the territorial status quo had already been recognized, and there was no real

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[1] This article is based largely on interviews with delegates and on observations during five weeks spent in Madrid in the fall of 1980, supplemented by other interviews and talks during several visits to Washington and Ottawa in 1980 and 1981. Interpretations, however, are those of the author and not of individual informants.

[2] *The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal,* transmitted to the US House of Representatives by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, DC, May 17, 1978, p. 4.

[3] Mattew Nimetz, "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* (Nashville, TN), special issue on "Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord—A Five-year Road to Madrid," Spring-Summer 1980, p. 325.

[4] Geoffrey Edwards, "Belgrade and Human Rights," *Government and Opposition* (London), Summer 1978, pp. 320–21.

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Principal members of the Soviet delegation at the opening session of the Madrid CSCE meeting on the night of November 11, 1980. From left to right: delegation chief Leonid F. Il'ichëv, Soviet Ambassador to Spain Yuriy Dubinin, S. A. Kondrashev, and Maj. Gen. Konstantin F. Mikhaylov.

—EFE/Pictorial.

danger of the use of force by the West against the Soviet domain in Eastern Europe. However, contrary to Soviet expectations, "noninterference" proved to be no protection against a barrage of criticism of its failings with respect to human rights and cooperation in the humanitarian field. At the same time, vigorous condemnation of the faults of the Soviet Union and East European countries—to the disappointment of the West—produced no positive substantive change in their policies. Indeed, it caused some worsening of the treatment of their citizens, particularly the self-appointed monitors of the implementation of Helsinki and other defenders of human rights. It became abundantly evident that strong words could not seriously influence the policies of the Soviet bloc and that the polemics of Belgrade had in fact further eroded the confidence necessary for peace and security.

The final communique, adopted after weeks of debate and lacking even a single reference to human rights, signaled to both the dissidents and the Western public that nothing tangible had been achieved. At best, Belgrade had been able to confirm the Helsinki Final Act and to provide for another follow-up in Madrid, thus continuing the process of détente in Europe.

During the period between Belgrade and Madrid, this thin line of continuity was maintained. Three meetings of experts were convened—one on the peaceful settlement of disputes at Montreux in October-December 1978, another on Mediterranean questions at Valetta in February-March 1979, and a third, a scientific forum, at Hamburg in February 1980. Montreux was an exercise in verbal gymnastics, seeking, like dozens of conferences of the past half-century, to define various procedures for the settlement of disputes. One Western

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diplomat called it a disaster. The Valetta meeting was designed to partially satisfy Malta and the nonparticipant Mediterranean states, whose spokesman Malta had become. It dealt only with general problems of cooperation (economic, cultural, and scientific) among Mediterranean states, and some Western diplomats regarded it as a "success" only in the sense that it failed to do anything substantial. Only at Hamburg was something concrete achieved. Western scientists were sharply critical of repression of scientists in the USSR, and a message of solidarity was sent to Andrey Sakharov by some of those present. Most significant, the final document laid stress on human rights and freedom as a necessary foundation for scholarly and scientific cooperation, thus accomplishing something that the Belgrade communique had failed to do.

Certain events, however, cast a cloud on the forthcoming Madrid conference, and on the CSCE and détente in general. These included the invasion of Afghanistan and the heightened repression of dissenters in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. There was some uncertainty as to whether Madrid would take place, either because of loss of Soviet interest in another "Belgrade" or because of the unwillingness of the West to participate after the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. One Western observer suggested that the West should "rescind the Helsinki accord," as the "greatest Soviet diplomatic victory of the 1970's."[5] Others were critical of the so-called confrontation policy pursued by the United States at Belgrade and urged that the balance be shifted away from human rights to more positive elements of cooperation.[6] Still others insisted that questions of human rights must not be ignored, and should in fact be pressed vigorously.[7]

By the summer of 1980, however, it seemed almost sure that a gathering would take place. Clearly, neither the USSR nor the United States, and certainly not the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, wished to see an end to the CSCE process. Still less was any state willing to assume the responsibility of bringing it to a close. Bilateral negotiations among signatory states, and discussions within the alliances, proceeded, but the Western allies had not achieved a united stand even by the time of the NATO Council meeting in September 1980. Nor was there a meeting of minds between the NATO group and the other European countries, and still less between West and East.

A further element of uncertainty was created by the impending American elections, with questions raised as to whether a Reagan victory would lead to a shift in course by the United States. Other countries, too, were not acquainted with the leaders of the American delegation, Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman, and were unsure whether they would continue the polemical style of Justice Arthur Goldberg at Belgrade.

It was likely therefore that the shape and form of the conference would be determined only at Madrid, during the preparatory meeting and at the main conference. The Soviet Union, it appeared, would seek to shift the emphasis away from human rights and toward "security," notably military measures of détente. France, too, had advanced security proposals. West European governments and Canada favored a balanced approach, but human rights did not bulk large in their planning in bilateral and allied negotiations. The United States, it seemed, would insist on a thorough discussion of Afghanistan and of human rights violations and would emphasize "the principle of balance among all aspects of the Final Act."[8] Public pressures, within the United States and Canada, although perhaps not as intensive as before Belgrade, were mounting, so that it was improbable that human rights could be downplayed or neglected.[9]

The Preparatory Meeting

The first task to be performed when the preparatory meeting opened in Madrid in September 1980 was to work out an agenda and to determine the rules of procedure for the follow-up. Unlike most regional and international organizations—e.g., the Inter-American system or the Organization of African Unity—the CSCE did not possess a charter which described in systematic fashion its organs and their rules of procedure. It lacked even the continuity of regular meetings, each follow-up meeting having to decide whether, when, and where to hold another similar conference. Belgrade had ended with agreement to have another follow-up at Madrid, but it had not established rules of procedure and timetable.

When the preparatory meeting began, it soon became

[5] William Safire, "Doing It Ourselves," *The New York Times*, May 22, 1980.

[6] Carrol Sherer, "Breakdown at Belgrade," *Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978, pp. 80–84; Albert W. Sherer, Jr., "Goldberg's Variation," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1980, pp. 154–58; David A. Andelman, "The Road to Madrid," ibid., pp. 159–72; Harold S. Russell, "Follow-up at Madrid: Another Chance for the United States," *Vanderbilt Journal*, special issue cited, pp. 359–73.

[7] Vratislav Pechota, "East European Perceptions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Role of Citizen Initiatives," *Vanderbilt Journal*, special issue cited, pp. 467–500.

[8] Dante B. Fascell, "The CSCE Follow-up Mechanism from Belgrade to Madrid," ibid., p. 356.

[9] The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held public meetings in seven American cities, and a special conference in Washington on the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, addressed by President Carter. In Canada, a newly formed subcommittee on the CSCE of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense held hearings in preparation for Madrid in July and October 1980.

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clear that Western hopes of maintaining unchanged the rules of procedure in effect at Belgrade, the so-called Yellow Book, were a delusion. The Soviet Union, anxious to avoid a repeat performance of Belgrade and in particular to forestall a long review debate, wished to make substantial changes in the agenda and the timetable. The Western powers had toyed with the idea of seeking some improvements in the Yellow Book—e.g., increasing the number of subsidiary working bodies, or committees, from five to six or even nine—but had concluded that to propose anything more than cosmetic changes would risk losing a system which on the whole had been satisfactory. Thus, when the Spanish delegation proposed a set of rules and a timetable that would have followed the Yellow Book in all essentials, the Western powers immediately endorsed it. But the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept this proposal as the basis of discussion, and the Hungarian delegation offered an alternative. There followed nine weeks of tough and tiring discussion, during which the two superpowers held to their positions. Only in the eleventh hour, so to speak, was a compromise reached which broke the impasse and made the convening of the main meeting possible.

In the protracted debate, there were three major points of controversy—two relating to the agenda and timetable, and a third concerning the place and date of a subsequent follow-up meeting. The first two issues reflected the determination of each of the two superpowers to have its own way. The United States sought to guarantee plenty of unbroken time for a review of the record of all states in applying the Final Act, and the USSR tried to limit the scope and duration of this debate. Although the Yellow Book had defined the agenda in simple terms, most of which were acceptable to both sides, point 4 defined the purposes of the conference in two paragraphs, separated by a blank space, as including (1) review of implementation and (2) consideration of new proposals. This caused the battle of "the blank space," or of the "optical illusion," as it came to be called. The Soviet Union sought to reduce the amount of time spent on review to two weeks only and, by eliminating the blank space, to blur the separation

The agenda for the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is debated down to the wire at a preparatory session in Madrid in November 1980.

—Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

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Madrid CSCE's shaky start: at left, Swiss delegate Edouard Brunner (left) presents the views of neutral states to Soviet delegate Yuriy Dubinin in a last-ditch attempt to find a working agenda agreeable to both East and West; at right, Spanish Foreign Minister José Pérez Llorca (left) seems to be eying the clock as he formally opens the CSCE session just before midnight on November 11.

—Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

between review and new proposals. The US, and the West generally, sought to have at least six weeks (up to Christmas) for review, and even to continue this discussion after Christmas if necessary. They also wanted a clear-cut division between review and new proposals, so that no delegation could deflect attention from the review debate by talking about new proposals at an early stage of the proceedings.

The third issue, the decision on a follow-up, had been defined by the Belgrade concluding document as a matter to be settled at the preparatory meeting. However, the Soviet Union strongly opposed the listing of this item in the Madrid agenda, while the Western allies and the neutrals were equally insistent that it be included.

The crisis on these issues reached a climax in the period of November 5–10, and although intensely serious, it took on some features of the absurd. Since the conference was supposed to open on November 11 (according to the Belgrade decision), delegates at the preparatory meeting found themselves in a quandary on Monday, November 10, with no agreement on agenda or timetable in sight. The day was saved by the use of the old parliamentary device of stopping the clock. Just before midnight, all clocks in the conference building were stopped, and the committee session then continued far into the night, and again the next morning and afternoon, under the chairmanship of the Hungarian delegate, who had been selected by rotation for the November 10 session. Ultimately, the Western delegates realized that the only way to replace the chairman, whose conduct of the meeting they regarded as not entirely proper, was to start the clock again. This was done late Tuesday.

Another maneuver was employed to make possible the opening of the conference on the appointed day. Although the preparatory meeting was still deadlocked, the Spanish delegate, having obtained a gentleman's agreement, convened the Madrid conference at a quarter to midnight on the 11th, only to adjourn it two or three minutes later. The weary delegates at once resumed their task of seeking an agreement on timetable and agenda. When their efforts were unsuccessful, the conference proceeded with its opening ceremonies on the 12th and with its public plenary sessions during the ensuing few days.

Until late Friday afternoon, the 14th, however, it was not certain that the Madrid conference would in fact continue after the conclusion of the general debate. In the nick of time, a compromise proposal on procedure and agenda, submitted by a group of neutral and nonaligned countries, legitimized the continuance of the conference the following week, this time in closed plenary session.

The actual settlement, embodied in a book bound in violet, and hence likely to be dubbed the "Violet Book," was viewed by some as a victory for the West, and by others as a victory for the East—thus suggesting that it was a genuine compromise. Certainly, the Yellow Book was not adopted unchanged, but the changes were not great. The two phases of the conference were to be separated. The first, which had already begun, would extend for another five weeks, until the Christmas

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break; the other would commence after the meeting resumed on January 27. During the first five weeks, it was agreed, new proposals could be submitted but not discussed; during the sixth week, the last before Christmas, introductory explanations of new proposals might be made at the same time the review was being completed. To make the separation of the two tasks more definite, a statement by the chairman reported general understanding that item 5 of the agenda contained "two distinct elements."

Thus, the West had achieved its objective of keeping the two major phases of the conference distinct and had won five weeks for review—somewhat less than the 11 weeks at Belgrade but in fact likely to be adequate. Nor was it excluded that, in the discussion of new proposals, delegates might continue with criticism of past performance in justifying these proposals. For its part, the Soviet Union had secured some changes in the Yellow Book and had whittled the review debate down to less than six weeks (of which one was already over and another, the sixth, would be reduced in scope by simultaneous discussion of new proposals).

As at Belgrade, the agreed timetable included a day-by-day grid of regular plenary meetings and the meetings of five subsidiary working bodies (dealing with security, economics, humanitarian issues, Mediterranean questions, and the follow-up to Madrid), so that a systematic review of the entire Final Act was assured. But there was an initial procedural squabble during the first week in the first committee over the sequence of discussion of the two main themes, the Ten Principles of Basket I and the confidence-building measures (cbm's).[10] The West sought separate discussion of the two and emphasis on the principles, while the Soviet Union wanted a combined discussion of both and emphasis on cbm's. It was eventually decided that during the pre-Christmas sessions more time would be allotted to principles, since the review of military measures was likely to be less time-consuming. However, it was recognized that in the discussion of new proposals after Christmas, proposals relating to disarmament and cbm's would inevitably take up the major share of the time.

In all other respects, the rules of procedure remained unchanged. The rule of unanimity or consensus was to prevail, so "decisions" could be made only if none of the 35 states objected. At the earlier follow-up, in Belgrade, a statement by the chairman (August 5, 1977) had made clear that "decisions" were to include "conclusions and recommendations." Hence, the veto power was much more comprehensive than in the United Nations. All countries, large or small, possessed it, and it was to be applied to procedural as well as to substantive questions. As for the issue of a third follow-up conference, it was agreed to include in the agenda a discussion of "other meetings." The matters of date and place were dealt with in a statement by the chairman, who reported a general consensus that they would be discussed during the Madrid proceedings.

In accordance with procedures used at earlier conferences, most meetings of the Madrid conference were to be closed to all but accredited delegates. Only the inaugural and closing plenary sessions were to be open to the public and to the press. Thus, the main sources of information about the conference have been leaks, briefings, press conferences, and interviews with delegates. As a result, the interest of the world media has been more or less minimal except at times of high crisis such as the period November 5–10, 1980.

Public Opinion and Madrid

Despite the rules, however, there have been other factors which have opened up the proceedings to the public more than many had intended. The United States delegation, in striking contrast to all others, has at times included not only professional diplomats but also 8 members of Congress and a number of staff from the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 30 "public" representatives as full members. There has thus been a kind of built-in "lobby" for human rights and Basket III matters, and the non-diplomatic members have to some extent served as a conduit for information about what has been happening behind closed doors. The American delegation, through a press officer, has given detailed briefings after every committee meeting and distributed texts of American speeches, to the discomfiture of the Soviet and some Western delegations. Still more significant has been the presence among the journalists of many representatives of ethnic newspapers in the US and Canada and of human rights organizations, who have been able to keep in close touch with delegates and to exert some influence. Other persons, too, such as Mrs. A. Shcharansky and the sister of Raoul Wallenberg, have been admitted to the conference center as "visitors" or "VIP's" and, once inside, could buttonhole delegates and hold press conferences.

This is not all. During the critical 10 days at the opening of the conference a veritable "counterconference"

[10] The Helsinki Final Act consisted of agreements in three general areas, or "baskets." Basket I covered ten general principles to govern interstate relations (which included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) and security matters. Basket II dealt with cooperation in the realms of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Basket III encompassed cooperation in humanitarian and other related fields.

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was taking place in Madrid as groups and individuals gathered to lobby the CSCE delegates, transforming the city, in the words of *Le Monde,* into "a city of dissidence."[11] There converged on Madrid a large number of celebrated Soviet dissidents in exile (Gen. P. Grigorenko, L. Alekseyeva, V. Bukovskiy, N. Gorbanevskaya, L. Plyushch, and others), exiles from Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland, and representatives of various ethnic groups and human rights organizations, such as the Helsinki Watch, the Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte, and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Although this gathering was not so dramatic or as well-publicized as similar parallel meetings at earlier international conferences in Stockholm and Vancouver, it nonetheless exerted considerable influence on world public opinion.

These groups and individuals conducted press conferences, gave interviews to the press, and held public meetings to discuss human rights and détente. There was an exhibit of *samizdat* literature, a concert in honor of human rights activists, and a few hunger strikes and demonstration marches in various parts of the city. A Latvian cut his wrists outside the congress center; others put up a huge banner of protest against Soviet occupation of the Baltic states on the stadium opposite the congress hall. Six Canadian Latvian girls attended a public session in national costume and attracted the attention of the cameramen of the mass media. The death of Andrey Amalrik, who was killed in an automobile accident en route to the conference, was the occasion of a service in Russian in a small Russian Orthodox church in Madrid. This memorial tribute was attended by the American delegate Max Kampelman and other delegates.

An important event was the founding of the International Helsinki Association, under the honorary presidency of Dr. Sakharov, and including on its board well-known former dissidents and human rights advocates from most West European and North American countries. Its main purpose was to monitor the Helsinki accords and to establish a bureau for complaints concerning violations of the Final Act. It was also designed to promote assistance for those persecuted in Communist countries and to seek an amnesty for them.

[11] *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 12, 1980.

Participants in a human rights "counterconference" in Madrid during the CSCE meeting are interviewed for Spanish television. From left to right: Aleksandr Ginzburg (with his back to the camera), one of five Soviet prisoners released to the US in 1979; General P. S. Grigorenko, an exiled Soviet dissident; Aishe Seytmuratova, an émigré Crimean Tatar rights activist; Barbara Torunczyk, a Polish dissident; Vladas Sakalys, a Soviet Lithuanian defector; and Eduard Kuznetsov, a Soviet Jewish human rights activist (he was exchanged along with Ginzburg).

—Freedom House photo.

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Dissent and Madrid

One of the important consequences of the Helsinki Final Act had been the creation of private citizens' monitoring committees not only in the West but also in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[12] These included not only the groups in Moscow and in Lithuania, Georgia, the Ukraine, and Armenia, but also Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the Movement for the Defense of Civil and Human Rights (ROPCiO) in Poland. They served as a source of detailed information on the violations of human rights in their respective countries, and as Madrid drew nigh, they drafted a number of proposals for consideration by the conference. Conversely, the trial and imprisonment of many members of the Soviet monitoring groups and of Charter 77 presented Madrid with a challenge that could not be ignored.

Before the opening of the preparatory meeting, the Moscow Helsinki group issued a statement on August 20, 1980, rejecting the idea of a boycott of the Madrid conference and describing the gathering as a forum useful for drawing public attention to human rights. The document urged that Madrid confirm the link between human rights and détente and treat human rights as a matter of international law. More concretely, it called for the conference to censure gross violations of human rights and organize an international tribunal to hear concrete cases, it sought acknowledgment of the right of the Helsinki monitoring groups to function, and it pressed for an amnesty for all prisoners of conscience and for an international commission to verify documents issued by the groups.[13]

Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 on September 17, 1980, soon after the opening of the preparatory meeting, sent a letter to President Gustav Husak urging him to cancel the unjust sentences imposed on Vaclav Havel, Jaroslav Sabata, and other Chartists and to terminate proceedings against Rudolf Battek and others. In addition, it called for the signatories of the Helsinki accords to reach an agreement to bring their legislation and their administrative practices into line with Principle VII and the international human rights covenants, as well as with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It recommended the formation of a "coordinating body," comparable to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to assist in this work. Finally, it proposed that the Madrid conferees "legitimize and support the 'citizens' initiative groups," and establish a means of communication between them and the organs of the conference dealing with Basket III—along the lines of the relations between the UN Economic and Social Council and nongovernmental organizations.[14]

Shortly thereafter, three Chartist prisoners, V. Benda, J. Dienstbier, and V. Havel, who were confined in the same jail, smuggled out a letter addressed directly to the delegates in Madrid. This suggested that all the Helsinki signatory states accept a commitment to submit lists of political prisoners and agree at Madrid to establish a commission to study the physical conditions of their incarceration and the state of their health, and to investigate the justice of their detention from the point of view of the laws of the country concerned and of the Helsinki Final Act and international covenants.[15]

These various proposals were brought to the attention of the conference in diverse ways. Not only did the dissidents from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe help to circulate them, but ethnic organizations in the West and even Western delegates with connections with such groups served as conduits.

The Negotiating Process

The process of negotiation at Madrid has resembled that of Belgrade in most respects. Delegations have ranged in size from the large Soviet and American delegations, some 50 strong during the first phase, to the Maltese, which has consisted of a single person who has functioned without even secretarial assistance. Although each delegation has kept in touch with its home office on major lines of policy, the delegations have, in varying degree, had a certain freedom of maneuver on specific issues. Each has been immersed in constant negotiations with other delegations—allies, adversaries, and nonaligned alike—and in frequent caucuses of the groups to which it belongs. Although meetings in plenum and in committee have been important, a great deal of the most effective work has been accomplished through group caucuses and informally over coffee, drinks, or meals.

The main alignments have been (1) the NATO group (15 members, plus Spain, which hopes soon to join the Western alliance); (2) the European Community group (9 members, plus Greece, which became a member of

[12] For a full description of these groups, see Virginia A. Leary, "The Right of the Individual to Know and Act Upon His Rights and Duties: Monitoring Groups and the Helsinki Final Act," *Vanderbilt Journal*, special issue cited, pp. 375–95.

[13] *A Thematic Survey of the Documents of the Moscow Helsinki Group*, Washington, DC, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 12, 1981, pp. 27–29. The document was originally issued on August 20 by the Moscow Helsinki Group and signed by Elena Bonner, Sofiya Kalistratova, Ivan Kovalev, and Feliks Serebrov.

[14] H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 162-64.

[15] Ibid, p. 163.

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Members of the US delegation prepare to take their places for the official opening of the Madrid CSCE Conference on the night of November 11, 1980. From left to right: R. Spencer Oliver, delegation chief Griffin B. Bell, and Max M. Kampelman.

—Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

the EEC in January 1981); (3) the Soviet bloc delegation, tightly knit and disciplined with the exception of Romania, which has often acted almost like a nonaligned country; and (4) the neutral and nonaligned group (NNA), which has included neutrals such as Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, nonaligned states such as Yugoslavia, and sometimes the Holy See, and mini-states such as Liechtenstein and Monaco.

The American delegation has not been affected by the presidential elections. Madrid did not become an issue during the electoral campaign, and although there had been calls for withdrawal in line with the boycott of the Olympics, the Republican program was positive regarding Madrid. After January, President Ronald Reagan made no major change in policy.

Initially, the American delegation was headed by Griffin Bell, a close friend of President Jimmy Carter from Georgia and Attorney General during the first years of the Carter administration. His "cochairman," and second in command, was Max Kampelman, a prominent Washington lawyer and well-known Democrat who had been active in Jewish affairs. Both were entirely new to the CSCE process, and indeed to diplomacy in general. One of the next two in rank was Warren Zimmermann, a career diplomat who had no direct experience in handling CSCE and related issues but had served in Moscow and several other European capitals. The other, Spencer Oliver, staff director of the Washington Commission, although not a diplomat by profession, had the experience of Belgrade behind him and an intimate knowledge of the issues at Madrid.

Under the new administration, Griffin Bell withdrew as chairman, but Kampelman remained, as de facto chief of the delegation. Representative Dante Fascell (Florida) continued as the head of the Congressional contingent, although he came to Madrid for short visits only.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichëv, was also new to the CSCE process and, like his American counterpart, had to learn on the spot. Of a higher political stature than his predecessor at Belgrade (Yuliy Vorontsov), he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March. His colleague next in rank, Yuriy Dubinin, ambassador to Spain, was also new to the game, but the third-ranking delegate, S.A. Kondrashev, had been at Belgrade.

Major Soviet policies have been outlined by Leonid Brezhnev in several speeches and in communiques of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Soviet delegation has received instructions from the appropriate ministries in Moscow. The Soviet bloc as a whole has shown a high degree of discipline. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic have toed the Soviet line without deviation, but Hungary and Poland have demonstrated at least the appearance of independent action.

The intransigence of the Soviet delegation during the preparatory session and the later switch which made the opening of the conference possible are difficult to explain. Perhaps the initial hard line was due to the crisis in Poland, which eased at least temporarily as events came to a head in Madrid at the same time. Moscow may have been waiting for the state of affairs there to clarify before finally committing itself to the opening of Madrid. The American election and uncertainties about American policy may also have played a part in the situation. As for the change in the Soviet stance, the Politburo perhaps hoped to establish a business-like relationship with the new Reagan administration and concluded that torpedoing Madrid (or invading Poland) would destroy any chances of forging such a relationship. Moreover, the Soviet government, and Brezhnev personally, had invested much in the CSCE from the beginning and hence were not willing to terminate the process by preventing a meeting at Madrid. They probably also were eager to secure approval of a conference on disarmament and anticipated economic and technological benefits from the preservation and expansion of measures under Basket II. In return, they were willing to pay the costs of criticism of their behavior in the areas covered by Baskets I and III.

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No doubt they hoped as well to get the most favorable conditions possible for Madrid by holding out to the last minute, and in the much longer run to exploit the CSCE process in their own interests.

Phase I: Review of Performance

According to the agreed agenda and timetable, the review of the performance of CSCE signatories began in closed plenary session (the public debate was already completed) and then continued in greater detail and more systematic fashion in the committees. The Soviet delegate had warned against "a verbal bullfight (*corrida*)" and had called for a "business-like" procedure which would emphasize what had been accomplished under the Final Act. In fact, as the West desired, there followed, in a kind of reprise of Belgrade, four weeks of searching examination of the record, with the criticism flowing mainly from the West to the East. Although the discussion dealt with the specific commitments of the Final Act (e.g., the treatment of foreign journalists, and procedures for emigration), such topics raised, implicitly or explicitly, significant questions of principle touching on the free flow of information and the fate of individuals. The West gave praise as well as censure, and it differentiated between individual Communist states, exempting Yugoslavia entirely from challenge, subjecting Poland and Hungary, and even Romania, to mild criticism only, and sharply castigating Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union.

The Communist states, even the most hard-line ones, sat through the barrage of criticism and did not walk out of the meeting, but the review debate did not become the "dialogue" for which the West had hoped. Instead of trying to refute specific charges, the Communist states usually preferred to enumerate their own achievements in observing the Final Act and occasionally responded with criticism of Western practices, especially those of the United States. They continued to voice their long-standing objection to censure of their domestic policies by other signatories, even if it related to specific commitments under the Final Act.

Discussion in the second committee, dealing with Basket II (on economic affairs), was the most matter-of fact and the least polemical. The Soviet Union tended to strike a positive note, stressing the growth of East-West trade and the agreements which it had concluded with individual countries, and discoursing on the amount of information available. It indulged in some criticism of Western protectionism, such as the failure to grant most-favored-nation treatment to all Soviet bloc countries and the post-Afghanistan economic sanctions imposed on the USSR. The West found fault with the limits on economic information in Eastern Europe, the obstacles to business contacts, and the preferences given to large countries and large firms, at the expense of small states and enterprises. There was much adverse comment on the so-called "counterpurchase" system employed by Soviet bloc countries, a barter-like arrangement which linked exports and imports and constituted a kind of veiled protectionism.

Discussion in the third committee, covering Basket III (on human contacts and information), was more controversial. Western delegates condemned limitations by the Soviet bloc on the flow of information, noting restrictions on the import of newspapers and periodicals and especially the resumption of the jamming of radio transmissions. Soviet delegates replied that the West was unduly stressing certain parts of the Final Act at the expense of others, and they argued that the flow of information would increase as détente developed.

On human contacts, the Soviet spokesman insisted that each government, under the Final Act, was entitled to determine its own laws, without outside intervention. The USSR, he argued, was in fact dealing with such matters as family reunification in a humanitarian spirit and placed no obstacles to reunification or to marriage with foreigners (15,000 such reunifications or marriages had taken place in recent years). Tourism was not restricted. Sixteen million foreigners had visited the Soviet Union in the past four years, and 12 million Soviet citizens had traveled abroad.

Western delegates, however, pointed out less favorable aspects of the situation in the Soviet bloc countries. They mentioned specifically limitations on the right to leave and to return freely to one's country. Although they acknowledged that conditions had improved in some instances, there were still time-consuming and expensive controls on the movement of people, and administrative barriers which hindered travel and family reunification.

It was in the first committee—which handled the two main aspects of Basket I, the Ten Principles and confidence-building measures—that the tone of the debate was sharpest and most polemical. There was really not too much to discuss in connection with the cbm's, for the Helsinki commitments had been limited and had for the most part been honored by all concerned. In the discussion of the principles, the condemnation of the Soviet Union was quite severe. The United States was joined by most Western states, whether associated with NATO, neutral, or nonaligned, in invoking the principles and citing cases of the breach of specific clauses. During the open plenary debate, for instance, the majority

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of Western delegates denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan directly, and others did so at least indirectly, without mentioning names. In this debate, too, 16 countries censured Soviet violations of human rights, mentioning specifically the persecution of Helsinki monitors or human rights advocates.

As an example of the strained atmosphere in this committee, it is worth mentioning the speech of Spencer Oliver on Principle VII and the Soviet reply. Oliver noted that the CSCE Commission had conducted a searching examination of American implementation of Helsinki, and that the Wilmington Ten, whose imprisonment the Soviet Union had criticized, had been released. Then he went on to express profound disappointment at the repeated Soviet violations of Principle VII and other human rights provisions of the Final Act. In particular, he cited the persecution of Andrey Sakharov and members of the several Helsinki groups in the Soviet Union, of Crimean Tatar and Baptist activists, and of the organizers of an independent trade union. He also condemned the conditions under which religious believers live in the Soviet Union, mentioning not only Catholic and Orthodox believers but Baptists, Pentecostals, and Adventists as well. Although he welcomed a few encouraging signs in the treatment by East European governments of their Jewish populations, he censured what British and Canadian delegates had already labeled "officially sanctioned anti-Semitism" in the Soviet Union. In addition, he deplored the imprisonment of Charter 77 members in Czechoslovakia and the persecution of Chartists in general.

The Soviet delegate responded with a vituperative 45-minute tirade, during which he charged the United States and Great Britain with using Principle VII for cold war purposes and to conduct a struggle against socialism. The principle, he maintained, referred only to "gross and massive violations" such as mass unemployment or racism. Moreover, he charged that the United States had ratified only a handful of the international conventions on human rights. "We all know about the United States," he said, "where it was not possible to walk through Central Park," and "we are glad" to live in "our monastic society." Spencer Oliver, exercising his right of reply, observed that while the United States had not ratified the UN covenants on human rights, the President had declared that it would adhere to the provisions of these pacts and would use them as criteria to measure its own performance.

There was a certain air of unreality about the review debate. Although the Polish crisis hovered over Madrid like a cloud and was the subject of concern and discussion in the corridors, it was hardly mentioned in the deliberations of the first phase of the conference. (After Christmas, however, Western delegations censured the Soviet Union for the conduct of military maneuvers in and around Poland without informing other governments, as required under the Helsinki Final Act—thereby violating Principle II, which forbade the use of force, or the threat of its use, in interstate relations.) In fact, only the Polish delegate referred briefly and ambiguously to the Polish process of "renewal." He praised Poland's alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union as making possible this development without outside interference. Other countries, even though alarmed by the threat of armed Soviet intervention, did not speak explicitly of this threat, or even of the movements of troops in Poland and adjacent border areas. The repeated condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan, however, was also an implicit warning to the USSR not to invade Poland. Several speakers even went so far as to caution that a "new Afghanistan" would pose a grave threat to détente. At the same time, no one openly praised, or even as much as noted, in the review debates the giant step forward that Poland had taken in respect to human rights as a result of the August events, although it was a classic example of the kind of progress for which the Final Act stood.

Phase II: Discussion of New Proposals

According to the agreed timetable, the discussion of new proposals was to begin in the subsidiary working bodies when the meeting resumed on January 27 and to be concluded by February 12. These bodies would then commence drafting the individual proposals and eventually formulating the conference's concluding document. The entire meeting was to end if possible by March 5.

In fact, this target date and later ones passed without agreement. No work had begun on the concluding document when the meeting recessed on April 10 to resume again on May 5.

The slowness of the proceedings was due in part to the plethora of new proposals—more than 80 in all. Of these, 19 were in Basket I, including 7 on confidence-building measures, 6 on human rights, and 6 others. There were 27 in Basket II, ranging widely from ones on energy to ones on the role of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The largest number, 30, related to Basket III. These included 5 on information, 8 on human contacts, and 6 on cultural exchanges. In addition, there were 5 proposals dealing with the Mediterranean and 2 with the follow-up to Madrid.

A more significant cause of delay was the controversial character of some of the proposals under Basket I.

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A landing of amphibious armored personnel carriers on the Polish seacoast during the March 1981 Soyuz-81 joint maneuvers of Warsaw Treaty forces of Poland, the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

—SYGMA.

Particularly significant here were those relating to confidence-building measures and the proposed disarmament conference and those relating to human rights. The Soviet Union attached the highest priority to the former, and the West regarded the latter as indispensable conditions of a final consensus.

The cluster of measures relating to "military détente" were designed to extend the provisions of Basket I of the Final Act having to do with confidence-building measures and with security and disarmament. In their original form, these provisions of the Final Act had been limited and for the most part voluntary in nature. Only in one case—namely military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops—did they commit states to notify other signatories. Other steps, such as invitation of observers to large-scale maneuvers and notification of major military movements (as distinct from formal maneuvers) or of smaller-scale maneuvers, were entirely optional. Moreover, the Final Act referred to "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" as an ultimate goal only.

The idea of expanding these measures of military détente was particularly attractive to most European countries, for all of whom—East and West, allied and neutral—security ranked high on their list of priorities, often ahead of economic or humanitarian cooperation. No less than five proposals were advanced for the convocation of a conference on disarmament in Europe. The most notable came from Poland and France, but Romania, Yugoslavia, and Sweden also put forth variants.

The proposals for a disarmament conference varied a good deal in substantiveness and preciseness of content. Almost all envisaged two distinct phases, beginning with confidence-building measures and proceeding to measures of actual disarmament only in the second phase, presumably after achievement of satisfactory results in the first. The French proposal focused essentially on confidence-building measures. Only the Yugoslav centered directly on disarmament (reduction

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of armed forces and armaments), foreseeing a first phase of "transitional measures" which would limit military activities and establish military disengagement. The Yugoslavs suggested that a preparatory meeting of experts be held to define the conference's agenda and mandate more precisely. Most of the proposals (with the exception of the Polish) linked the future conference directly with the CSCE process by recommending that any accords reached be referred to the next follow-up meeting (although the French, Romanian and Swedish plans stated that the measures endorsed might enter into force immediately). Two of the proposals, the French and the Swedish, incorporated principles which had been enunciated by the NATO powers at their Ankara meeting in June 1980—namely, that the measures adopted by an eventual conference (or at Madrid) would be "binding" (the Swedish draft used the phrase "political commitment"), militarily significant, and verifiable through varying monitoring measures (in the French case, the use of observers; in the Swedish, the compulsory notification of maneuvers and movements). The Polish proposal was the least precise of all. It specified the place and date of the conference—Warsaw in October 1981—but made no reference to monitoring and left almost every issue open for decision at the conference itself.

Perhaps the most controversial question related to the area to be covered by future cbm's. This was usually defined as Europe, or the whole of Europe, including adjacent air and sea space (Romania) and European waters (Austria). The military measures of the Helsinki Final Act had applied to the European territories of the signatory states, except for the USSR, where they had applied only to the area within 250 kilometers of its European borders. The Austrian proposal defined European waters as the "inner seas" (Baltic, North, and Black), the Mediterranean, and the ocean areas adjacent ot the European states. Most far-reaching was the French proposal. It made cbm's applicable to the entire European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, thus covering the whole of the European USSR. The Polish proposal did not specify the area involved, and according to a statement of the Polish delegate at a press conference, Poland would leave the matter open until the actual conference.

Two other proposals, a second by Romania and one by Austria in the name of the NNA states, did not propose a conference but dealt exclusively with cbm's, to be decided presumably at Madrid. The Austrian draft was a very detailed plan seeking to improve the Helsinki provisions in several substantive and precise ways. Maneuvers or movement exceeding 18,000 troops, as well as smaller maneuvers or movements taking place more or less at the same time in geographically related areas, must be announced to other signatories, and observers were to be invited. Such obligations were to apply even to naval exercises which involved amphibious forces and included 5,000 troops and/or 10 major amphibious vessels. The Romanian proposal required notification of major military movements, as well as air and naval maneuvers, although there was no precise definition of size, and banned multinational military maneuvers near the frontiers of other states and the establishment of new military bases.

Six proposals concerning human rights ranged from relatively simple affirmations of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief (the Holy See) and commitments to the right to work and the elimination of discrimination in education (Romania) to the more controversial recommendation that all states should accede to the international human rights covenants (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic). Of the several proposals from the Western countries, one, sponsored initially by Canada and later cosponsored by Spain and the United States, called for a meeting of experts, made up of official delegates and representatives of private groups, to last for four to six weeks. It would recommend ways and means to enhance respect for human rights and would conduct an exchange of views on human rights and on the role of governments, institutions, and persons in their protection. This draft referred to Principle VII of the Final Act and specifically to the clause which asserted "the right of the individual to know and to act." Another proposal offered by the EEC and cosponsored by Canada, the United States, and others (16 in all), provided for measures to improve implementation of the Final Act in regard to human rights, and for the removal of measures jeopardizing the rights of the citizen to monitor implementation and publicize his views on these matters. Still another proposal, by the United States and cosponsored by Denmark and Norway, called for bilateral round-table meetings of experts from the foreign ministries and the parliamentary and private sectors to discuss human rights.

Basket II proposals were highly diversified in character. The subjects included a high-level meeting on energy (Poland and the USSR); cooperation in the field of energy (Austria); improvement of the conditions of migrant labor (Spain and Portugal; Finland and Sweden; Yugoslavia); development of the work of the ECE (Luxembourg et al.; Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic; Denmark et al.); the use of arbitration in commercial matters (Luxembourg et al.; Sweden); improvement of business contacts (Luxembourg et al.); encouragement of the role of small and

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middle-sized firms (Denmark et al.; Bulgaria and Hungary); promotion of industrial cooperation (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; Romania); development of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation (Bulgaria and the USSR; Romania); North-South cooperation (Yugoslavia).

As for Basket III, proposals ranged broadly but tended to focus on quite specific issues. Among the topics were improving the process of application for family meetings, family reunification, and marriage (EEC countries and others); encouraging meetings of young people (EEC and Greece; Romania; Hungary and the USSR); facilitating the dissemination of newspapers (Austria et al.) and access to printed matter (EEC et al.; Luxembourg et al.); the use of the mass media for "positive purposes" (German Democratic Republic and the USSR); termination of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (the USSR); cultural cooperation (Bulgaria; Poland); a cultural forum (France; Yugoslavia); educational and scientific cooperation such as travel by students and scholars (EEC et al.); exchange of textbooks (German Democratic Republic); reaffirmation of the conclusions of the Hamburg Scientific Forum (EEC and Greece); teaching of less widely-studied languages (Finland and Hungary); cooperation regarding the content of textbooks (the USSR); measures to prohibit war propaganda in the media and outlawing of fascist organizations (Romania); study of the problems of the younger generation (Bulgaria).

Diplomatic Deadlock

When delegates recessed on April 10, little progress had been registered in the drafting committees on the contentious issues relating to military détente and human rights. There had been informal agreement on less controversial matters, such as the proposal of a Mediterranean meeting in Venice, a cultural forum in Paris, a meeting of experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes (to be held perhaps on Mount Athos in Greece), and a Spanish draft of a statement on terrorism. These, however, were only tentatively approved and subject to final approval when the more controversial matters had been settled.

Just before the recess, the NNA group (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and others) tabled a 30-page draft of a concluding document which had been circulating informally. This included a list of topics on which agreement either had been provisionally reached or might eventually be reached, such as family reunification, working conditions of journalists, cultural and scientific exchanges, and the projected disarmament conference. It afforded at least something for study during the Easter break, and the sponsors hoped that it might contribute to an ultimate compromise.

When the conference resumed on May 5, it became obvious that the impasse had not been broken. Neither the United States nor the USSR was ready to submit its own version of a concluding document. The NNA draft did serve as at least an informal basis of discussions, particularly with regard to the disarmament conference, and work did resume in the drafting committees. But profound disagreements emerged. There appeared to be no prospect of an early successful conclusion of the conference.

As the days dragged on and the length of the deliberations exceeded even the duration of Belgrade, anxiety to bring the gathering to a close grew. However, no one was willing to assume the responsibility for breaking off without agreement, and a lingering hope persisted that agreement might eventually be achieved.

The major stumbling block was the question of the disarmament conference, for the sake of which the USSR had endured the unwelcome review debate. Without a satisfactory bargain on this issue, the USSR would obviously not agree to anything else, including even a follow-up to Madrid.

The Polish draft proposal on the conference had left the nature of the conference vague and ill-defined—without "pre-conditions," as the Poles put it. Although the main theme of the first phase would presumably be the cbm's, there would be an almost automatic transition to the second "disarmament" phase.

During the discussions, there gradually emerged an apparent Soviet willingness to accept the "principles" on which the Western allies insisted. The key problem became the zone to be covered by additional confidence-building measures. Brezhnev's acceptance, in his report to the 26th CPSU Congress at the end of February, of the area "from the Atlantic to the Urals" had awakened some hope at first,[16] but the Soviet delegation soon intimated that, in return, it expected the zone to encompass the North Atlantic and even North America—a suggestion which the United States explicitly rejected.

Throughout these tiring months, the unity of the Western allies was maintained. The Reagan administration had endorsed the French proposal, and the French showed no sign of making any concessions of their own to win Soviet acceptance. Since the NNA draft also approached the stance of the Western allies, there was virtual consensus among all states other than the Soviet

[16] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981.

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bloc concerning the nature of the proposed disarmament conference.

The Western allies agreed, specifically, that the disarmament conference must on no account be a mere propaganda forum, but should operate according to the principles enunciated by the French draft and on the basis of a tightly defined agenda. Moreover, it was hoped that the first phase, on cbm's, would produce new measures much stronger than those of Helsinki or those advanced by the NNA and other drafts. (Although the NATO allies had a detailed package of cbm's ready, they did not want to discuss them at Madrid. Instead, they preferred to reserve them as the main topic for the disarmament conference.) The transition to a second phase of "disarmament" should not be automatic but must be conditional on concrete results in the first phase and the outcome of an explicit decision at the next follow-up. Warsaw, incidentally, was not regarded as a suitable site, partly for security reasons. However, it was deemed perhaps acceptable as the scene of an opening ceremony, to be followed by working sessions in Stockholm.

Members of the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes. From left to right, Feliks Serebrov, Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, and Irina Grivnina. Serebrov, one of the very few Helsinki monitors in the USSR to remain at large, was arrested in January 1981 and sentenced to four years in prison and five years in exile by Soviet authorities in July, as the Madrid CSCE meeting was about to adjourn.

—ARC.

At the end of July, in a last-ditch attempt to break the deadlock over the disarmament conference, the American delegation informed the Soviet delegation of US willingness to consider prior notification of any NATO maneuvers in the air and seas adjacent to European territory to take place in conjunction with land maneuvers on the European continent. But the Soviet representatives reiterated their demand for the inclusion of the North Atlantic and North America. This stance blocked a compromise and seemed almost designed to torpedo the entire Madrid meeting. Nonetheless, the Western countries presumably did not take it as dashing all hopes of an eventual consensus and reluctantly resigned themselves to a recess until the fall as the only alternative to total failure.

The issue of human rights received less attention but constituted an equally large obstacle in the way of ultimate agreement. Continued Soviet repression of the Helsinki monitors in the USSR and the wave of arrests in Czechoslovakia in April and May were the subject of severe condemnation by Max Kampelman of the United States in his opening address in early May. West Europeans and Canadians, after some initial uncertainty, had gradually come around to a mutual acceptance of each other's specific recommendations on human rights. However, the NNA draft barely mentioned the subject, so it could not serve as a basis for discussion on this issue.

The Western allies left no doubt that they would reject a post-Madrid military security meeting, in whatever form, without receiving something in return on human rights. The American initiative at the end of July again made this clear by insisting on a balance of advantage in a final document. That is, there should be a substantive gathering on the subject of human rights of equal weight to a military security conference. In its reply, the USSR delegation indicated that there would be no concessions on human rights without satisfactory movement on the security issue. Two events in the closing days of the meeting emphasized the continuing harshness of Soviet bloc policy and the unlikelihood that the Soviet bloc states would accept any Western proposals designed to recognize and protect advocates of human rights. In the USSR, Feliks Serebrov, one of the last Helsinki monitors still free, was tried and sentenced to four years in prison and five in exile; in Czechoslovakia, Chartist spokesman Rudolf Battek was tried and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison and three years of internal exile.

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Last Chance in the Autumn

The double deadlock at Madrid has made it evident that achievement of a consensus after the resumption of talks in October will be difficult in the extreme. Neither East nor West will agree to commitments under Basket II and III without agreement on issues under Basket I, and with regard to Basket I the West will not accept a disarmament conference without a clear-cut agenda and without Soviet concessions on human rights. In short, it seems to me that the crucial first step will have to be an agreement on the disarmament conference, followed by an accord on human rights, so that other less controversial items may then be added to a final document fuller and more meaningful than that adopted at Belgrade. Only such a mutually acceptable package can open the way for another follow-up in two or three years, for the Soviet Union has made its consent to such a follow-up conditional on concrete results at Madrid. (It is doubtful, however, that the West will accept Bucharest as a site for such a meeting in view of Romania's repressive policy and the unlikelihood that the Romanian government will provide such access for human rights activists as they have enjoyed at Madrid. Although Belgium has also offered its capital as a venue, Vienna is more likely to be selected as a compromise.)

The decision to recess until the autumn suggested that no country has entirely given up hope of ultimate agreement. Only an optimist could believe, however, that the renewal of discussions will overcome differences that have blocked agreement for so many months and produce a final consensus that, like Helsinki, would represent a genuine balancing of interests.

Alternative outcomes are conceivable. One would be a failure to reach accord on the main issues and a decision to conclude with a Belgrade-style communique, merely confirming the obligations of Helsinki and agreeing to meet again in several years. Perhaps the neutrals and some members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact consider the Helsinki process worth continuation at almost any cost.

But would the United States, the Soviet Union, or many of the Western allies be willing to pay the price in time, effort, and money of still another conference such as Belgrade and Madrid after results so meager? Would American and other Western leaders be able to convince a disillusioned public, or Soviet leaders their hardline colleagues, of the desirability of such a course? The chances seem more likely that, in the absence of an agreement that represents a real compromise of interests, there will be a total breakdown of the CSCE process and the end of one of the last vestiges of détente.

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Arab Communism at Low Ebb

By Arnold Hottinger

Arab Communism has in recent years found itself at a low ebb of power and influence. In a number of Arab countries, there still appears to be no organized Communist movement at all. In most, Communist parties are proscribed and forced to lead a clandestine existence. In a few others, they are legal but closely controlled by the ruling regimes; in fact, some of these parties have come under severe persecution in the last several years. Only in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) does a Marxist—let alone a Communist—party hold power, and the PDRY is a special case, which owes much to unique local conditions and Soviet strategic interests.

However, the Arab Communists have not always been in such a forlorn state. On occasion, in different countries at different times, they have enjoyed a modest measure of success. Thus, it is important to understand how and why they have suffered such a decline. Moreover, their varied fortunes in the past raise the question whether they are destined to remain as weak and tractable as they have been in recent years. This article will explore these issues in some depth.

Communists and Radicals

Although Arab Communist parties have never been very powerful, there have been periods when they exercised considerable influence. They achieved their successes principally in countries with fairly conservative regimes and in which semifeudal privileges survived, and they owed their influence chiefly to their agitation for social reform (through revolution) and full national independence (from "colonialism"). Not infrequently, they were the first, the most revolutionary, the best organized, and the most self-sacrificing of the various opposition groups.

This uncompromising stance against social injustice and the vestiges of colonial power and privilege often earned the Communists a considerable measure of popularity. To be sure, the Arab Communist parties were well known for their ties with the Soviet Union. In some instances, moreover, the Soviet connection was a definite liability—for example, when in 1948 the Soviet Union extended diplomatic recognition to Israel immediately upon US recognition, called on the Arab Communist parties to support its action, and urged the Arab world formally to acknowledge the existence of Israel. To much of the Arab populace, however, the Communists' call for freedom and social justice was primary, and the Soviet connection, only secondary.[1]

Within several years, however, most Arab countries—and the most populous ones—were witness to reformist and "socialist" revolutions, often with involvement by the military. In many cases, the new regimes moved quickly to advocate and attempt social reforms

[1] The voluminous work of Hanna Batatu documents with exceptional clarity and rigor the mechanisms by which the Iraqi Communists, in advocating social and anticolonial revolutions, gained this early popularity; it also describes the setbacks that followed upon their acceptance of the Soviet policy line, which was not popular in the Middle East. See Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists and Free Officers*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 485–1113, and especially the sections on Fahd (Yussuf Yussuf Salman, the veteran Communist leader hanged in Baghdad in 1941) and on the later revolutionary movements.

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

Examples of social changes in Arab lands that have undermined the appeal of communism: at left, a worker and a soldier stand at the Syrian pipeline terminal of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in June 1972, several days after all IPC facilities in Iraq and Syria had been nationalized by the respective governments; at right, former nomads at work on the November 24th cooperative farm in the Algerian Sahara.

—ADN/Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

and to conduct vigorous anticolonial and anti-imperialist foreign policies. In Egypt, for example, the "revolution" of the Free Officers and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–70) proclaimed sweeping economic and social reforms, enunciated a strident anti-Westernism, and, in 1955, began to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc. In Syria and Iraq, the nationalist officers and Ba'th parties that took power by means of a series of complex coups and countercoups beginning in 1949 (Syria) and in 1958 (Iraq) steered an anticolonialist course, introduced some type of land reform, and at a certain stage nationalized basic industries (including oil, if there was any, and sometimes even foreign trade). In Algeria, the war of independence (which ended in 1962) and the coup against Ahmed Ben Bella (1965) led to the establishment of a radical socialist regime. In Tunisia, radical socialism was tried under Planning and Finance Minister Ahmed Ben Salah after 1962, only to be repudiated in 1969 after repeated economic failures. In Sudan, the radical officers' regime of Gaafar Nimeiri went in the same direction, at least in its initial years after 1968. In Libya, the overthrow of King Idris I in 1969 and the subsequent regime of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi can be viewed as part of the same general phenomenon. In these and other Arab countries, the radical new regimes were at least partly successful in stealing the Communists' thunder.[2]

For the Soviet Union, the emergence of radical and self-styled revolutionary regimes created the possibility of a two-pronged approach to the Arab world. On the one hand, the Soviet Union attempted to cooperate directly with the new regimes. Its efforts in this direction met with no little success, initially with Egypt and Syria, and later with Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen. This direct collaboration with the regimes necessarily went over the head of, and sometimes came into conflict with, the local Communist parties. In the case of South Yemen, even though there was no local Communist party, the conversion of a radical socialist and nationalist party into a Marxist one seems to have been achieved with the help of a series of bloody coups within the ruling party, much outside aid from the Soviet Union, and the introduction of Soviet, Cuban, and East German personnel into the economy, the military, and the security forces.[3]

On the other hand, the Soviet Union continued its ef-

[2] There were, of course, exceptions to the pattern. On the Arabian Peninsula, the old structures survived, reinforced by oil money. In Morocco and Jordan, the royalty managed to stay in power owing to good fortune and tactical skill.

[3] On South Yemen generally, see Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans,* London, Pelican Books, 1975, pp. 153-265; U. Steinbach, R. Hofmeier, and M. Schönborn, Eds., *Politisches Lexikon Nahost* (Political Lexicon of the Near East), Munich, K. G. Sauer, 1979, pp. 134–44, in the chapter by T. Koszinowsky; Colin Legum, Ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey,* New York, NY, and London, Holmes and Meier, Vol. 1 (1976-77), 1978, and Vol. 2 (1977-78), 1979; W. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and His Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism,* London, C. Knight, 1975; and the press, notably *Le Monde* (Paris). See also the vivid account of early revolutionary enthusiasm in South Yemen by E. Rouleau, "Red Star over South Yemen," *Le Monde,* May 27-30, 1972; this series of articles has been translated by MERIP as a pamphlet, *Hitched to A Red Star: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,* Washington, DC, MERIP, 1973.

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forts to strengthen the local Communist parties.[4] Whenever possible, it advocated national fronts, in which the local Communist parties would have a place, even if only as junior partners. For example, national fronts were established in Syria in 1966 under the Ba'th, in Iraq in 1973 under the Ba'th, and in Lebanon on the side of the pro-Arab, nationalist Left during the civil war of 1975 and thereafter. Egypt under Nasser was a special case, because Nasser managed in 1965 to have the Egyptian Communist Party dissolve itself. Later, however, the Soviets persuaded him to introduce a secret "vanguard organization" into the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU), a stratagem by which they hoped eventually to dominate the ASU.[5]

For the local Communist parties, the direct links between Moscow and their own rulers posed considerable difficulties. They had to give up their radical and revolutionary opposition to the local regimes, precisely the stance that had initially made them popular. As mere junior partners, they had to concede to the regimes, their majority partners, all the prestige accruing from attempts at social reform. They frequently had to suffer major restrictions on their propaganda and political activities, restrictions against which, because of the link with Moscow, they found it difficult to protest. As we shall see, such disadvantages made the Arab Communist parties easy targets for radical Arab leaders.

Communist Parties "Tamed"

The new ruling regimes, taking a page from the Communist book, soon learned how to suppress and subordinate competing revolutionary and nationalist parties and groupings. Most of the opposition groups—not only Communists but also nationalists and Nasserites in Syria, nationalists, socialists, and Kurdish Democrats in Iraq, individuals of all persuasions within the ASU and later, under Anwar al-Sadat, controlled political groupings of all varieties in Egypt—were subjected to periods of persecution and imprisonment alternating with periods of strict control, within either a national front or a state party dominated by the state security apparatus.

For the Communist parties, the effect was demoralizing. On the one hand, because they remained under control and supervision, the Communists were less dangerous to the ruling powers than a clandestine opposition would have been. Indeed, the Communist parties, like other members of such national fronts, were transformed into congeries of timid dignitaries, petrified of making any political move lest they lose their sinecures and end up in prison. On the other hand, and for much the same reasons, the Communists lost the appeal they once had among the underprivileged and discontented. They were seen as opportunists, not as an opposition. They were identified solely with the Soviet Union, never a popular image in the nationalistic and Islamic Arab world.

Once the Arab Communists were "tamed," their fortunes became increasingly tied to relations between the ruling regime and the Soviet Union. In periods of friction, they suffered from harsh repressive measures—such was the case in Egypt in 1958 and 1972 (and since), in Syria in 1958, in Iraq in 1963 for a time around the fall of Abdul Karim Kassem and in 1978 (and since), in Algeria after the overthrow of Ben Bella, and in Sudan after the unsuccessful pro-Communist coup against Nimeiri in 1971. In periods of close cooperation, the Arab Communist parties were preserved within the official state structure, but were increasingly consigned to a life of indolence and isolation.

In actuality, good relations between the USSR and the Arab revolutionary regimes so far have endured in only two countries: Syria and South Yemen. In all the others—Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and to a lesser degree Algeria and Tunisia—both the Soviet Union and the local Communist parties have suffered major setbacks. Libya and Lebanon—each for different reasons—have to be classified as undecided cases at present.

In the case of Syria, the close connection with the USSR is conditioned principally by US aid to Israel and Syrian fear of Israel. The Soviets are seen as an indispensable bulwark against the Israelis, particularly since Egypt's withdrawal from the common Arab front against Israel. They are regarded as all the more necessary because Syrian relations with Iraq and, more recently, Jordan are quite tense.

In the case of South Yemen, Israel has not played a comparable part in forcing an alliance with the USSR. Rather, it was a mismanaged passage to independence (mismanaged by Great Britain) that gave the Soviets the opportunity to play godfather to the radical people's

[4] For Soviet relations with the Egyptian Communist Party, see M. Confino and S. Shamir, Eds., *The USSR and the Middle East*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, p. 258 (chapter by P. J. Vatikiotis) and p. 315 (chapter by Shamir). Mohammed Heikal gives several inside looks at Soviet concerns. In 1961, for example, Nikita Khrushchev, referring to arrested Egyptian Communists, said to the Egyptian ambassador: "I'm not talking to you officially, but as one human being to another. These people you have arrested took part in the national resistance. So why do you treat them this way?" Cited in M. Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and the Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1978, p. 74. Another anecdote concerns 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub, the head of the Sudan Communist Party and at the time exiled in Cairo. Moscow was "worried" about Mahjub. Nasser called Mahjub and handed him the money and tickets to go anywhere he wanted. Mahjub chose Khartoum, where he was arrested. Ibid., pp. 230–31. Similarly, Khrushchev's remarks to Abdel Salim Arif, the head of state of Iraq: "We cannot be friends with those who hang Communists." Cited in M. Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, New York, NY, Doubleday, 1972, p. 156.

[5] See John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, p. 23.

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democracy. Poverty, small size, and the menace of tribal wars financed by Saudi Arabia combined to make Soviet military, financial, and organizational aid essential.

Whether persecuted or tolerated, the "tamed" Communist parties of the Arab world have had little chance to break out of the impasse into which their radical rulers and their ties with the Soviet Union have cast them. With the recent resurgence of Islam, however, a new force has increasingly made itself felt in Arab politics—Islamic fundamentalism. For the Arab Communist parties, as we shall see, it may have far-reaching consequences.

Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism is a grass-roots phenomenon, whose promise of an authentic and truly indigenous regime has gained momentum as popular frustrations with the nationalism and state socialism of the ruling regimes have mounted. Its appeal is primarily to the "masses"—the lower and lower-middle classes, high school pupils, and university students—who see little future for themselves under their present regimes, no matter whether of the more "capitalist" Western-style variety, as in Egypt, or of the more "socialist" Eastern-style variety, as in Syria. There is thus a clear correlation between hopelessness and disappointment with current ruling regimes and the growth of prophetic fundamentalism. Although Islamic activism has appeared in all the Arab countries, it is strongest where the population sees no other way out, in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco. It is not strong in Iraq, where oil money and a paternal, if severe, attitude on the part of the Ba'th rulers have produced a considerable increase in well-being and a great appetite for more of the same.



Muslims, including Iraqi military prisoners (in the foreground), at prayers in Tehran, the capital of Iran.

—Ledru/SYGMA.

Politically, the Islamic fundamentalists are not organized into a single tightly knit party or grouping. Rather, they form a complex stream of groups and tendencies, all more or less radical and all in a state of constant flux. Most recently, the trend has been toward a fundamental split, in many instances a violent split. On one side are the "radicals," who continue to admire Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran and advocate his doctrines and methods (rule by the ulemas). On the other are the more "moderate" and mostly older groupings, which are closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and which have benefited from Brotherhood leadership and (originally, Saudi) money.

For the Arab Communist parties, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism has been highly important in two respects. First, the Communists compete for essentially the same public as the fundamentalists. The rivalry between the two groups has been particularly fierce at the universities, where Communist (or leftist) student activists all over the Middle East have come to blows with their fundamentalist competition.[6] In Egypt, for example, these two main currents of student activism have been represented for several years now at Cairo University, and the fundamentalist trend has even penetrated the secondary schools of the Egyptian elite, such as the German school of Cairo.[7]

The rivalry has also been intense in the popular quarters of the big cities, where the fundamentalists have won over a considerable part of the Communists' supporters and sympathizers. Here, it is not merely a matter of competing for leadership of the disgruntled

[6] This has been reported frequently from Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. See D. Khalid, *Die politische Rolle des Islam im Vorderen Orient: Einführung und Dokumentation* (The Political Role of Islam: Introduction and Documentation), Hamburg, Aktueller Informationsdienst Moderner Orient, 1978, esp. pp. 69–93, with the important article by J.-P. Péroncel-Hugo, reprinted from *Le Monde*, July 27, 1977, on fundamentalism in Egypt.

[7] Author's conversations in Cairo in 1977 and the spring of 1981.

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Hostile crowds are still evident the day after Muslim-Christian rioting on the night of June 17, 1981, in Cairo's Zawiya al-Hamra sector.

—Barry Iverson/Gamma-Liaison.

masses. Fundamentalism tends to stimulate popular animosity toward the local religious minorities (mostly Christians, since the Jews have left nearly everywhere). It thus strikes hard at one of the pillars of Arab communism, which has generally found its most capable leaders and most dedicated activists among the minorities (frequently among the Christians). In bringing traditional cleavages to the fore again, the fundamentalists in effect set their Communist rivals (popularly felt to be "unbelievers") apart and disqualify them from participation in the true Islamic state.[8]

In these and other social milieus, the fundamentalists and leftists are rivals as well in a broader philosophic sense. Both promise deliverance from today's miseries through a kind of revolutionary miracle, the one using religious reasoning, the other a class mythology disguised as scientific truth. Unlike the promises of communism, though, the call of the fundamentalists has had the advantage of novelty: it has not yet been tried and found wanting.

Second, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism has already changed and could well continue to change the policies of the ruling regimes toward the local Communist parties. The regimes have been aware for some time of the rivalry between the fundamentalists and the extreme Left, particularly at the universities and secondary schools. Initially, they tried to use the religious enthusiasts against the extremists of the Left. In Egypt, for example, Anwar al-Sadat asked General Abdel Munim in the early 1970's to create about 1,000 "Islamic committees" in the universities and factories to "fight against atheistic Marxism." (This particular demarche, undertaken to please Libya's Qadhafi, has had unwanted consequences for the Egyptian regime. After Sadat's break with Qadhafi in 1974, some of these committees continued to receive money, but now from Tripoli.) [9]

[8] For recent clashes in Zawiya al-Hamra, a crowded suburb of Cairo, on June 18, 1981 and in Alexandria a month earlier, see *Le Monde,* May 28, June 23 and 24, 1981. For a long analysis in Arabic, see *Asharq al-Awsat* (London), July 14, 1981. These troubles have a long history. See, for example, *Le Monde,* June 21, 22/23, 1980, on the troubles and tensions in Upper Egypt; ibid., Oct. 11, 1980, on the anti-Semitic outbursts of *Ad-da'wa,* the organ of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; ibid., Dec. 19, 1980, on student disturbances in Alexandria.

[9] *Le Monde,* Sept. 7, 1977. See also ibid., Aug. 30 and Sept. 9/10, 1979.

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Lately, however, the fundamentalists have grown so strong that they are now a danger in their own right. This raises a new possibility in the politics of the Arab world—that of a tactical alliance between fundamentalists and leftists (a possibility preeminently in Egypt) aimed at the overthrow of pro-Western and procapitalist rulers. There are at least two levels on which such an alliance might be formed. One is in the universities, between the extreme Left and the extreme fundamentalists. The other is in the officer corps, also between the extreme Left and the extreme fundamentalists among the younger officers, who tend to think much like their student contemporaries.[10] Generally, it appears to be the nonorthodox Left—including the many splinter groups that have broken away from the official Communist parties—that would be open to tactical cooperation. But if a combination of diverse elements, especially the military, can be drawn in, a leftist-fundamentalist alliance might well have a chance to succeed.

In all, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism presents both challenges and opportunities for the Arab Communist parties. It confronts them with the necessity of keeping their traditional constituencies and, to the extent that they ally themselves with antiregime movements, poses the distinct threat of stronger government persecution. But it also opens up new opportunities, whether those conceded by the regimes in their struggles against the Islamic fundamentalists or whether those offered by alliance with the fundamentalists against the existing governments. Obviously, the very possibility of destabilization in such a volatile region is of major significance.

Case Studies

The changing fortunes of Arab communism can perhaps be seen more clearly in case studies of individual parties. Such studies are helpful in giving an idea both of the tremendous variety in Arab communism and of the manner in which local conditions can affect general trends.

Iraq. Iraq provides the most spectacular recent case of a Communist party's sudden decline. Since 1972, the Iraqi Communist party had cooperated with the ruling Ba'th regime and had become one of the Arab world's most visible Communist parties. In the spring of 1978, however, it fell victim to a campaign of intimidation mounted against it by the Iraqi regime. Within six months, its situation had deteriorated to the point that fraternal parties were voicing open concern. In December 1978, for example, the Communist parties of Iraq and eight other Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria) assembled at an unknown locality and published a strong criticism of the Iraqi regime's "oppressive measures against the brotherly Iraqi CP." Such measures, they claimed, could impede the unification of Arab progressive forces at a time when a general Arab progressive front "containing the Communists, Ba'thists, Nasserists, Socialists, Nationalists, and other progressives and respecting the political, ideological, and organizational independence of all these parties is indispensable."[11]

The story of the Iraqi party is in many ways typical. There had been underlying tensions between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Communist Party (and its Soviet mentor) for several years before the troubles surfaced openly. For one, Iraq had had strong reservations about Soviet policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. Since 1977, it had reluctantly agreed to admit Soviet overflights, ostensibly to South Yemen only but in reality to Ethiopia, for it was widely known that South Yemen served as a base for the Soviet intervention in Ethiopia. The Ba'this disliked these overflights, and they said so. Thus, while the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty of 1972 (originally concluded in order to permit Iraq to nationalize the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company) remained in force, this was increasingly true only on paper.[12]

More important, the Iraqis were disturbed at Communist attempts to organize within the army, which the Ba'th regime regarded as its own private preserve. In 1975, 21 Iraqi Communists had been arrested and charged with forming Communist cells inside the army. On the strength of a "law" of long standing, according to which any Iraqi officer who had political connections other than with the Ba'th party would forfeit his life, all 21 had been sentenced to death, although they were still awaiting execution in 1978.[13] It should be mentioned in this regard that an adamant commitment to ensuring the loyalty of the army was no doubt what prompted Iraq to react strongly, much more strongly than other states, to the pro-Communist coup in Af-

[10] Perhaps in Egypt, Tunisia, or Algeria. Only hints of the security forces' preoccupation with leftists and fundamentalists have appeared in the press. It is probable that the events in Mecca in November 1979 have to be seen in the light of such convergences. See J. Reissner, "The Occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca 1979," *Orient* (Hamburg), No. 2, June 1980.

[11] *Le Monde*, Jan. 7/8, 1979.

[12] See *The Economist* (London), June 24, 1978, pp. 78 ff.; and "Iraq Starts Changing Its Tune," *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (Manchester), Aug. 5, 1978.

[13] The exact dates and details of the trials are not known. The information was first made available by Soviet sources in Beirut and later confirmed by Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein. See *Le Monde*, May 27, 30, and June 4-5, 1978; and *Financial Times* (London), May 27, 1978.

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Muhammed Aziz, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iraq, pictured in November 1974 in Moscow, at a time when his party still played a public role in Iraq's political life.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ghanistan in April 1978, in which military units were involved.

Finally, Iraqi rulers, notably Saddam Hussein, had gradually come to realize that the country's oil income allowed the purchase of arms not only from the Soviet Union but also from the West, particularly from France. They had also learned that the Soviet Union was not really able to provide goods and development aid of the same quality as goods and services obtainable from the West. As a result, Iraq was significantly increasing its imports from the West.

Open conflict broke out in the spring of 1978. In May, for example, there was some trouble between the Soviet embassy in Baghdad and the Ba'th authorities. The government had discovered that the Soviet embassy was close enough to the presidential offices to eavesdrop electronically, and it asked the Soviets to accept quarters elsewhere. The Soviets refused. Thereupon, the government resorted to cutting off the electricity and water to force them to move.[14]

At about the same time, the 21 jailed Iraqi Communists were executed. In mid-June, the executions were announced officially (but only after Soviet sources had leaked the news to the Western press in May). On July 17, 1978, Saddam Hussein declared that the executions had been a "political act." [15] At the time of the executions, the Communists lost their only cabinet post. Several months later, in December 1978, 18 other Communist officers and soldiers were executed.

During the same period, the Ba'th bylaws were tightened. Henceforth, it was declared, one would also risk execution if he joined the Ba'th and did not reveal previous or continuing ties with other political organizations, if he left the Ba'th to join other political organizations, or if he tried to influence Ba'th members to join other organizations. Moreover, any military personnel who had left the army after 1968 but maintained political links with any organization other than the Ba'th were also declared liable to execution.[16]

It is clear that the ruling powers in Baghdad—Saddam Hussein in fact, though not in name—had decided to reinforce the security of their party and army and that such reinforcement was directed primarily against the Communists. Their concern was doubtless heightened by reports that certain Iraqi Communists had left Baghdad in the summer of 1978 to join the Kurdish resistance, which under Jalal Talabani had started to fight again and apparently enjoyed Syrian sympathies.[17]

Once such developments were under way, relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate, and the Iraqi regime did not hesitate to criticize the Soviet Union in strong words. On the question of commercial relations, for example, the regime explained its stand quite clearly: "The Soviet Union is by all means unable and unprepared to respond to all the requirements of the Arab development, even for those who are able to pay in cash and with foreign currencies."[18] On the question of Soviet foreign policy, the same official pamphlet explains that the USSR, being unable to exert direct pressure on the oil-producing countries and the "Arab" Gulf, attempted to gain footholds at the ap-

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[14] See *Financial Times*, May 23, 1978; and Legum, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 519, 526 ff.

[15] Saddam Hussein admitted that the executions had been carried out despite an appeal by the Soviet ambassador to Iraq. Saddam Hussein also mentioned "warnings" to the Soviet Union against supporting Ethiopia against the Eritreans and referred to a ban on Soviet overflights. Interview in *Newsweek* (New York, NY), July 17, 1978.

[16] See *Le Monde*, Jan. 7/8, 1979.

[17] Clashes between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime had broken out once more in April 1978 and were increasing in intensity during the summer. In June, 28,000 Kurdish villagers were resettled—allegedly with the aid of incendiary bombs—away from the Turkish frontier so as to create a 180-mile-long buffer zone. At the same time, there was fighting between the two Kurdish factions: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by Talabani, and the remainders of the groups that favored General Mulla Mustapha al-Barzani. See Legum, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 521.

[18] Iraq, Ministry of Culture and Information, Department of Translations and Publications in Foreign Languages, "What Are the Results that the Soviet Union and the World Are Waiting for After the Intervention in Afghanistan?" Baghdad, 1980, p. 21. The text, which is in English, is sometimes obscure.

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

Khaled Modieddine, a pro-Soviet leftist in Egypt.

—*Al Majalla* (London).

proaches to the Gulf and in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is interested in those "most sincere countries" not because of their resistance to imperialism, the pamphlet claims, but rather because they are strategically situated to serve as a "bridge by which to enter the region."[19]

The same message, but stated more diplomatically, was evident in the Arab Charter proposed to all Arab countries by Saddam Hussein in February 1980 (shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). This proposed charter would require all Arab countries not to accept foreign bases or grant military facilities on their soil and to boycott any Arab country that did so.[20]

The war between Iraq and Iran has worsened Iraq's relations with the USSR even more. High Iraqi emissaries visited Moscow before and immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980. But Moscow obviously gave them little encouragement, the friendship treaty notwithstanding. It did not supply Iraq generously with arms, munitions, and spare parts, so that even though most of the Iraqi arsenal was of Soviet origin, Iraq was eventually forced to buy munitions in Egypt. Moscow also made clear that it desired an end to the war and did not want to oppose the Iranians.[21] Soviet behavior was interpreted in Baghdad—correctly no doubt—as another sign of Soviet imperialism and opportunism: the Soviets saw possible gains in Iran and did not want to forgo them by taking the side of their Iraqi allies. In the circumstances, Baghdad was forced to seek financial and diplomatic backing from Saudi Arabia. Saudi help was readily forthcoming, since the Saudis feared the Iranian revolution and hoped to encourage an irrevocable Iraqi break with the USSR.

Baghdad has come a long way since 1972. The Iraqi Communists find themselves, if they survive at all, far removed from power. As with most Arab Communists, their principal aim now must be to endure until the Middle Eastern kaleidoscope turns over once more and provides new opportunities in new circumstances.

Egypt. The Egyptian Communist party is in much the same position. It is underground and retains some influence with the workers. It keeps up some limited activity, such as distributing clandestinely printed leaflets. In 1977, 22 Communist cells were reported to have been broken up, and in 1978, 230 Communist activists were said to have been arrested.[22]

The Egyptian Communists have a legal "tip of the iceberg" in the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP), led by Khaled Muhieddine, a Free Officer in 1952, a peace partisan later, and always a major figure in Egypt's pro-Soviet Left. But the NPUP has come under a variety of official and semiofficial pressures from the Sadat regime. Its members have been in and out of prison, they are frequently made the scapegoats for manifestations of popular discontent, and they are always accused of being the instruments of the USSR. The last parliamentary elections in June 1979 were managed in such a way as to deprive the party of its two seats in the Egyptian parliament.[23] However, the NPUP has not been outlawed altogether, mainly because it is easier to control a legal party than an underground party.

Sudan. In Sudan, the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) has remained strictly underground ever since Nimeiri

[19] Ibid., p. 28.

[20] For the text, see *Vanguardia* (Barcelona), Feb. 26, 1980; and *Le Figaro* (Paris), Mar. 5, 1980.

[21] See *Le Monde*, Apr. 2, 1981, for Anwar al-Sadat's remarks on Egypt's sale of arms to Iraq. According to Sadat, Iraq needed the ammunition "because of the Soviet embargo." There are many signs that the USSR was interested in assisting Iran. See, for example, ibid., Jan. 6, 1981, for indications that the Soviet Union's KGB had handed Iraq's invasion plan over to Iran. There are also signs that Moscow refused arms to Baghdad. For example, Tariq 'Aziz, the second man in Baghdad, declared in Paris that the USSR had interrupted arms deliveries to Iraq since the outbreak of hostilities. See ibid., Dec. 26, 1980.

[22] Legum, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 292-95; Vol. 2, p. 385.

[23] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), June 22, 1979.

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executed its leaders in July 1971.[24] But the Communists show some indications of continuing activity. They publish an underground newspaper, *Al-Maidan,* which appears at irregular intervals. They retain some influence among the population, particularly among skilled workers and in their old stronghold, the Sudan railway. They are also active in the universities, such as Khartoum, where they mix intimately with the Islamic fundamentalists.

The SCP has been one of the few political formations that has resisted Nimeiri's policy of "reconciliation." In the course of his attempts to regain the support of such important sectors of the population as the Ansar (Mahdiya) or the Khatmiya (Mirghani), Nimeiri did make overtures to the Communists as well. But he has failed to win them over, perhaps because they are not interested in a controlled shadow existence within the regime and prefer to stay underground in anticipation that the regime will fall. This last possibility should not be ruled out, especially if there is a major upheaval in Egypt; the Egyptian troops present in the Sudan are a mainstay of the Nimeiri regime.

Syria. The Syrian Communists have gone along rather far with the regime of President Hafiz al-Assad. Such collaboration has been understandable, for they have only been following the example of their Soviet mentors. But among the Syrian populace, the Syrian Communists have suffered the consequences of their policy. For most Syrians, the real opposition to the regime is certainly not the Communists. Rather, it is the Islamic fundamentalists and their shadowy allies who have been conducting a bloody war against the ruling Alawi Ba'th regime.[25]

This underground war has been led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which in part reflects the fact that Assad rules through his family and men in whom he has confidence, most of whom are members of the Alawi sect. The antigovernment forces have tried to shoot as many high-placed people close to the ruling Alawi Ba'thists as they can. On June 16, 1979, they murdered 60 cadets of the military school in Aleppo. In 1980, disturbances broke out, and severe government repression followed in most Syrian cities, especially Aleppo, Hamah, and Homs. Damascus was relatively quiet, but it too witnessed several murders. The regime has killed many in the Muslim Brotherhood in retaliation. On June 27, 1980, about 300 prisoners were murdered near Palmyra in a staged jailbreak. For much of its difficulties, the government tends to blame Iraqi and, more recently, Jordanian agents.

Developments in Syria may go in any of several directions. If the current regime falls, the Syrian Communists would probably be able to accede to power in some form, perhaps together with some Sunni army faction. If the regime survives, they will probably remain its weak third fiddle, strictly controlled and circumscribed. If events go so far that the regime becomes as heavily dependent on the Soviet Union as South Yemen is, the Soviet Union may be able to impose its will on Damascus and force the Ba'th regime to accept its Communist junior partner as an equal. Such an eventuality may be a long way away, but the Syrian acceptance of a friendship treaty with the USSR in October

Hafiz al-Assad (left), General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, is welcomed to Moscow by Soviet party and state leader Leonid I. Brezhnev on October 8, 1980, at the start of a visit that resulted in a Soviet-Syrian treaty of friendship and cooperation.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[24] On Sudan and the Sudan Communist Party, see H. Shaked, E. Souery, and G. Warburg, "The Communist Party in the Sudan, 1946-51," in Confino and Shamir, op. cit., pp. 335-67; and G. Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan,* London, Frank Cass and Co., 1978. For a good survey of recent developments, see *Le Monde,* Mar. 8, 1980.

[25] For accounts of recent events in Syria, see *The Observer* (London), July 27, 1980; Legum, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 729; and *Le Monde,* April 11, 12-13, 14, and 20, 1979. After Soviet personnel in Syria were attacked and killed, all Soviet personnel were reportedly asked not to go outside without an escort. Ibid., Sept. 3, 1980.

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1980, after President Hafiz al-Assad had refused such a treaty for many years, has generally been attributed to a new feeling of isolation and weakness in Damascus, a feeling that requires reinforcement of the Soviet prop. Some further movement in this direction could follow on events—for example, if the Syrians lost, or waged inconclusively, another war against Israel.

Lebanon. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) is a legal party but belongs to a kind of national front of the Left, the National Movement. Such an arrangement is similar to that which has prevailed in several other Arab countries in the past or continues to do so today. The difference is that in Lebanon there is virtually no central state power and civil war is chronic.

As a result, the LCP cannot avoid genuine tests of strength, either with its front partners or in the civil war. The LCP has one major advantage in the National Movement—its openly acknowledged link with a great power, the USSR. But its advantage is also its disadvantage. Many of the left-leaning and Muslim forces see the LCP as the "agent" of that power. Moreover, the National Movement includes political groupings and forces much stronger than the LCP, and it itself is allied to the politically and militarily much stronger Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Thus, the LCP can play only a minor role in the Lebanese struggle for power.[26]

The disabilities imposed by the Soviet connection have led to the appearance of splinter groups, such as the Organization of Communist Action (OCAL). OCAL is composed mostly of students. Its founder and leader is Muhsin Ibrahim, also a prominent figure in the National Movement. Ibrahim's political evolution from nationalism to the Left is part of the general trend today in Lebanon. But those with nationalist backgrounds do not always fit in with orthodox Communists.

Perhaps in consequence, OCAL is the first Arab-Communist group comparable to the Eurocommunists of southern Europe. It rejects obedience to both Moscow and Peking, but wants to retain the ideology and organizational principles of Marxism-Leninism. Given the latent antipathy for great powers so common in the Third World, and in the Arab world in particular, such Arab-communism could have a future. Like Eurocommunism, its greatest difficulty will be to preserve its Communist identity amid so many other Marxist-Leninist, scientific socialist, or simply socialist groups.

The Arab Communists in Lebanon—not only the local Communists but also the exiles from Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere—have also joined together to create their own resistance group, the Palestine National Front (PNF).[27] Founded in 1973 by M. Abu Mayzar, the PNF has remained small. It does not have the same ideological or material attractions as the other groups can offer. For "Marxist" enthusiasts, there are such groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (George Habbash), and the Popular Democratic front for the Liberation of Palestine (Nayef Hawatme). For careerists, there are such highly subsidized (by Syria) groups as al-Sa'iqa. For military devotees, there is the OLP, which offers the prospect of regular military careers. For the average Muslim, concerned above all with the political and military struggle against Israel, there is al-Fatah (Yasser Arafat). Moreover, al-Fatah has direct access to Moscow. While al-Fatah leaders enjoy trips to Moscow, a poor PNF leader has to go to the local bosses of his own Communist party. There is really little incentive for joining Abu Mayzar and the PNF.

Muhsin Ibrahim, founder and leader of the Organization of Communist Action of Lebanon.

—***Al-Hurriyah*** **(Beirut), Mar. 13, 1978.**

[26] A useful survey of Lebanese armed political groupings of the Right and the Left is given in *MERIP Report* (Washington, DC), No. 44, 1976, pp. 4-8 and the listing on p. 18.

[27] The PNF is classified by Olivier Carré as the last of the small Palestinian groups that have between 100 and 500 armed men. Olivier Carré, *Le Mouvement National Palestinien* (The Palestinian National Movement), Paris, Gallimard, 1977, p. 205.

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Mohammed Harmel, Secretary-General of the Tunisian Communist Party, who had an audience with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba on July 18, 1981.

—Sovfoto.

Morocco. In Morocco, the local Communist party—for legal reasons, officially known as the Party of Progress and Socialism—confronted a choice in the 1970's similar to the one that the Sudan party faced, but the outcome was different. In 1974-75, King Hassan II offered reconciliation to the parties of the opposition if they would agree to close ranks with the government over the issue of the Western Sahara. Unlike their Sudanese counterparts, the Moroccan Communists, under Ali Yata, accepted the offer. Together with other opposition parties—Istiqlal and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)—they rallied round the throne in the name of national solidarity (in reality, one might argue, they had grown weary of police persecution and political impotence in the previous ten years). Ali Yata himself was made an emissary of the court—first in 1974 and most recently in the summer of 1981—for the purpose of explaining Morocco's position on the Sahara question to several Soviet bloc countries.[28]

Today, however, the end of Moroccan solidarity is in sight. One reason is friction between the government and the opposition, especially the USFP. On June 20, 1981, the trade union federation close to the USFP, the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), organized a nationwide general strike to protest food price hikes. The result was riots in Casablanca, which "auxiliary forces" suppressed with considerable violence. The official death count was 67. In fact, however, it must have been higher, and the UGTM leaders claim at least 780. Many of the USFP and UGTM leaders were arrested, and the USFP and UGTM newspapers were suspended. The Moroccan Communist party, however, was not directly involved. It is closer to the rival trade union bloc, the Union of Moroccan Workers (UMT), and it had criticized the UGTM strike. In fact, it had supported the general strike that the UMT had organized in Casablanca on June 18, which had come off without incident.[29]

The other reason is external—the Sahara question. If the Sahara question is resolved in favor of the Moroccans, there will be no need for further solidarity. If—as is much more likely—it is not so resolved, the economic burden of the war will eventually rend the Moroccan social fabric, notwithstanding such short-term expedients as US arms or Saudi aid.

For the Communists and other leftist groups (fundamentally the USFP), it is now a question of choosing the right moment for abandoning the throne and returning to opposition. If they move too soon, persecution by the police and security forces could ensue. If they move too late, the credibility of the Left under any coming regime might be damaged. For the Moroccan Communist party, it is wait, survive, and strike when the time is right.

Tunisia. The Tunisian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Tunisien—PCT) has recently been legalized. On July 18, 1981, in a surprise move, President Habib Bourguiba met with Mohamed Harmel, the PCT secretary general. After the meeting, Harmel announced that Bourguiba had agreed to allow the publication of a PCT press organ, *Al-Tariq al-Jadid,* and the government announced the lifting of the "suspension" on the PCT. For the first time since 1963, when the regime "suspended" it (but did not declare it illegal), the PCT could function as a legitimate political party.[30]

The legalization of the PCT must be seen in the larger context of Tunisian politics. Because of the widespread popular discontent with the ruling Destourian Socialist

[28] On the policy of "national unity," see A. Hottinger, "The Struggle for the Western Sahara," *Politique Étrangère* (Paris), No. 1, 1980, pp. 167 ff.

[29] For details on the strikes, see *Le Monde*, June 25 and July 1, 7, 1981.

[30] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), July 24, 1981, p. Q/15; and, in general, *Le Monde*, Apr. 12/13, June 7/8, 21, and 30, and July 2, 1981.

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Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien—PSD) and its political monopoly, the need for change had long been recognized at the highest levels. Bourguiba himself had called for a return to political "pluralism" at the 10th PSD Congress in late 1979. The new prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, who had replaced Hedi Nouira in April 1980, also stood behind the change of direction. In anticipation that "pluralism" meant the readmission of the various political groups into the political arena, preparations got under way for the holding of a nationwide election.

In the ensuing months, the regime took a significant step. It ruled that a group desiring to participate in the elections would be recognized as a legitimate party only after it obtained more than 5 percent of the vote. In practice, of course, this meant that any such group would have to run as a mere "nonparty," and at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis the ruling PSD. The various political groupings protested loudly, declaring that it would be more logical first to obtain recognition and then to take part in the elections. If some change was not made, they hinted, they might boycott the elections.

It is clear that the PSD seeks to gain an advantage from the new electoral rules. As far as the PCT is concerned, the new rules will have little legal effect. According to Tunisian lawyers, the fact that the PCT was fully legalized before the elections means that it is not subject to the 5 percent clause, which applies only to nonrecognized groups. Thus, the PCT will stay in politics even if it does not gain 5 percent of the vote. But for the other opposition groups, the new rules are most uncomfortable. They appear to be aimed directly at the Movement of Social Democrats, led by Ahmed Mestiri, and the Popular Unity Movement, led by the exiled Ahmed Ben Salah. Both groups have far more electoral appeal than the Communists and, as a consequence, are far more dangerous rivals of the PSD. Given these circumstances, the readmission of the Communists to the political arena can best be interpreted as a move to strengthen the relatively harmless PCT and at the same time to weaken the really dangerous electoral competition.

There are other indications, too, that the PSD may lack a genuine commitment to political "pluralism." As the PSD has been ushering the Communists through the doors of parliament, it has been throwing the Islamic fundamentalists in jail. In Tunisia, the fundamentalists are organized for political purposes primarily within the Movement of the Islamic Way (Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique—MTI). They want legal recognition as a party. But they have declared that they will boycott the elections, which they term a "farce." On July 18 and several days thereafter, the PSD moved against the MTI. Most of the MTI leaders were arrested—according to MTI sympathizers, all but one of the members of the MTI leadership committee, including Rached Ghannouchi, the MTI president. The total number of those arrested is estimated at anywhere from 14 (Interior Ministry) to 40 (international agencies), and even 61 (MTI sympathizers).

By striking at the MTI, the PSD regime will no doubt seek to affect the PCT's relations with the opposition forces. Like the would-be political parties, the PCT has expressed its sympathies for the arrested fundamentalist politicians. In an interview, moreover, PCT head Harmel has explained that the PCT has had "relations with the MTI as a political movement." The two have had a constructive and useful dialogue and have even signed joint communiques. In the aftermath of recent events, however, the "constructive" relationship between the PCT and MTI may not survive.[31]

It is still several weeks before the elections, now scheduled for November 1, 1981. But the PSD may have accomplished much of what it intended at the outset. It may well have succeeded in using the weaker Communists against its really dangerous rivals, electoral and otherwise. It can also now call itself "pluralistic," as it did before 1963, when the legal existence of the PCT was cited as proof of Tunisian "pluralism." If no other party reaches the required 5 percent, and even if no other party takes part in the elections, there will always be the PCT and PSD to attest to "pluralism." But just how far the PSD will really travel down the path of "pluralism" still remains to be seen.

Algeria. In Algeria, the Communist Party is practically nonexistent. Like many other political groups, it has fallen victim to the monolithic Algerian state erected by Houari Boumediene with the help of the bureaucracy and army.

There remain sources of opposition and stirrings of criticism (illegal, naturally). Obviously, they are fed by the all-too-evident shortcomings of the state-run economy. But the main currents of criticism are either Berber, or else Islamic fundamentalist and Arabic. Berber dissent, whose most vocal expression has come from the students of Tizi Ouzou University, has been a problem for several years. The fundamentalist groups have been relatively more quiet. But they do exist, principally in the Arab universities of Algiers and Constantine. One should also note the existence of underground currents among the Algerian intelligentsia. Particularly revealing are the recent interviews of Ben Bella, printed in foreign media

[31] On Harmel, see *Le Maghreb* (Tunis), No. 16, July 25, 1981, pp. 23–29. On the arrests, see ibid., p. 22; and ibid., No. 17, Aug. 1, 1981. On Tunisian fundamentalism in general, see *Le Monde*, Aug. 14, 1981.

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after his release from confinement by President Chadli Bendjedid. Many Algerian intellectuals are—as Ben Bella expresses it—searching for some new combination of Islam and socialism.[32]

Libya. In a sense, Libya is much like Algeria. There is no Libyan Communist party. Indeed, no such party has ever existed, and the ground on which it might have taken root has been preempted by a radical state regime. In another sense, Libya is quite different, for it is dominated by the colorful and controversial personality of Qadhafi, who has led Libya into an increasingly intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. If one cares to speak of an "opening" for communism in Libya, therefore, it is essentially that created by Qadhafi's Soviet connection.[33]

Qadhafi started out as an Islamic fundamentalist with Nasserite leanings. In rapid succession, he made attempts at unification with neighboring Arab and African states. But one after another, they all spurned him. Qadhafi blamed their bureaucratic state structures and the "egotism" of their rulers, who refused to yield gracefully to his ambitions.

Disappointed, Qadhafi then turned to the "revolutionary" movements of these same countries, hoping that "the peoples" would follow where the governments had not. In 1976, with the "green book," he began developing his own brand of Islamic socialism. At the same time, he forged links with all kinds of revolutionary and terrorist movements—from the radical groups of Palestinians, inside and outside of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to the Basque Euzkadi ta Askatizuna, the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara, and the Irish Republican Army. Few African and Arab liberation movements could not find money, arms, and training facilities in Libya.

[32] A critical view of Algerian state-building as seen from the left is given by G. Chaliand and J. Minces, *L'Algérie indépendante,* Paris, François Maspéro, 1972. Ben Bella's declarations have appeared in many French-language news media—e.g., *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris) and *Le Monde.*

[33] Over the last few years, it has been *Jeune Afrique* (Paris) that has published the most detail about Qadhafi and his operations. See, e.g., the issues of Nov. 22, 1978; Jan. 31, 1979; Feb. 13, 1980, p. 26; Apr. 16, 1980, p. 22; June 1980, p. 22; Nov. 19, 1980; and Jan. 21, 1981. See also my survey, "Libyan Expansionism: The Middle East, the Maghreb, and North Africa," *Politique Étrangère,* No. 1, 1981, pp. 137-49.

Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi (center) confers with Sudan's Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo on January 3, 1970. Qadhafi's brand of revolution has not proved appealing to his neighbors.

—AFP/Pictorial.

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The growing militancy of the Qadhafi regime has created its own pressures and strains. Externally, the link with the USSR came principally from arms purchases, for which Libya could pay cash and avoid dependence. But the mass of Soviet arms accumulated by Libya, combined with the recent Libyan intervention in Chad, has stirred fears in all the African and Arab countries bordering on the Sahara. Internally, the more radical and militant the Qadhafi regime became, the more it was forced to employ authoritarian means. It smashed a rebellion in the interior in 1980 by executing an estimated 800 suspects, and it has made attempts to murder Libyan dissidents in Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and elsewhere.

The fact that Qadhafi has invented his own sociopolitical system and tries to propagate it by all means at his disposal makes him a difficult friend for the Soviet Union to handle. After all, his system is not communism, and Qadhafi is its prophet. But if he feels that he confronts a direct challenge from the West, he may well move further toward collaboration and eventually a client relationship with the USSR. A man like Qadhafi, who sees himself as a political prophet, is not likely to "learn a lesson." Rather, his probable preference would be the alternative of becoming a Soviet client.

The danger, then, is that Libya, if pressed, will go the same way as Angola did. The new treaty linking Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, signed in Aden on August 20, 1981, gives the Soviet Union a means to influence and protect Qadhafi indirectly, through two client states linked to it and to each other by friendship treaties, without having to enter into a direct and official treaty relationship with maverick Libya.

The Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The other oil-producing countries will in all likelihood manage to avoid dependence on Moscow, insofar as they have any dealings with Moscow at all. The danger is not excessive dependence on Moscow, as is the case with South Yemen. Rather, it is subversion from within, particularly in Saudi Arabia, where social change has been greatly accelerated by oil money and where privilege and corruption are pervasive. Here, the problem is of such magnitude that the final reckoning may be only a matter of time. Whether there is an underground Saudi Communist party to take advantage of future opportunities is not generally known. But there are nationalist and socialist forces of opposition, which could play a role eventually, perhaps in conjunction with elements of the army.[34] If the Saudi regime does fall, the consequences for the Arab world—and for the Western world generally—would be so great as to render most other predictions and preoccupations immaterial. Obviously, another factor in the region is Iran, where developments might well upset the equilibrium in the Gulf and radically change the perspectives of the local Arab Communist parties.

South Yemen. As noted above, South Yemen constitutes an exception to the generally poor success of Marxist politics in the Arab world. Even here, the Moscow-style "vanguard party" that rules the country can probably not be accurately described as a full-fledged "Communist" party.

The National Liberation Front (NLF), to which power was ceded by the British when they quit Aden in November 1967, was a fairly recent movement, formed by activists of the Ba'th and the Movement of Arab Nationalism. (The latter has also served as a catalyst for revolution in many other Arab countries, especially Syria and Iraq, and also inside the Palestinian resistance.) The British had concentrated their anti-insurgency efforts against the older and more moderate Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, thereby permitting the NLF to infiltrate the Aden hinterland and the army.

Once in power, the NLF split into two wings, one more nationalist and close to the army, under Qahtan Ash-Shaabi, and the other more Marxist, under 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il. The leftist faction was temporarily eclipsed, but it regrouped to overthrow Shaabi on June 22, 1969. Isma'il became chairman of the NLF, and Salim Rubay'i 'Ali (a former guerrilla leader) was named head of the Sovereignty Council. The army was purged and put under the control of political commissars, and a radical socialist program was inaugurated, which included nationalization of all land and all means of production (including fisheries and housing property). In October 1975, the NLF itself merged into (and remained the dominant force in) a United Political Organization National Front, which also included the Ba'thist Popular Vanguard Party and the Popular Democratic Union.

At first, China served as the model, but Chinese influence waned as the Soviet Union and its allies proved capable of furnishing more concrete aid. East German security experts were brought in, and the Cubans took over training of the popular militia. Moscow trained and supplied the armed forces. Repeated unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the regime by tribal invasions, armed and financed by Saudi Arabia, drove the Aden regime deeper into the arms of the USSR.[35]

[34] Fred Halliday gives a few hints as to the composition of the underground groups in Saudi Arabia, in Halliday, op. cit., pp. 65 ff.

[35] See the sources given in fn. 4, especially Rouleau, op cit.

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'Ali Nasir Muhammad-al-Hasani (third from left), General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemen Socialist Party, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, seen at Moscow airport on May 27, 1980, with his host, Leonid I. Brezhnev (left).

—TASS from Sovfoto.

In June 1978, Rubay'i, known for pro-Chinese leanings, was removed by Isma'il and killed after a bloody battle. He was replaced by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani as chairman of what had become the Presidential Council. However, the dominant figure in the new regime was Isma'il, head of the NLF. In October 1978, the NLF's political front organization was transformed into the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), a Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist "vanguard party." Isma'il headed the YSP until April 21, 1980, when he, too, was forcibly retired, perhaps with the agreement of the USSR. The objection to Isma'il may have been that he had caused dangerous discontent by his policy of isolating South Yemen from the rest of Arabia, thereby prohibiting South Yemenis from seeking work and money in Saudi Arabia.[36] In any case, his successor, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, has pursued a more open policy toward North Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, the nature of the Yemeni regime has not changed. The Soviet bloc's hold appears to have grown too strong.

Prospects

The future of Arab communism depends to a large extent on the future of the ruling Arab regimes. In the eyes of their subjects, the present regimes, being authoritarian, are unable to change and to adapt themselves, so the anticipation is that they will ultimately fall. The only exception at the moment is Tunisia, where the promised "pluralism" still has not yet become an accomplished fact. If this anticipation proves accurate, then pro-Western regimes such as those in Egypt and the Sudan are likely to crumble first, partly because the Camp David accords seem to be unpopular among the masses and partly because these masses tend to asso-

[36] For the overthrow of Salim Rubay'i 'Ali, see D. Hirst in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Sept. 10, 1978; *Le Monde*, June 28, 1978; and "Large-Scale Purge in South Yemen, *Financial Times*, June 29, 1978. On the overthrow of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and preceding events, see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Mar. 29/30 and Apr. 22, 1980.

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ciate the increased misery that they have experienced with the "capitalist" path of development. Simplistically perhaps, the people blame US and Western "exploitation." But even the regimes that keep their distance from the West in both foreign and domestic affairs are vulnerable to collapse. One-man leadership—i.e., one person "in power"—cannot easily keep pace with the social changes that these regimes themselves promote (e.g., by the spending of oil money). This author does not know a single "stable" country in the Arab world—stable in the sense that it is capable of renewing and replacing its own leadership in harmony with the wishes of the population.

For the Arab Communist parties, which the ruling regimes have driven underground or to the political margins, the downfall of the various Arab power structures would open up new opportunities. In most countries, some kind of military junta is the most likely successor regime. Civilian upheavals, such as the Khomeini revolution, are much less probable. If the Communists can survive and keep some kind of cohesive organizational structure, they could well profit from the new political milieu. Depending on the composition of any future military junta, they might be in a position to influence it and to collaborate with it.

But the Communists would have competitors. One would most certainly be the Islamic fundamentalists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Movements of this kind are springing up all over the Muslim world—in a way, as the children of absolutism. Any regime that tends to monopolize power and to restrict communications works to the advantage of the fundamentalists. This is because fundamentalist ideas and ideals are endemic to any Muslim society. Moreover, everybody has a copy of the Koran, and everybody is thus a potential target for appeals to understand it in its fundamentalist interpretation. Governments cannot stop such appeals. They can only allow the free circulation and discussion of other, competing ideas. Free inquiry would reduce the impact of fundamentalism. But it would pose perhaps greater threats. It is for very good reasons that authoritarian regimes, in monopolizing power, fear the unfettered exchange of ideas.

In the long run, then, the governments of the Arab countries will probably "turn over" again and again, for the political systems of these countries have not yet assumed stable forms. After each "turnover" (*inqilab,* which has become the Persian word for "revolution" and the Arabic word for "coup d'etat"), the Left and the Islamic forces will in all likelihood vie for power. The Left, and the Communists in particular, can always count on "international solidarity" with the USSR to help them gain and maintain power, as the Left has done for the time being in Aden. The Muslim forces can rely on the fact that only they are truly "indigenous" and only they are identified with the values of authenticity, or of preserving the self.

At the same time, one can even today observe a certain convergence between the Islamic and left-wing forces. So far this has been confined essentially to the articulation of ideals and aims and to tactical maneuvers designed to gain power. A viable synthesis has not yet been accomplished. Qadhafi's effort has remained a capricious one-man affair. The Iranian Mojahedin could break down under the weight of Khomeini's persecution. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria might easily bleed itself out.

But this state of affairs does not mean that the attempt to achieve a common ground will cease. The popular ferment, unless interrupted by military occupation by some outside power, will in all probability continue. The Arab masses appear to want a regime that permits them a combination of widespread economic development at the grass-roots level and the preservation, or organic evolution, of their own innate and Islamic "way of life."

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Communism and India: A New Context

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

Since the dramatic 1977 defeat of Indira Gandhi's ruling Congress party by a Janata-led coalition, there have been major shifts in relations between the two major Indian Communist parties, between these and the Indian political system, between the respective Communist groups and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and between India and the USSR and China. Once remarkably stable—if not frozen—the patterns of relations along these diverse axes are currently in a complex state of flux, with change in one area simultaneously affecting and feeling effects from other areas. The consequences of this period of marked change, while hard to predict, are fraught with importance for the Indian Communist movement, Indian politics, and relations between India and the major Communist states.

Most noteworthy has been the evolution of a "left and democratic front" uniting the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) for common political action in opposition to Mrs. Gandhi's resurrected Congress government. By ending some 15 years of rivalry and strife, this development could pave the way for eventual reunification of the 50-year old Indian Communist movement, even if it has created serious complications for the respective Communist factions. The CPI has felt compelled to expel its long-time chairman, Sripat Amrit Dange, proud possessor of the Order of Lenin. Dange, now 80, leads a new rump group, christened the All-India Communist Party and armed with a political line loyal both to the CPSU and to Indira Gandhi. The CPI-M, in turn, has been torn by controversy over the kind of linkages it should have with the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties. While the party leadership has moved closer to Moscow, this has been against the will of the majority of cadres, with the result that a party congress scheduled for the spring of 1981 had to be postponed for a year.[1]

The import of these political events will not be clear unless they are viewed against the extraordinary stability that prevailed in most of these political relationships for more than a decade preceding Mrs. Gandhi's unexpected defeat in early 1977. We shall briefly review that stability before examining in some detail the developments in Indian communism over the last four years.

Frozen Patterns

The Indian Communist movement split into two apparently unreconcilable factions in 1964, under the cleaving impact of the ideological split between the CPSU and the CCP. According to a recent CPI-M account, Nikita Khrushchev's revision of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union triggered a debate within the CPI leadership over the party program—i.e., the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions obtaining in India. Debate raged about such revisionist concepts as peaceful coexist-

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[1] The postponement was announced in the party weekly, *People's Democracy* (New Delhi), Dec. 25, 1980. The reason given was inadequate organizational preparations, particularly in the Hindi-speaking states, where the CPI-M continues to remain weak.

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Promode Dasgupta, a member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), speaks on behalf of Indrajit Gupta, member of the Politbureau of the rival Communist Party of India, during Gupta's January 1980 campaign for election to India's Lok Sabha from West Bengal's Bashihat constituency.

—PANA-India.

ence, peaceful competition, peaceful transition, noncapitalist growth, and national democracy. At the turn of the 1960's, these differences crystallized into a sharp struggle between two programmatic lines, the line of people's democratic revolution under Communist leadership and the line of national democracy under the joint hegemony of the bourgeoisie and the working classes, or, in the CPI-M's words, between "the line of revolutionary struggle for social transformation and the line of class collaboration, parliamentary path and a coalition government with the Congress party for peaceful transition." At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI in September 1961, on the eve of a party delegation's departure for Moscow to attend the meeting of 81 Communist parties, the people's democratic line (which happened to be the line of the CCP) was defeated by a single vote.[2] From this setback, it was a short trip to the formal separation of the losing faction from the parent body and its constitution as the CPI-M at a founding congress in 1964.

The outbreak of border hostilities between India and China in the late 1950's, and particularly the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, inaugurated a period of hostility between New Delhi and Beijing which was only equaled in intensity and durability by the friendship that developed between India and the USSR. In this setting, adhering to its "revisionist" view of the proper course to be followed in India, the Moscow-oriented CPI stood trenchantly and unequivocally behind the ruling Congress party, especially Mrs. Gandhi's political leadership, which it deemed to be progressive in its internal as well as external manifestations. The prime minister welcomed this connection for the boost it gave to her progressive image and for the CPI's willingness to abet her efforts to humble the CPI-M on the Marxists' own political territory in Kerala and West Bengal. The latter, lacking linkages with outside Communist parties, devoted its limited manpower and organizational resources to sculpting an indigenous political tactic of peasant mobilization, which enabled the Marxists, over 10 long, hard years, to build

[2] Ibid., July 27, 1980.

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a strong rural support base in India's eastern flank.[3] Central to this strategy was unremitting opposition to the government of Indira Gandhi.

The CPI-M, wrongly labeled pro-China because of its vehement rejection of the CPSU's path, was determined to remain independent of, and equidistant from, Moscow and Beijing, which it held equally responsible for the split in the international Communist movement. While the CPI-M (or at the very least, a majority of its national leadership) shared the CPSU's perceptions of the general global condition and of the shifting engagements of the two "mutually opposing" capitalist and socialist international systems, it had strong differences with the CPSU concerning both Soviet theoretical formulations on Third World nations and Moscow's willingness to deal with the "bourgeois-landlord" regimes in developing countries. At the same time, the CPI-M leaders almost entirely rejected the Maoist world view of the 1960's and 1970's, and looked dimly on China's movement toward friendship with the United States and Beijing's extreme hatred for the Soviet Union. The Marxists were somewhat sympathetic to the CCP's interpretation of Third World political and social realities, but took the dourest view of Chinese support for "the most reactionary regimes" in the Third World, among which the CPI-M numbered the military juntas of Chile and Pakistan.[4] The CPI-M held that both the Soviet Union and China used friendly relations with Third World regimes to advance their own foreign policy interests, in cynical disregard of the interests of native democratic or revolutionary movements. For example, in a March 1974 resolution criticizing the Soviet proposal for Asian collective security, the CPI-M Politbureau stated:

Our party has again and again declared that the leaders of both the Soviet Union and China in their efforts to improve relations with American and other imperialist powers and in pursuance of the short-term needs of their foreign policies are resorting to steps that are causing damage to the national liberation and world liberation cause.[5]

However, neither the CPSU nor the CCP was inclined to pay much attention to the CPI-M, with its forlorn indignations, until the electoral upheavals of 1977-78 in India revealed the Marxists' political clout.

Dynamic Developments

In March 1977, the Janata party scored a stunning triumph over Indira Gandhi's Congress. The Janata government that came to power in New Delhi had promised during the election campaign to abrogate the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty and after its inauguration sought to pursue a policy of "genuine nonalignment," designed in the long run to balance India's relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States.[6] This clearly represented an unwelcome turn of events for Moscow.

The national elections of 1977, combined with subsequent local elections, brought the CPI-M into the limelight as the main Communist electoral force in India. On the strength of its stable support base among the rural poor, the Marxist party diversified its hitherto almost exclusively Bengali presence in the Lok Sabha (the lower chamber of India's parliament). With some 4.30 percent of the vote, it won 22 Lok Sabha seats, including 17 in West Bengal and three in the hitherto impregnable Congress citadel of Maharashtra. In elections held three months later to legislative assemblies in two territories and ten of India's 22 states, the CPI-M captured 205 of 2,455 seats, including 174 of 294 in West Bengal; at the end of the year, a leftist front led by the CPI-M swept to power in Tripura as well.[7]

The CPI, by contrast, paid a heavy price for having fought the election in alliance with Mrs. Gandhi's party. Its parliamentary representation dropped from 23 to 7 seats, all from the south, and its share of the vote dropped from 4.73 percent in 1971 to 2.82 percent. In the elections for legislative assemblies, the CPI was virtually wiped out, as was Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party.[8]

Combined, these developments laid the groundwork and enhanced the need for bringing the two warring In-

[3] See the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1972; "India's Rival Communist Models," ibid., January-February 1973; and "Indian Politics and the Communist Party (Marxist)," ibid., September-October 1978. For the only book-length study of the Communist Party of India-Marxist so far, see his *The CPI-M: Promises, Prospects, Problems*, New Delhi, Young Asia Publications, 1979.

[4] See *CPI-M: Political Resolution, 10th Congress*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, May 1978; also, *People's Democracy*, Aug. 9, 1977.

[5] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Mar. 14, 1974.

[6] For a forceful exposition of the Janata concept of "genuine nonalignment," see Atal Behari Vajpayee, "India's Foreign Policy," in Bimal Prasad, Ed., *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979, pp. 1-11. Vajpayee was Minister for External Affairs in the Janata government.

[7] In West Bengal, a left front consisting of the CPI-M and three small leftist allies took 230 seats. However, the front polled only 36 percent of all valid votes in an election which witnessed a voter participation of only 54 percent. The Congress party won 22.53 percent of the valid votes and only 20 seats.

In Tripura, the CPI-M and its allies won 51 of 59 seats, and four independents were elected with Marxist support. For the first time, the Congress party failed to win a single seat. The CPI-M got 36.65 percent of the valid votes; the Congress, 13.85 percent.

[8] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1978*, Stanford CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 243. For detailed analyses of the various 1977 elections, see Myron Weiner, *India at the Polls*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Affairs, 1978.

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dian Communist parties together. At a party congress in the spring of 1978, the CPI made an important step by acknowledging that its support for the June 1975-January 1977 emergency regime of Indira Gandhi had been "wrong from the beginning. . . ." The CPI had

. . . insufficiently realised that the fight against the increasingly anti-people internal policies of the Indira Gandhi government had to be given priority by our party even while supporting its [the government's] anti-imperialist foreign policy as well as its progressive internal measures.[9]

For the future, the CPI resolved to pursue seriously the tactical goal of Communist unity and the forging of a left and democratic front. Since a strong CPSU delegation attended the CPI congress, it was assumed by analysts that the new tactical line of CPI accommodation with the CPI-M at least had Mosow's blessing, if it had not been jointly crafted.[10] Certainly, the CPSU sent out tentative feelers for consultation with the CPI-M about the future development of the Communist movement in India.[11] (Moscow was soon to find that Beijing was courting the Indian Marxists with even greater zeal.[12])

Negotiations for a rapprochement between the CPI and the CPI-M were tortuous and often acrimonious. Each party demanded of the other concessions it was reluctant to make. The Marxists insisted that the CPI leave the 10-year-old united front government in Kerala, in which the Congress faction of Indira Gandhi was its principal partner, and join a new "left and democratic front" cabinet under CPI-M leadership that would exclude Indira Gandhi's Congress faction (Congress-I).

S. A. Dange, left, chats with a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the 1978 Congress of the Communist Party of India at Bhatinda, Punjab.

—India Today.

The CPI wanted the CPI-M to withdraw its support from the Janata government or, more precisely, from the Jana Sangh, which both Communist parties perceived to be the most anti-Soviet constituent of the coalition.[13]

The CPI-M's new prominence and its courtship by Soviet and Chinese parties alike clearly put on the agenda a clarification of the party's stand regarding the international Communist movement in general and CPI-M relations with the CPSU and the CCP in particular. As the Marxists began to debate and conceptualize their party's international connections in 1978 (after muting the question for nearly 14 years), they seemed inclined to retain their independent stance, and to continue to criticize both the CPSU's revisionism and the CCP's left adventurism, as well as the penchant of both to subordinate the interests of indigenous democratic and revolutionary movements to the foreign policy interests of the USSR or China.[14] Nevertheless, the party did appear at first to respond more warmly to Beijing's gestures than to Moscow's. Without muting criticism of China's rabid anti-Sovietism and the CCP's "sectarianism," the CPI-M consistently advocated normalization of Sino-Indian relations—a posture that even survived the Marxists' stern denunciation of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.[15] The CPI-M was also more critical of Moscow's than of Beijing's role in Indian politics, even while it called for closer cooperation between India and the Communist states, headed by the USSR.

A sign of things to come emerged, however, at the May 1977 CPI-M congress. The leadership apparently

[9] See the political resolution adopted at the CPI's 11th Congress in *Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of India,* New Delhi, CPI Publications, 1978.

[10] For the view that the CPI and CPSU "covertly coordinated" the strategy of wooing the CPI-M, see Barun Sengupta, "Communist Giants Woo CPM," *Sunday* (Calcutta), Aug. 10, 1980. Sengupta is political correspondent of *Ananda Bazar Patrika,* the powerful anti-Communist Bengali daily of Calcutta.

[11] For a detailed analysis of contacts between the Soviet party and the CPI-M during 1978-80, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Moscow Connection," *This Fortnight* (New Delhi—since discontinued), May 1-15, 1980.

[12] China's hopes for improved relations with the CPI-M may have rested in part on improvement in relations between Beijing and New Delhi. In the mid-1970's, there were several diplomatic contacts between the two countries in foreign capitals, and in 1976 China sent an ambassador to New Delhi, a move quickly reciprocated by India.

Whatever the reasons, contacts between the CCP and the CPI-M increased during 1977-78, and the Marxist government of West Bengal even gave an official welcome to a Chinese goodwill mission in 1978. See Bhabani Sen Gupta "Indian Politics and the Communist Party (Marxist)," loc. cit.

[13] On these negotiations, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, *CPI-M: Promises, Prospects, Problems,* Ch. 12, pp. 218-33.

[14] Ibid., pp. 247-52.

[15] The CPI-M Politbureau expressed "grave concern" at the Chinese "invasion" of Vietnam, demanded withdrawal of Chinese troops and peaceful settlement of Sino-Vietnamese disputes, and announced "solidarity and sympathy" for Vietnam. See *People's Democracy,* Feb. 25, 1979. The party newspaper described the Chinese action as "shocking and disgraceful." Coming during a visit to Beijing by Atal Behari Vajpayee, Foreign Minister in the Janata government, the Vietnam incursion was also a sharp setback to normalization of China's relations with India.

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Morarji Desai, left, then Prime Minister of India, confers in Darjeeling, West Bengal, in November 1979, with Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, center, and Governor T. N. Singh of the Marxist-controlled state.

—Asoke Bose.

included in the draft political resolution a paragraph which appeared to many to tilt toward Moscow. However, the delegates, in an indication of intraparty strains, finally persuaded the leaders to delete this passage.[16] The CPI's continued participation in the Kerala coalition with the Indira Congress fueled deep suspicions within the CPI-M regarding the real intentions of the CPI—and, hence, the CPSU—regarding Mrs. Gandhi. In a somewhat perfunctory editorial welcome to the late Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin during his March 1979 visit to New Delhi, the Marxists' weekly reminded its readers that the CPI-M had "never concealed its disagreements with the leaders of the CPSU."[17] Two months later, CPI-M General Secretary E.M.S. Namboodiripad aired the suspicion that the CPSU and the CPI were actually trying to "rehabilitate" Indira Gandhi. This suspicion, he felt, was reinforced by the CPSU's failure to criticize crimes that she had committed during the Emergency.[18]

A Fruitful Bargain

A quid pro quo was finally struck, however, between the two Indian Communist parties in the autumn of 1979. The first essential precondition emerged earlier in the year, when the Janata government led by Morarji Desai, torn and enfeebled by intracoalition conflicts, fell after the Lok Dal and another faction walked out of the coalition and the CPI-M withdrew its support. A caretaker coalition government (pending January 1980 parliamentary elections) was formed by Charan Singh, leader of the breakaway Lok Dal group, in partnership with Congress-U (the rump faction surviving after Mrs. Gandhi split the Congress party in early 1978 for the second time in nine years), and with tacit Communist support. The second essential element was provided in Kerala, where, in October, the CPI chief minister tendered the resignation of the united front government. This move led eventually to dissolution of the state legislature and elections in January 1980 to chose its successor.

In anticipation of the January 1980 national and state elections, the two Indian Communist parties put substance into their common political commitment to a left and democratic alternative to bourgeois rule, an alternative that would tactically embrace all left, democratic, and progressive forces, including those that could be found in the bourgeois political parties.[19] The parties campaigned together, divided up constituencies, and extended each other a certain amount of logistical help. In Kerala, the CPI-M led a front that included the CPI and the rump Congress, which was opposed by a united front of rightist parties led by the Indira Congress.

Soviet commentaries and reports suggested Moscow's approval of the new Communist unity. This stance seemed premised on an expectation that no one of the three competing bourgeois parties would win a stable and decisive parliamentary majority. For example, B. Chekhonin, the TASS correspondent in New Delhi, predicted a general "fragmentation and atomization" of political forces in India, a setting in which the two Communist factions, united in action, would constitute an "important political factor." He wrote:

. . . the Left forces are closing their ranks on the initiative of the Communist Party of India. For the first time in the past few years the main parties of the Left—the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India-Marxist—have reached agreement on the distribution of constituencies between them in almost all states.[20]

The unity strategy was successful. The CPI-M and its allies, including this time the CPI, won 37 of the 41 parliamentary seats contested in West Bengal, 12 of 20 in Kerala, and 2 of 2 in Tripura. The two Communist factions entered the new (Seventh) Lok Sabha with 47 seats (35 for the CPI-M and 12 for the CPI), the largest Communist contingent ever in the Indian parliament. The Communists scored a similar success later in Jan-

[16] See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "India's Politics and the Communist Party (Marxist)," loc. cit.
[17] *People's Democracy*, Mar. 11, 1979.
[18] Quoted in *The Statesman*, May 18, 1979.
[19] "So Much in Common," *The Hindu* (Madras), Feb. 10, 1980.
[20] See Chekhonin's article "India: On the Threshold of the Election, *New Times* (Moscow), No. 52, December 1979.

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Members of the Communist Party of India (CPI) demonstrate outside the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on February 18, 1979, to protest China's invasion of Vietnam.

—ADN/Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

uary in polling for the Kerala state legislature. The Marxist-led left and democratic front won 93 seats in a legislature of 140.[21]

The parliamentary elections highlighted in particular the strength of the CPI-M. Nationwide, it polled almost 12 million votes—compared to 83.5 million for Congress-I, 37.2 million for Janata, and 18.5 million for Lok Dal. In contrast, the CPI polled just over 500,000 (some 80,000 fewer than in 1977). The CPI-M's electoral tactics were the most efficient of any party in terms of winner performance. According to one observer, the CPI-M, "contesting fewer seats, distributed its resources in areas of the greatest promise, and many of its candidates in West Bengal came out victorious with thumping majorities."[22] Regionally, the CPI-M's performance was most impressive in West Bengal. In capturing 27 Lok Sabha seats, the Marxists garnered 39.42 percent of the vote against Congress-I's 36.47 percent (all told, the left front captured 50 percent of the vote).

Post-Election, Post-Afghanistan

The landslide electoral triumph of Indira Gandhi came just days after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Together, these developments had an important impact both on internal Indian politics and on the relationships between Indian political forces and outside Communist parties and powers.

The two Communist parties' differing attitudes concerning the threat posed by Indira Gandhi, which had been evident before the elections,[23] continued to be visible after Mrs. Gandhi's return to power. For the CPI-M, the event was pregnant with dark possibilities of a restoration of authoritarian rule.[24] The CPI, while delighted at the Janata's rout, took an ambivalent position on Mrs. Gandhi's victory. On the one hand, the CPI stressed the need for "the utmost vigilance" against

[21] However, the vote for the parties in the left and democratic front increased by less than 4 percent from 1977. The front captured only 50.75 percent of valid votes, which made the Marxist Chief Minister of Kerala, E.K. Nayanar, assure the public that his government would "strive to function with utmost humility and respect to the opposition," a remarkable statement to come from a Communist "revolutionary." See *People's Democracy*, Feb. 3, 1980.

[22] G.G. Mirchandani, *The People's Verdict*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing house, 1980, pp. 119-38 and 170-75.

[23] The CPI-M had spoken of Mrs. Gandhi as the "arch enemy of democracy, the author of the dark emergency, the perpetrator of monstrous crimes against the people," while the CPI had taken a mellower view, even if it was inclined to view her "authoritarian aspirations" as being as reprehensible as the "reactionary policies" of the Janata. See *People's Democracy*, Dec. 30, 1979, and *New Age* (New Delhi), Dec. 30, 1979.

[24] See a statement by the CPI-M Politbureau in *People's Democracy*, Jan. 13, 1980.

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authoritarian elements behind her, "whose aggressive hostility to the working class and the forces of socialism is only too well known."[25] On the other hand, the party went on record as supporting "whatever progressive steps this government might take"—indeed, it would "fight for such steps' being taken."[26]

The different reactions of the two parties stemmed mainly from the internal tensions ignited in both by the election results. In the CPI-M, the leadership was under attack from the powerful West Bengal unit for scuttling the Janata government and paving the way for Mrs. Gandhi's return to power.[27] In the CPI, a group led by Dange had waged a flanking operation even before the elections to revive the old alliance with Mrs. Gandhi. Now it used her upset victory as a weapon with which to mount a frontal attack on the party's entire new political line, especially its "abject surrender" to the CPI-M.[28]

The quarrels within the CPI derived a sharper edge from uncertainties regarding the Soviet reaction to the new political situation in India. This, in turn, was related to Soviet anticipations regarding India's reactions to the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan. As Dange saw things, the Soviet Union needed India's support more than ever before. If Mrs. Gandhi extended that support, could or should the CPI oppose her in league with the CPI-M? Even if she proved reluctant to back the Soviet position on Afghanistan fully, was it not the task of the CPI to coax or cajole the desirable policy out of her by restoring the pre-1977 relationship between the CPI and the ruling Congress faction? Had the CPI for 25 years pursued its tactical line of working with the national bourgeoisie as a means of attaining the strategic goal of a national-democratic state only to end up in a spineless surrender to the CPI-M, with its unrepentant crypto-Maoism, its continuing opposition to the so-called revisionism of the CPSU?[29]

However, the CPSU was cautious in its own reactions to the Gandhi landslide. In fact, in one of the first Soviet commentaries on the election, an analyst saw the January 1980 vote as having been not so much "for" Mrs. Gandhi as "against" the discredited Janata and Lok Dal coalitions. In the same breath, the Soviet analyst noted that the two Communist parties, "which campaigned jointly under a slogan calling for the unity of the progressive forces, have consolidated their position in the lower chamber of parliament." A little later, the TASS correspondent in India in a more comprehensive report praised Mrs. Gandhi as an "outstanding national political leader," while claiming that "major successes" scored by the two Communist factions "stand out in especially bold relief against the background of the shattering defeat sustained by [the] two bourgeois [opposition] groups." The Communists, the report added, "will now be an important political factor in the parliamentary opposition."[30]

One may deduce several factors behind this new Soviet coolness toward Mrs. Gandhi. To be sure, even before her formal return to power, the prime minister did instruct the Indian ambassador at the United Nations to defend the Soviet action in Afghanistan and to vote against a resolution calling for immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, as we shall see, it grew increasingly clear that the continued massive Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had generated a distinct chill in New Delhi's attitude toward Moscow.[31] Moreover, the CPSU's perceptions of shifting political alignments in the developing world had been hardening throughout the 1970's.[32] This being the case, the Soviet leadership probably decided that Communist unity in India aligned against the government in New Delhi would be a distinct asset—so long as the CPI-M could be prevented from tilting toward China.

Dange reportedly sent one of his close followers in the CPI Executive Council, Mohit Sen, to Moscow to plead his case with the CPSU for reestablishing ties with Indira Gandhi.[33] This effort proved to be in vain. In a five-day meeting convened in late January, the CPI National Council, by overwhelming majorities, rejected Dange's proposals, endorsed the party's electoral tactics, and accepted Dange's resignation as party chairman.[34] The National Council called for frequent consultations with

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[25] *The Hindu*, Feb. 10, 1980.

[26] *Indian Express* (New Delhi), Feb. 6, 1980; and *The Times of India* (New Delhi), Feb. 6, 1980.

[27] See *The Times of India*, Mar. 21, 1980, and *Indian Express*, May 4, 1980. Also, conversations by the author with cadres in West Bengal.

[28] Dange had put up a note to the CPI's Executive Council in November, protesting the electoral tactics adopted by the leadership. In January, he sent another ten-page note claiming that the election results had justified his criticisms and asking for a return to the political line of cooperation with Mrs. Gandhi. *Indian Express*, Jan. 31, 1980.

[29] Such questioning is reported in two of several retrospective analyses: Sankar Ghosh, "Dange May Not Get Soviet Backing," *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), Apr. 7, 1981; and "The Dilemma Facing CPI," *The Hindu*, Apr. 9, 1981.

[30] See A. Usvatov, "The Return of Indira Gandhi," *New Times*, No. 2, 1980, and Boris Chekhonin, "India: Looking into the Future," ibid., No. 4, 1980.

[31] *Indian Express*, Jan. 13, 1980. For detailed analyses of Indian diplomacy following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, see the author's *The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Global Power*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1981.

[32] One can trace a progressive hardening of the CPSU's stance toward Third World regimes and toward social and political alignments in the "new nations" over the last decade. Most of these nations are now viewed as caught in insoluble internal political and economic crises. Class polarizations are seen to be increasing in many, thus pushing the feudal-bourgeois ruling elites closer to the imperialists. This evolution in Soviet thinking emerges in General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's reports to successive CPSU congresses in 1971, 1976, and 1981. For the relevant passages of the respective Brezhnev reports, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Apr. 20, 1971, Mar. 24, 1976, and Mar. 25, 1981.

[33] *Indian Express*, Jan. 20, 1980.

[34] Dange's resignation had actually been tendered in November 1979. The National Council denounced his "anti-party activities" by a vote of 108 to 16, with 2 abstentions. *The Times of India*, Feb. 6, 1980. See also, Sankar Ghosh, "The Chairman is out," *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Feb. 11, 1980.

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the CPI-M and stressed that existing differences should not prevent the two parties from "coming closer on many points."[35] In an interview after the meeting Rajeshwara Rao, General Secretary of the CPI, reiterated that the CPI would adhere to the political line of a left and democratic front, but explained that the party would not immediately join the left front in West Bengal because of certain ideological issues—largely related to China—remaining to be sorted out with the CPI-M.[36]

In February 1980, the two CPI's took a big step forward toward Communist unity by forging the first "left and democratic government," in Kerala. This drew immediate approval from the Soviet media.[37] Doubtless even more pleasing to Moscow's ears was a decision several days later by the CPI-M Politbureau to support the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan—a surprisingly quick decision whose manner of adoption annoyed, or even upset, the Marxists in West Bengal.[38]

A CPI National Council meeting in July, shortly before Rashewara Rao and Indrajit Gupta traveled to Moscow for discussions with CPSU officials, produced a statement reiterating the line of opposing the "bourgeois" rule of Mrs. Gandhi even while supporting her progressive actions. In the realm of foreign policy, it welcomed India's recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a de facto government and of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. At the same time, the statement deplored India's withholding of complete and unequivocal support for the Soviet stand on Afghanistan and described as "unfortunate" the Indian foreign minister's criticism of the prolonged Soviet military presence in that country. While continuing to attach increased importance to unity in action with the CPI-M, the CPI was highly critical of the Marxist party's support for normalization of Sino-Indian relations, and of its failure to criticize China's pro-imperialist and anti-Indian foreign policy.[39]

Rajeswara Rao (right) and Indrajit Gupta on the way to a meeting of the leadership of the Communist Party of India.

—Asoke Bose.

Most of these positions on Indian domestic and international policies were reiterated in the communique issued after the CPI's talks in Moscow. From this, Indian analysts inferred that the CPI's line on "unity of action" and its criticism of Mrs. Gandhi's policies and of the China policy of the CPI-M reflected the thinking of the Soviet party also.[40]

Such positions, however, could not be imposed on the larger CPI-M, which was still in the throes of debate over its foreign orientations. A majority of the members of the CPI-M Politbureau apparently inclined toward the CPSU; the dominant mood within the party Central Committee was in favor of strict independence; and the rank-and-file cadres were pointedly critical of the Soviet Union and sympathetic to the Chinese party.

The CCP, for its part, was now stepping up its courtship of India's Marxists, a task complicated by the fact that it was the Chinese who had broken ties with the CPI-M in the late 1960's, out of contempt for the Marxists' pursuit of a parliamentary road in Indian politics. Beijing evidently hoped to regain some foothold on the subcontinent. Moscow's move in Afghanistan and the resulting differences between Soviet and Indian leaders regarding Afghanistan together clearly spurred these efforts. (It should be noted that the effort to patch inter-

[35] *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Feb. 6, 1980.

[36] *Indian Express* and *The Times of India*, Feb. 6, 1980.

[37] See the *Pravda* report of the event as reported in *The Times of India*, Feb. 18, 1980.

[38] The resolution supporting the intervention was adopted at a meeting with only the two CPI-M Politbureau members present in Delhi attending. See *People's Democracy*, Feb. 4, 1980.

The circumstances of this decision raised protests in the Bengal unit of the party (see *The Times of India*, Feb. 8, 1980). The CPI-M's Bengali daily, *Ganashakti*, pointedly failed to print the Politbureau statement.

At a student meeting at Delhi University in the spring of 1980 (at which the writer was also an invited speaker), the CPI-M's foreign affairs specialist Harkishan Singh Surjeet described the Soviet intervention as "unfortunate." However, with the passage of time, the CPI-M support for the Soviet role in Afghanistan became louder and less equivocal.

[39] See *New Age*, July 7, 1980. Commenting editorially on this resolution, *The Hindustan Times* of July 23, 1980, wrote: "In sum, the CPI wants the Government to be more pro-Soviet, especially on Afghanistan, and correspondingly more anti-American. It also wants that India should not settle the border problem with China but keep it alive. It would like to persuade the CPM [i.e., the CPI-M] to be more forthright in declaring its loyalty to the Soviet lobby."

[40] For a text of the communique, see *New Age*, July 21, 1980. Participating in the meeting for the Soviet party were Andrey Kirilenko, a member of the CPSU Politburo; Boris Ponomarëv, a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo and head of the party's International Department; and Rostislav Ulyanovskiy, a deputy director of the International Department. Editorial commentary on the Moscow consultations may be found in ibid.

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party relations paralleled Chinese efforts to improve relations with the Indian government.[41])

In May 1980, Saroj Mukherjee, a member of the CPI-M Central Committee and editor of *Ganashakti* (the party's Bengali daily, published in Calcutta), and his wife, Kanak Mukherjee, a Marxist member of parliament, paid an informal visit to China. At the CPI-M's headquarters in Calcutta, there was much enthusiasm about the visit and Saroj Mukherjee's comments to Indian reporters upon his return that the CCP would "like to develop a new perspective of its relationship with the CPSU and any other Communist party."[42]

Not long thereafter, the CPI-M Politbureau circulated a note to members of the party's Central Committee criticizing China's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the United States. But the sting was blunted in the Politbureau's qualification:

. . . despite our sharp delineation of Chinese policies, we refuse to join the Indian revisionists who . . . seek to run down China. They act as storm troopers of the CPSU.[43]

In August, Politbureau member Harkishan Singh Surjeet disclosed that the CPI-M had received "feelers" from the CCP for restoration of ties, but fellow Politbureau member M. Basavapunniah told reporters that the Marxists were "not in a hurry. Discussions will take place at the proper time."[44] In October, Basavapunniah and the leader of the CPI-M's Lok Sabha group, Samar Mukherjee, spent a week in Beijing, talking with appointed officials of the CCP. After the CPI-M Central Committee considered their report on the talks, Namboodiripad told reporters that there was "room for hope" of a "gradual shift in the Chinese line."[45]

The perspective of the CPI-M was apparently that the determined efforts of China's post-Mao leaders to correct Maoist excesses and aberrations in China's domestic policies might be extended to the realm of foreign policy.[46] As a ranking Marxist leader told this analyst:

It is possible to see the CCP's desire to normalize relations with our party as a step toward a gradual modification of its international policies. The Chinese comrades know how strongly we reject their extreme anti-Sovietism, and what our feelings are about their attitude to Vietnam. They also know that we vehemently oppose their near-alliance relationship with America and their support to the most reactionary dictatorial regimes in the Third World. If they still are keen on establishing normal party relations with us, it may be because they are ready to take the first steps toward a broad revision of their entire world view and foreign relations.

Closer to Unity

For its part, Moscow continued to push for a unity of the two Indian Communist parties that excluded good relations with the CCP. In July 1980, Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of West Bengal and a member of the CPI-M Politbureau, visited Moscow to see the Olympic games and to have "wide-ranging" discussions with a CPSU team headed by Boris Ponomarëv. Upon his return to Calcutta, Basu reported that the CPSU was interested in "unity of the Indian party."[47]

The visit of USSR President and CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to New Delhi in December 1980 led to further CPSU endorsement of the CPI's political line. Brezhnev prominently received CPI leaders Rao, Bhupesh Gupta (editor of *New Age*), and Indrajit Gupta, and conspicuously allowed Dange to appear nowhere near him. The CPSU leader also had occasion to shake hands with several members of the CPI-M Politbureau—Namboodiripad, Basavapunniah, and B. T. Ranadive.[48]

These gestures must be seen in the context of interstate relations. The Soviet visit failed to narrow Indo-Soviet differences over Afghanistan (indeed, Afghanistan was not even mentioned in the joint declaration issued on the talks between Brezhnev and Mrs. Gandhi).[49] To be sure, these differences were not per-

[41] After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing initiated a campaign of "media diplomacy," suggesting a settlement of the India-China border dispute on the basis of "lines of actual control," or even a possible exchange of territory. In May 1980, Mrs. Gandhi met briefly with Chinese Party Chairman Hua Guofeng in Belgrade at the time of Tito's funeral, and a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua was scheduled for early 1981. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Global Power.*

[42] *The Times of India,* May 30, 1980.

[43] Ibid., June 27, 1980.

[44] *The Hindu,* Aug. 31, 1980.

[45] *Indian Express,* Nov. 1, 1980.

[46] See, for example, *People's Democracy,* Sept. 28, 1980.

[47] *Amrita Bazar Patrika,* July 25, 1980; and *Indian Express,* Aug. 6, 1980.

[48] Reports suggested that the CPI-M and Brezhnev's party each expected the other to take the initiative for a formal meeting; but neither did, and no meeting occurred. Dange not only failed to be received by Brezhnev; he was not invited to any official function. See accounts in *The Times of India,* Dec. 12, 1980, and *Hindustan Times,* Dec. 11, 13, 14, 1980.

[49] From the first official function to the last, Indian officials from President N. Sanjiva Reddy down made clear India's displeasure with the continued high-profile Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Brezhnev, for his part, made it equally clear that Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan until "imperialist intervention" ended and Pakistan and Iran settled their differences with the Afghan regime through direct negotiations. See accounts in *The Hindu, Indian Express,* and *Hindustan Times* in the period of Dec. 10–14.

Two thirds of Brezhnev's speech to members of parliament, in which he dealt with the Afghan crisis, were heard in silence. *The Hindu* reported on Dec. 11, 1980, that Brezhnev did not ask India to endorse the Soviet stand on Afghanistan but only "hoped" that while advocating the restoration of the independence of Afghanistan, "India would not unwillingly become a source of embarrassment to the Soviet Union."

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Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev defends the USSR's position in Afghanistan in an address to the Indian parliament on December 10, 1980, as Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi looks on.

—Raghu Rai/MAGNUM.

mitted to block expansion of Indo-Soviet cooperation in economic and defense matters—for example, the USSR reportedly agreed to transfer to India highly sophisticated MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft.[50] Nevertheless, it was clear to both leaders that the relationship in 1980 was not what it had been in the early 1970's. While stressing harmony in Indo-Soviet relations, Mrs. Gandhi did not hide the differences between India and the USSR.[51] And in the course of remarks welcoming Brezhnev at a civic reception, she took the unusual step of referring to her domestic political troubles with the leftist opposition.[52] Brezhnev, while bestowing fulsome praise on the Indian prime minister, stopped conspicuously short of describing her or her government as "progressive."[53]

In the aftermath of the Brezhnev visit and its clear personal rebuff, Dange formally attended the All-India Communist Party's first congress in April at Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, the city where he and others had created the skeletal CPI half a century earlier. Dange's outbursts against the CPI quickly led to his expulsion from the party, without a single dissenting vote in the CPI National Council.[54]

For the Marxists, the Brezhnev visit had brought considerable political gain. The CPSU stood behind Communist unity in India, which could come only under CPI-M leadership. The Soviet media no longer refused, as it had since the early 1970's, to treat the CPI-M as a legitimate Communist party.[55] Brezhnev had exchanged handshakes with Marxist leaders, even if he had not invited them into his parlor. The Soviet leader was hailed with unusual warmth in the Marxist press, even though he was criticized for praising Mrs. Gandhi, who, it was claimed, would use Soviet friendship to further the interests of her bourgeois government and would not implement the anti-imperialist thrusts of the joint Indo-Soviet declaration.[56]

The China Factor

The principal unresolved problem between the CPI-M and the CPI—and therefore the CPSU—was the former's openness and the latter's closed mind on China. The Marxists chose to mute their interest in normalizing relations with the CCP and thereby continued to ignore an invitation to send an official delegation to Beijing for talks on restoration of normal party-to-party relations.[57]

The Marxists now indicated a clear tilt toward the CPSU by sending a delegation headed by Surjeet and Bengal CPI-M leader Promode Dasgupta to Indochina to consult with the pro-Soviet Vietnam and Laotian Communist parties and fully endorse the Vietnamese

[50] *The New York Times*, Dec. 12, 1980. Brezhnev also reportedly made "liberal offers" of military hardware on easy terms.

[51] *Hindustan Times*, Dec. 14, 1980.

[52] This point was made by M. Basavapunniah in his article in *People's Democracy*, Dec. 21, 1980.

[53] For example, at one civic reception, Brezhnev stated: "I make no secret of the fact that we have always had a particular liking for Srimati Indira Gandhi, that outstanding political and state figure of contemporary Asia." Reported in ibid.

[54] *The Hindu*, Apr. 9, 1981, and *Indian Express*, Apr 14, 1981. An English-language Delhi broadcast of May 30, 1981, reported Dange's election as General Secretary of the All-India Communist Party. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SAS*), June 2, 1981, p. E/3.

[55] In 1967–69, when the Marxists and the CPI were working together in united front coalitions in Kerala and West Bengal, Soviet media had referred to the CPI-M as the "parallel Indian communist party." See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "A Maoist Line for India," *China Quarterly* (London), February 1968; idem, *Communism in Indian Politics*, Ch. 2; and Mohan Ram, *Indian Communism*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1969.

When the CPI broke away from these coalitions, the CPI-M ceased to be recognized as a Communist group in Soviet analyses of Indian politics. Today, Moscow refers to the CPI-M as the "other" Indian Communist party, but always mentions the CPI first.

[56] See M. Basavapunniah, writing, in *People's Democracy*, Dec. 21, 1980.

[57] In November, the CPI-M was reported to have made up its mind to start official talks with the CCP and, if Moscow agreed, with the CPSU. *The Statesman*, Nov. 8, 1980. Things apparently changed after the Brezhnev visit. In a three-day debate in January, the CPI-M Politbureau postponed sending of an official delegation to China, according to a high-level party source, to wait for an improvement in relations between India and China. *Indian Express*, Jan. 14, 1981.

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political line. Dasgupta had been most reluctant to make the gesture, but was brought into line by Namboodiripad after four days of marathon discussions.[58]

The CPI-M's gesture did not, however, win it an invitation to the 26th CPSU Congress in late February (the CPI's Rao attended and spoke at the gathering[59]). Nor did it conceal continuing wide differences between the two parties on a number of critical issues. This was evident in a sharp written attack by Basavapunniah on portions of the Brezhnev political report to the Soviet party congress. He accused the Soviet leader of underplaying the "depth of disunity" that was damaging "world peace, independence and socialism" and had brought Communist movements into armed confrontation and even war. Moreover, he charged that the CPSU was downgrading the priority it had in the early 1970's accorded to normalization of relations with the CCP. Finally, he pointed out Moscow's failure to acknowledge reversals of the victories of the "noncapitalist path" in Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Sudan, Somalia, and Tanzania—victories that Brezhnev had trumpeted in 1971 at the 24th CPSU Congress.[60]

(Interestingly, the CPI-M, arguing from its Stalinist perspective, has also taken the Polish Communist leaders to task for mishandling socialist reconstruction and has termed Lech Walesa an "impostor." The Marxists opine that the Soviet Union should not hesitate to intervene in Poland to save Polish socialism, if circumstances demand.[61])

In trying to work out some sort of accommodation with the CPSU and CCP, the leadership of the CPI-M faces a growing disenchantment among its cadres regarding both. Speaking in Kerala in April 1981, Namboodiripad observed:

A feeling has developed among us that the Soviet Party and the Chinese Party are both enemies of the revolutionary movements in the capitalist countries. One section holds that China is not socialist, its leaders are enemies of revolution, while another holds that the Soviet Union is not socialist, its leaders are enemies of revolution. Though our party leadership opposes both these understandings, there is a trend growing in our ranks which is against the world Communist movement itself. The party leadership has not succeeded in effectively countering this trend.

Prominent members of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). From left to right: E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Harkishan Singh Surjeet, and Promode Dasgupta.

—Asoke Bose.

Although "not neutral" (in fact leaning toward Moscow) in disputes between the Soviet and Chinese parties, the CPI-M, continued Namboodiripad, was not in either "camp." However, the Indian party remained

part of the world Communist movement. All its victories are also our victory, all its reverses are also our reverses. This understanding has still to grow in us.[62]

As if to underscore its involvement with broader Communist issues, the Marxist party has been diversifying its foreign contacts. It has conducted party-level discussions with two of the major independent Communist parties in the industrialized world, those of Italy and Japan.

The CPI, mirroring as it does the Soviet world view, is not tormented by such dilemmas. While it goes along with the CPSU, it tolerates the CPI-M's support for normalization of relations between India and China and probably will, at the appropriate time, tolerate restoration of party-to-party relations between the CCP and the

[58] *The Times of India*, Jan. 3, 1981, reported: "There is little doubt that a good deal of pressure had to be brought on Mr. Dasgupta to fully accept the central line."

For a report on the CPI-M delegation's talks with the CP's of Vietnam and Laos, see *People's Democracy*, Feb. 8, 1981.

[59] Rao dutifully lambasted "the heinous role of the new Chinese leadership in the international arena" and accused Beijing of trying to undermine India's close friendly ties with the Soviet Union. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Feb. 26, 1981, Supp. 003, p. 27.

[60] "On the 26th Congress of CPSU," *People's Democracy*, Mar. 22, 1981.

[61] See an editorial in ibid., Feb. 15, 1981.

[62] Reported in ibid., Apr. 26, 1981. Namboodiripad issued a brief statement in the May 3 issue of *People's Democracy*, saying that certain passages of the report of his speech conveyed meanings he "did not have in mind," but he did not specify or offer any clarification—a plain indication that he stood by his comments. This curious exercise suggests the high degree of sensitivity of the party's leadership about its internationalism.

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Jyoti Basu, left, Marxist Chief Minister of West Bengal, and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi discuss issues between Calcutta and the center; at right, police of Basu's government extinguish streetcar fires ignited during April 1981 demonstrations by followers of Mrs. Gandhi's faction of the Congress party.

—Rajib Bose.

CPI-M.[63] If the Marxist party's claim that the CCP is steadily moving toward normalizing relations with the CPSU is confirmed by developments over the next few years, the CPI-M's stock in the world Communist movement would obviously rise dramatically.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi has been heading in the direction of confrontation with the Communists. She has kept the left front government in West Bengal on its toes by brandishing over its head like a sword of Damocles the possibility of dismissal by presidential order. In March 1981, she for the first time launched a frontal verbal attack on communism, questioning whether it could "secure the sort of democracy or sort of life we want in India."[64] Her party in West Bengal engaged the Marxists and their allies on the streets, and on April 3, several persons were killed when police of the left-front government fired on violent Congress-I demonstrators. The CPI-M accused the ruling party at the center of contriving a "law and order" situation as a pretext for dismissing the West Bengal government. Although the prime minister and her colleagues denied any such intention,they did not condemn the violent actions of her followers.[65] Mrs. Gandhi also moved against the CPI-M's partner, the CPI, by delinking it from institutions symbolizing Indo-Soviet friendship and removing pro-CPI intellectuals from positions in powerful and prestigious establishments of higher education and research.[66]

The Marxists do not seem intimidated. Instead, they set a May 31 date for municipal elections in West Bengal, polling that had been put off for more than a decade by successive Congress and left governments. The Congress-I boycotted the elections on the grounds that the CPI-M had "rigged" the electoral rolls, although observers suggested the real reason was bitter factional infighting within Congress-I.[67] The CPI-M and its allies won the vast majority of municipalities, thereby demonstrating the left front's electoral strength in urban areas also.[68] Moreover, the CPI-M successfully retained the sole Bengali Lok Sabha seat up for grabs in June 1981 by-elections, and the Marxists also won five seats, with the CPI taking a sixth, in eight contests for seats in West Bengal's state assembly.[69]

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[63] The Huang Hua visit to New Delhi, slated for early 1981, was cancelled by Beijing when India chose to recognize the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea. However, China's pique was shortlived, and Huang visited the Indian capital in late June, when the two governments agreed to take several confidence-building measures and to move toward settlement of their border dispute through negotiations. See reportage by Beijing Zinhua in English, as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), June 29, 1981 pp. F/4–6.

[64] *The Times of India,* Mar. 5, 1981. As long as the CPI had remained an ally, Mrs. Gandhi never attacked "communism" or the "Communist movement," but only the CPI-M and the so-called Naxalites.

[65] See *The Times of India* and *Indian Express,* Apr. 5, 6, and 7, 1981. In its April 5 edition, *The Times of India* alleged that Mrs. Gandhi had given clearance to her party and other like-minded factions "to launch movements against Marxists and their allies in both West Bengal and Kerala."

The CPI-M undertook a countrywide campaign to expose the Congress-I's alleged action. This included a highly disciplined meeting of several thousand staged by the local CPI-M in Delhi on May 19, which heard West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu and saw a film produced by his government on the April events. *Indian Express,* May 20, 1981.

[66] Ibid., Mar. 8, 1981; and S. Nihal Singh, "Bashing the Reds," ibid., Apr. 21, 1981.

[67] *The Times of India,* June 1 and 2, 1981.

[68] *Indian Express,* June 21, 1981.

[69] *FBIS-SAS,* June 24, 1981, p. E/1.

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Future Course

Within the shifting universe of Indian politics, Communist unity has already emerged as a powerful new element. Three states are under Communist rule, making the united forces of the CPI-M and the CPI the most disciplined and best organized political grouping in the country. This unity has deprived Mrs. Gandhi of opportunities to use Communists against one another to mutilate the Indian Communist movement.

Furthermore, the mobilization strength of the two Communist factions far exceeds their electoral support. For example, trade unions belonging to the two Communist groups command the loyalty of more than 50 percent of India's unionized industrial workers. Consequently, the Communists can organize large segments of industrial workers, poor peasants, landless laborers, and the poorer middle classes to oppose government policies and actions. There have been several demonstrations of this capability already in 1981. First, on March 26, the opposition parties held a million-strong peasant rally in New Delhi. The bulk of the peasants were brought in by the CPI from adjoining states, although the Marxist contingents showed themselves to be the most disciplined. (Similar rallies have been held in the capitals of Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka.) Second, nearly 100,000 workers of six huge public sector undertakings struck for 75 days early in the year.

The unity of the two parties and their combined resources may be able to plant in the minds of Indians the concept of a "left and democratic" alternative to the rule of the bourgeoisie. Leaders of both factions see their working unity in the total context of Indian politics—political fragmentation of the ruling class, the possible collapse of the ruling Congress party after Mrs. Gandhi passes from the political scene, rapid political socialization of broad masses of the people (especially the rural population, whose political loyalties are already seriously divided). They seem to be certain that, in unity, their parties would emerge as a formidable political force in India in the second half of the 1980's. To this end, both parties appear intent on building a strong left and democratic front in time for the next national elections, in 1985.

How will Communist unity affect India's foreign policy, especially relations with the Soviet Union and China? Over a stretch of 25 years, the Communist factor in the Indo-Soviet relationship has passed through two phases and has entered a third.

From the mid-1950's until the early 1960's, the united CPI stood firmly behind Indo-Soviet friendship. This phase was brought to an end by the split within Indian communism.

In the second phase, the CPI clung to the original political line, while the CPI-M—still supporting Indo-Soviet cooperation—moved out of the CPSU orbit. The Indian government's Soviet connection came in handy in dealing roughly with the Marxists in their strongholds in West Bengal and Kerala. Indo-Soviet friendship expanded enormously, but the Indian Communist movement was checkmated as a result of hostilities between the two factions.

Now, a third phase has begun, in which the Indian Communist movement and Indo-Soviet friendship are likely to lose the degree of symmetry they enjoyed in the first two periods. It remains to be seen whether Mrs. Gandhi can combine close cooperation with the Soviet Union and political confrontation with united Communist forces, and how the CPSU will react to this kind of situation. The current phase in the Indian Communist movement is charged with uncertain dynamism with regard to the two factions' relations with the CPSU and the CCP, their perspectives on the international Communist movement, and future developments in India's relations with the USSR and with China.

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Books

Soviet Leaders: Roots of Behavior

By Joel C. Moses

JERRY F. HOUGH. *Soviet Leadership in Transition.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980.

SEWERYN BIALER. *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union.* New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

PAUL J. MURPHY. *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician.* Jefferson, NC, McFarland & Company, Inc., 1981.

IF THERE was any emerging consensus in Western scholarship about the Brezhnev regime as inherently stable and predictable, more reasonable in its conduct of domestic and foreign policy, and more responsive in broadening the base of mass and specialist participation within the Soviet policymaking process than previous Soviet regimes, worsening Soviet-Western relations in recent years have unravelled any such consensus. This situation has thrown into sharp relief a problem that has always beset Western Sovietologists—namely, the quite different levels of analysis employed to explain the actions and outlooks of Soviet leaders. None of us resorts to only one level of analysis in his research, but all of us have tended to emphasize some to the exclusion of others. These alternative levels of analysis assume that different causal factors determine the personalities of Soviet leaders, result not unexpectedly in quite different conclusions about the nature of Soviet leaders, and color our general impressions of political continuity and change in the Soviet Union. Often this process is unconsciously reversed in our analysis. That is, we select only those levels of analysis to explain Soviet leaders which are logically consistent with our preconceptions of Soviet politics, and the questions which we ask and the evidence to which we are drawn by our levels of analysis only provide tautological confirmation of our preconceptions.

The impenetrable wall of secrecy which Soviet leaders still draw around themselves makes even more difficult a balanced understanding of the complex factors affecting their behavior and personalities. Like convex mirrors, particular levels of analysis can only highlight certain forces shaping Soviet leaders while distorting and understating others equally significant in forming their personalities. In this light, at least two of the books under review provide a needed corrective to some of the recent discussion in the West about Soviet leaders, and all three clearly illustrate how slightly different levels of analysis can convey different understandings of the nature and motivations of Soviet leaders.

THE FIRST and most prevalent level of analysis employed by Western Sovietologists in recent years to explain Soviet leaders takes a broad systemic view of Soviet politics and society. Grounded in historical, sociological, and psychological generalizations, this level of analysis assumes that Soviet leaders can be understood by the same kind of factors affecting aggregate leadership behavior in other political systems. In other words, Soviet leaders, like those in other systems, will be influenced by their dominant life experiences in passage from early adulthood to high political office, and they will be uniquely socialized and conditioned by the career and educational backgrounds of their particular leadership cohorts within the party. From this perspective, differences in the dominant life experiences of Soviet leaders and the career-demographic characteristics that they share with their leadership cohorts should persist throughout their political careers and eventually produce subtle variations in their values, attitudes, and behavior. Thus, the mix of background and career characteristics reflected among those achieving high political offices at various historical periods should afford a sensitive barometer of political continuity and change in the Soviet Union. For example, the values, attitudes, and behavior of leaders recruited predominantly

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from lower social classes with improvised formal education during the frenzied social change of the Stalin era should differ from those of the predominantly middle-class and technically proficient administrators recruited during the more stable Brezhnev era.

This level of analysis sensitizes us to underlying systemic changes in Soviet politics over time and to the potential diversity among generations of Soviet leaders as the conditions of Soviet society from which they originated as young cadres alter, and as the career requirements for advancement in the Soviet political hierarchy shift to satisfy newly emerging demands for different types of leaders. It assumes a potentially dynamic interchange between Soviet society and the Soviet political system. The system adapts to absorb new kinds of leaders produced by a constantly changing society; and, with the influx of new leadership strata into high political offices, the policy priorities of the system and internal policymaking affecting society, in turn, change. Consequently, system analysts of Soviet leaders expend much of their research efforts in compiling extensive biographical and career data on Soviet officials and tracing out the nuanced differences and patterned changes among those achieving high offices over decades.

Generational change provides the central focus to understand Soviet leaders in the books by Jerry Hough and Seweryn Bialer under review. Indeed, no clearer and more precise exposition of generational change could be found than in Hough's tightly reasoned and detailed monograph *Soviet Leadership in Transition.* In this book, an expanded version of an article written for this journal in 1979,[1] Hough contends that the Soviet political system is on the threshold of an important change. The Brezhnev political generation, a fairly homogeneous and somewhat self-conscious elite group dominant in all institutional realms of Soviet politics for the past 40 years, will soon pass from the scene, and it will be succeeded by a post-war and post-Stalin generation of younger leaders, whose quite different life experiences, background, and careers should bring forth qualitative changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Whether stimulating us by his insights, challenging us to question our implicit prejudices, or provoking us by his own value-laden judgments about Soviet politics, Hough over the last two decades has emerged as the preeminent system analyst of Soviet leadership among Western Sovietologists. Hough's mark of distinction always has been his exhaustive and painstaking research in compiling data on Soviet officials and the very consistent image of Soviet politics derived from his statistical findings on Soviet officials. For Hough, his findings reveal diversity and change among Soviet officials, and these patterns substantiate the institutionalized pluralism, policy conflict, and the dispersion of power that he perceives in the Soviet political system.

Consistent with his image of Soviet politics and based on extensive elite data, the monograph shows off Hough at his best. In 31 tables and figures, Hough demonstrates how the years in which various Soviet officials were born not only determined the formative life experiences and likely occupational and career backgrounds which they have had in common, but effectively biased the career advancement opportunities of these officials in various institutions and functional areas throughout their political lives. He distinguishes his birth cohorts among Soviet officials who have held various positions in the political-administrative apparatus, the

[1] "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1979, pp. 1–16.

Reviewers in This Issue

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military, and the foreign policy establishment from the early 1940's through 1980.

For Hough, World War II was the pivotal dividing line in life opportunities for all Soviet officials in these realms and the origin of the current generational gap among top- and second-echelon Soviet officials. Particularly advantaged were those born between 1900 and 1909 in the "Brezhnev generation." They were young enough to have completed their schooling and begun their political careers before 1941, at low enough positions to have escaped the purges of 1937–38, but at a high enough mid-career level by 1941 to benefit from the unusually rapid mobility and career opportunities of wartime service between 1941 and 1945. Those born only slightly earlier had already achieved high enough positions by 1937–38 that they were vulnerable to political denunciations and disappeared in large numbers during the purges before the war. Those born only slightly later had their schooling and early careers interrupted by the outbreak of the war and would remain permanently disadvantaged in career opportunities relative to the "Brezhnev generation," for they lacked the requisite formal schooling and credentials from wartime positions for important assignments immediately after 1945. The "Brezhnev generation" thus constitute something of a self-conscious political group and a "skip generation" in Soviet history. They filled the gap created by the disappearance virtually en masse of the slightly older pre-1900 birth cohort during the purges, but they were young enough (in their early 40's) after 1945 to dominate high institutional offices for the next two and a half decades in the Soviet Union.

Hough argues, however, that the "Brezhnev generation," now in their 70's and still dominant, are slowly if reluctantly giving up their positions through death and retirement, and that the new generation already are moving into high positions on a selective basis. Once the new generation replace the "Brezhnev generation," he contends, they will set different policy priorities and a new tone in internal policymaking reflective of their own unique life experiences and administrative and educational backgrounds, which have been more advanced technically than those of their predecessors. In foreign policy, Hough foresees that, in light of the Soviet position of military equivalency with the United States, this new political generation will be less driven by the classic inferiority complex of Soviet leaders about "catching up with the West," more assertive and self-confident in demanding respect from the United States for the Soviet Union as an equal global power, but also willing to pursue long-term cooperation in trade and to resolve international conflicts with the United States. He believes that they, although no less eager than their predecessors to expand Soviet influences in the Third World, have a more realistic appreciation of the limits of Soviet influence and of the complexities of these volatile regions, complexities not reducible to simple Marxist-Leninist tenets. Yet they also share a nationalistic pride and self-confidence which could turn aggressively defensive were they to perceive their national honor belittled by American political leaders or their national interests challenged in a new military arms race with the United States. Less bound by dogma and aware of the grave economic problems confronting the Soviet Union in the 1980's, they may be more willing to risk economic reforms akin to the Hungarian economic model to stimulate greater efficiency and labor productivity, even at the cost of short-term increases in inflation, unemployment, and income differentiation. For Hough, when this new generation solidify their hold and institute long-term policy changes depends on how disruptive the actual succession struggle becomes and how strained Soviet-American relations remain throughout the 1980's.

Hough's thesis of a generational pattern among Soviet leaders is convincingly argued throughout the monograph, and his detailed tables and figures confirm the diversity in generations among individuals working in various functional areas and holding various top- and second-echelon positions. Less persuasive for some Western Sovietologists will be Hough's central contention that generational differences actually make a real difference in elite values, behavior, and attitudes.

Hough admits that his contention about subcultural differences in attitudes among his leadership generations is based essentially on articles written by second-echelon foreign policy specialists and on speculation. Moreover, his speculation is devoid of any consideration of the dominant Russian and Marxist-Leninist elite political culture, in which all generations of Soviet leaders have probably been commonly socialized over the last six decades. Hough rejects the perspective of those who, like Hedrick Smith,[2] contend that Soviet politics reflects an underlying cultural continuity rooted in undemocratic, authoritarian, and bureaucratic traits, and Hough assumes that subcultural generational differences as a sociological phenomenon parallel those evident in Western nations like the "Vietnam generation" in the United States. In this reviewer's opinion, subcultural generational differences

[2] *The Russians*, New York, NY, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976, pp. 241–72, 281–301, and 504–09.

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do in a sociological sense alter the politics of a nation, but, from a psychological standpoint, the underlying elite political culture may also constrain and temper the impact of generational elite differences in any nation. It would appear, for example, that the new social conscience of the "Vietnam generation" from the 1960's in the United States has produced a new leadership stratum now in their 30's who individually seem to embrace the same old values of materialism, self-seeking competitiveness, and individualism endemic to American orthodox culture and elite thinking for the last 200 years. Why should the Soviet establishment have been more affected than the American by generational elite changes? Have not all new elites been co-opted and socialized into a common mold of traditional values and attitudes associated with their dominant elite political culture?

Like all of Hough's articles and books, this monograph is brilliant and stimulating at the broad systemic level of elite analysis but mechanistic and impersonal in discussing Soviet politics and the actual factors affecting elite advancement. In the monograph, leaders appear to be simply products of their careers and educational backgrounds, with their recruitment and promotion reflecting their rational objective capabilities or the system's adaptive responses to newly emerging groups in Soviet society. Just because the backgrounds and careers of Soviet leaders run parallel in terms of such objective criteria, Hough assumes that these leaders have personalities and motivations typical of party members, who in turn represent a cross-section of the "attentive public" in Soviet society as a whole. Thus, he holds that the "Brezhnev generation" underwent the same dominant life experiences as their fellow citizens during the frenzied changes of the First Five-Year Plan.

True, neither the "Brezhnev generation" nor any other generation of Soviet leaders have ever been the abnormal monsters or moral eunuchs sometimes portrayed by those interpreting Soviet politics in totalitarian terms. But have those aspiring to full-time leadership roles in the highly apolitical Soviet mass society ever been exactly like their fellow citizens or even their fellow party members? Many Soviet citizens experienced rapid social mobility in the 1930's, but what set the "Brezhnev generation" apart from average Soviet citizens was their very willingness to commit themselves at that time to fulltime political careers. What distinguished them from their fellow citizens of the 1930's was their willingness to make the moral compromises involved in holding official positions and acting as instruments of institutionalized terror from above, to enforce collectivization on fellow citizens who were resisting and dying in the hundreds of thousands, and to denounce fellow citizens and superiors as "subversives" and "wreckers" in their own rapid advancement up the political ladder. The unanswered question remains: did their direct political experiences "on the job" in their early 30's and their internal rationalizations for their behavior not define their unique generational personality as a leadership group more than did their sudden rise from lower social classes or their particular educational and professional backgrounds?

FOR THOSE troubled by Hough's unwillingness to consider the importance of underlying elite political culture in shaping leadership personalities and by his somewhat selective reconstruction of Soviet history of the 1930's, Seweryn Bialer's *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* will be welcomed as a more balanced and comprehensive overview of the forthcoming generational change among Soviet leaders. For Bialer, like Hough, the Soviet Union is on the eve of a significant generational change in the mid-1980's, with the top leadership soon to be almost totally replaced in all institutional realms by a postwar and post-Stalin generation. There are many other striking similarities in the views of the two authors. Both substantiate the uniqueness of the forthcoming post-Brezhnev generation of Soviet leaders with detailed background and career data. Both emphasize the close linkages between Soviet society and the political system forged over decades by the active recruitment of diverse social classes and ethnic groups into leadership and participatory roles. Both stress the pluralistic tendencies in policymaking increasingly characteristic of the Brezhnev regime. And both express dismay at what they regard as a tendency of certain Western political leaders to see Soviet military expenditures since 1975 as a new expansionist drive to achieve dominance over the West.

For both Bialer and Hough, too, the social and political mobility of the Soviet population over decades explains the high level of diffuse support for the system. This has given many groups and strata a perceived stake in maintaining the system, to preserve their advantages. But Bialer more explicitly recognizes a problem stemming from this situation—namely, the perception of mobility depends on the reality of a constantly expanding pie of economic and political opportunities in Soviet society. With the economic stagnation of the last decade and the other economic difficulties that now confront the leadership in the 1980's, the raised expecta-

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tions of the Soviet people for personal economic advancement in their lifetimes may be sorely disappointed. Indeed, a "politics of stringency" may prevail. Moreover, the aging top leadership, committed to "stability" in lower cadre ranks to preserve an oligarchical consensus and more comfortable with old familiar faces from their generation in formulating policies, may so frustrate ambitious younger leaders at middle-level positions (particularly non-Russian leaders, whose perceptions of the Soviet system's legitimacy derive from their own mobility) that the latter increasingly question the relevance of the system to their own political aspirations. These younger leaders, Bialer suggests, may justifiably feel that they are more competent than the present top leadership to stimulate real economic growth and satisfy the ambitions of the Soviet population for upward mobility.

As Bialer sees things, the record of the Brezhnev generation in power since 1965 has been both positive and negative. On the positive side, they have provided a needed stability and normalcy to political life after the chaotic, if well-intentioned, reforms and tensions unleashed during the Khrushchev era, and they have redirected economic priorities to improve the living standards of the Soviet population through increased investment in the consumer-goods and agricultural sectors. The Brezhnev era, Bialer writes, "will enter Soviet history as a period of the most impressive achievement, a period unequaled in the past and, incidentally, one not likely to be equaled in the foreseeable future" (p. 158).

On the negative side, according to Bialer, the Brezhnev generation now seem to be suffering from a terminal case of oligarchic sclerosis. Bent on maintaining consensus for its own sake, they have geared policies at the lowest common denominator so as not to threaten any major interests at the national level; consequently, they have fallen into a pattern of administrative tinkering, policy timidity and drift, and nondecisions. At the same time, they seem to have become obsessed with projecting their country as a global military power—perhaps because achievement of strategic military equality with the United States has been their one major policy accomplishment over the last 40 years—and they appear to feel slighted that their attainment of strategic military equality has not won them equivalent global diplomatic influence or global status in the eyes of the United States. To be sure, Bialer notes, the major internal problems which they will bequeath to the next elite generation have not been entirely of their own doing. Many are the legacies of the Stalinist economic system and Stalinist policies which only began to be confronted openly during the brief reign of Nikita Khrushchev. Yet the Brezhnev generation are still too much protégés of Stalin, who overlearned the lessons of the 1930's and have emerged as the major barrier to needed reforms in the Soviet Union.

Unlike Hough, Bialer appraises the significance of the forthcoming generational change in terms of the defining societal and political characteristics of the Stalin era that produced the current Brezhnev generation. That is, he gives attention not only to the educational and career patterns of the Brezhnev generation but also to their societal origins and the political experiences and motivations which he feels shaped their personalities.

For Bialer, one definable attribute of the forthcoming generation may be cynicism, for they entered the party and held their first positions at a time when the destalinization campaign of Khrushchev openly questioned the underlying values of the system. That cynicism, he suggests, may make them more willing to institute meaningful economic reforms and to abolish many of the continuing legacies of the Stalinist system.

Much as they may differ in their policy concerns and approaches from the departing Brezhnev generation, however, the forthcoming elite generation are themselves products of basic changes in elite recruitment and policymaking that have been institutionalized under the Brezhnev regime. For Bialer, these include the decline of generalists as a career type among party functionaries and the emergence of functional specialists as the career norm,[3] the changing role of the party and party functionaries from mobilizer to administrator of contending policy interests, the broadening of participation by specialists in the policymaking process, and the greater tolerance for policy initiatives by nonparty organizations and interests. As the new generation moves to remedy grave problems left over from the Brezhnev era, they will enact policy changes within the parameters of these underlying changes.

A SECOND LEVEL of analysis among Western Sovietologists has consistently challenged the assumptions of system analysts and the assignment of significance to generational changes. Representatives of this school attribute the behavior of Soviet leaders primarily to structural factors that—they argue—have shaped all Soviet leaders over decades into a common mold. These Sovietologists stress that all Soviet leaders must advance through a

[3] On the emergence of different functional specialists as a more prevalent career type in the Soviet Union, see my "The Impact of *Nomenklatura* in Soviet Regional Elite Recruitment," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique* (Tempe, AZ), forthcoming in 1981.

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highly bureaucratized political hierarchy, and that their very advancement up this bureaucratic hierarchy socializes all Soviet leaders into certain informal ways of understanding power and decision-making quite distinct from those internalized by leaders advancing in a less bureaucratized and more open recruitment system. Structural determinists contend that the formation of patron-client networks and factional cliques and the intense personal quality of all policy conflict constitute realities to which all Soviet leaders over decades have adapted to survive in the Byzantine political world of the Soviet Union, and these have engendered common leadership personalities, attitudes, and values. From Georgiy Malenkov vs. Andrey Zhdanov to Nikolay Podgornyy vs. Leonid Brezhnev, only the names of the major protagonists at center stage in the Kremlin have changed over time. All Soviet leaders rising in the highly bureaucratized political order have learned the informal rules of the game: don't trust anyone not your political patron or client (and then don't trust your own clients too much); adopt policy positions expediently, solely on the basis of whether they increase your influence or discredit your opponents; protect your political "territory" of clientele against incursions by all your political opponents; and be constantly alert to the formal symbols of your personal authority to cue your followers to obeisance and frighten your potential opponents into submission.[4]

Whatever systematic corruption and irrationality they impart to the Soviet political process, patron-client networks, factional cliques, and personalized conflict, in the eyes of structural determinists, also humanize Soviet politics and provide some latent predictability to leadership recruitment and the implementation of policies. Like the evolution of the "second economy" in the Soviet Union to correct the defects of the overcentralized and inefficient command economy, they have informally emerged as something of a political "market mechanism" to grease the rigid political system. They match the supply of future leaders to the demand for loyalty among their subordinates by contending top Soviet leaders, whose political priorities otherwise would be sabotaged or lost in the conflicting policies and irrational maze of the Soviet bureaucracy. Taken to a logical extreme by skillful structural determinists or Kremlinologists like Robert Conquest, Michel Tatu, and Sidney Ploss, this informal political reality of Soviet leadership comes to resemble a continuous 64-year Soviet version of the American TV program "Dallas," with Soviet leaders incessantly scheming against each other and attempting to maximize their authority and dominance over others.

Where the first level of analysis assumes that Soviet leaders change over time as a result of their changing formative experiences, careers, and backgrounds, structural determinists assume that any formal differences among Soviet leaders over generations have been minimized by their common formative life experiences advancing up the same bureaucratized hierarchy. Thus, there is leadership continuity from the same political structure, not constant leadership change from societal change and new leadership generations.

Paul Murphy's *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician* is a recent attempt to apply the assumptions of this second level of analysis. For Murphy, as for most structural determinists, "rivalry, struggle, and intrigue over power and policy are the stuff of Soviet politics . . . how Soviet politicians are made and how Soviet policy decisions are made . . ." (pp. iii–iv), and Brezhnev's entire political career has been a classic Soviet success story of these leadership attributes in application.

In Murphy's interpretation, Brezhnev's political career reads like that of a successful mafioso who rose to become the Soviet don of dons only because he was more ruthless, cunning, and opportunistic than others of his generation. A sense of this interpretation can be conveyed merely by citing Murphy's chapter headings and various phrases used to describe stages in Brezhnev's career. During his early 20's, as he enforces "dekulakization," Brezhnev is a "Commissar with a Whip," who, "using every available resource and applying repressive measures . . . unleashed a reign of terror against kulak and middle peasant alike to achieve collectivization by whatever means it took . . ." (p. 30). Under Stalin, he "learned to observe carefully and to move cautiously and methodically . . ." (p. 34). As Khrushchev's "loyal propagandist" in purging the Ukraine during the latter 1930's, Brezhnev engaged in wholesale "slander and character assassination . . ." (p. 53). In 1944, in "Conquering a Foreign Land," Brezhnev engaged in "deceit, intrigue, and ruthless force" (p. 83) in the bloodbath to bring the Transcarpathian population back under the heel of Soviet rule. He threatens and cajoles his workers in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'ye after the war to rebuild industries because "his personal political future depended upon it . . ." (p. 96). In reasserting control over collective farms in Moldavia in 1950, Brezhnev carried out a "blitz" of purges because over time "violence now came naturally

[4] For a recent example of this approach, see Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1980, pp 41–47.

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to him . . ." (p. 113). For 25 years from Dnepropetrovsk to Moscow, Brezhnev is Khrushchev's "hot shot for the provinces" (p. 110), the one mainstay of his "political machine," and one of his loyal "henchmen" (p. 156) against rival cliques and intrigues of Lazar Kaganovich, Lavrentiy Beriya, and Georgiy Malenkov. Since 1965, Brezhnev has solidified his authority by surrounding himself with loyal cohorts from his former political postings in Dnepropetrovsk, Moldavia, and Kazakhstan and by skillfully moving to isolate, discredit, and then oust major rivals in the Politburo like Aleksandr Shelepin, Pëtr Shelest, Podgornyy, Gennadiy Voronov, and then finally Aleksey Kosygin.

Readers will find that very similar ground has previously been covered in John Dornberg's *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power*.[5] More important, however, Dornberg, as a trained journalist posted as a bureau chief in Moscow, was more successful than Murphy is in capturing the complexities and personal foibles of Brezhnev the politician and the human being. While we can understand the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from the one-dimensional ruthlessness and cunning attributed to Brezhnev by Murphy, it is less easy by the end of Murphy's book to understand other "Brezhnevs": the "chairman of the board," who has remained in power by brokering diverse interests; the proponent of increased consumer goods and services to improve the lot of Soviet citizens; or the advocate of greater pluralism in the development of party policies.

If Hough errs in discounting the impact of political culture and assuming that Soviet elite attitudes and motivations closely parallel those found among elites in other nations, Murphy overstates his case in contending that Soviet leaders like Brezhnev are motivated solely by an opportunistic drive for power and domination conditioned by the political culture. Thus, Murphy, in attributing Brezhnev's motivations to his all-consuming drive for power and domination over others, interprets Brezhnev's policy of détente solely as a cynical ploy to advance his own political primacy in the Politburo, slow the growth of American military power, dampen American willingness to resist Soviet military expansionism in the Third World, and achieve Soviet military superiority over the United States by the mid-1980's.

At various points in the book, Murphy also becomes carried away by his negative portrayal of Brezhnev and attributes a state of mind and motivations to Brezhnev without any evidence for doing so. For example, Murphy says that the urgency with which Brezhnev ruthlessly carried out reforms in Moldavia in 1950–51 was "motivated" by his desire to be promoted into the central leadership once the first postwar party congress was convened (p. 118); and Murphy contends that Soviet publicity in 1972–73 stressing Brezhnev's down-to-earth personality was the consequence in part of Brezhnev's sensitivity since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia "about the Western portrayal of him as a kind of beetle-browed villain" (p. 279). It would be reassuring to believe that we actually know what Brezhnev has intended or thought at various stages of his career, but readers otherwise impressed by Murphy's diligent research on the facts of Brezhnev's career should be cautious about accepting Murphy's attempted reconstructions of Brezhnev's feelings or thoughts.

In all fairness, however, Murphy did not have the resources to write a balanced and comprehensive biography of Brezhnev. Therefore, the book should be looked at as simply a profile of a prototypical Soviet political career derived from a Kremlinological methodology and a series of assumptions. Murphy, to his credit, has thoroughly researched all the available sources on Brezhnev's career. He incorporates the recent disclosures about Brezhnev from the numerous publications in the Soviet Union which have appeared as part of the growing cult of Brezhnev since the mid-1970's, and he went back to Ukrainian newspapers from the 1930's and 1940's to retrace references to Brezhnev during the early years of the Soviet leader's political advancement. In addition, Murphy interviewed those in the West directly acquainted with Brezhnev or familiar with locales of the Soviet Union in which Brezhnev was stationed at various stages of his political career. Indeed, both Murphy and Dornberg interviewed Nathan Kruglak (now living in Milwaukee), who was born in Brezhnev's hometown of Dneprodzerzhinsk and was a former classmate of Brezhnev.

AS MURPHY sees things, there have not been, and will not be, fundamental changes in the characteristics of Soviet leaders such as Brezhnev. By the end of Murphy's book, the major figures of the post-Brezhnev generation seem to have internalized the same rules of the game learned by Brezhnev during the 1930's. Yet, from their broad systemic level of analysis, both Hough and Bialer anticipate an evolution in the Soviet political system with the ascendancy to power of the post-Brezhnev elite generation. On balance, this reviewer believes that Hough and Bialer's judgment will probably turn out to be accurate, for one should not underrate the degree of diversity

[5] *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power*, New York, NY, Basic Books, 1974.

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within the Soviet leadership. At the same time, Murphy reminds us that the post-Brezhnev generation are also political apprentices of the Brezhnev political structure. That political structure originated under Stalin and promotes a basic underlying continuity in mentality of all those who achieve high office in the Soviet Union, whatever the disparate nature of their formative life experiences, careers, or backgrounds. It is little consolation for any of us that such a political structure continues to single out future Soviet leaders more for their political cunning than for their abilities or policy views.

The "Action Arm" of the CPSU

By John J. Dziak

LENNARD D. GERSON. *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia.* Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1976.

GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD. *The Storm Petrels: The Flight of the First Soviet Defectors.* London, Collins, 1977.

ALEKSEI MYAGKOV. *Inside the KGB: An Expose by an Officer of the Third Directorate.* Richmond, Surrey, England, The Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1976.

VLADIMIR SAKHAROV and UMBERTO TOSI. *High Treason.* New York, NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1980.

US CONGRESS, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. *Soviet Covert Action: the Forgery Offensive,* Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, February 6, 19, 1980. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980.

HARRY ROSITZKE. *The KGB: The Eyes of the People.* New York, NY, Doubleday and Company, 1981.

IT HAS BEEN roughly seven years since John Barron's *KGB* attracted Western attention to the "action arm" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[1] His study appropriately emphasized that the Committee for State Security (KGB) is something much more than just another police organ or foreign intelligence service.

In the Soviet Union, the intelligence and security services have enjoyed a pervasive and powerful position since 1917. Created a little more than a month after the Bolshevik coup of November 7, 1917, these services—the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage (CHEKA) and its successors—soon became the mainstay of the party, a situation recognized by every Soviet leader from Vladimir Lenin through Leonid Brezhnev. Indeed, it is no accident that the KGB and its predecessors have occupied a special position as the cutting edge of party authority domestically and the leading organ in Soviet foreign activities. Lenin consciously collaborated with F. Dzerzhinskiy, the head of the CHEKA, in granting the CHEKA the extralegal or translegal authority to employ special measures to guarantee the monopoly of power of his faction. Iosif Stalin built on such precedents, adroitly using them to his own advantage, though obviously at the party's (and country's) expense. Nikita Khrushchev may have reined the KGB in, but he did it primarily to insure its role as servant of the party and not the reverse. Moreover, he left the reins on it considerably more slack with respect to the country as a whole. Brezhnev has essentially followed the reorientation of his predecessor, carefully overseeing the return of the security organs to the tradition of Dzerzhinskiy and Lenin, that of "most trusted servant" and "action arm" of the party.[2]

[1] John Barron, *KGB,* New York, NY, Bantam Books, 1974.

[2] For a survey of the function of the KGB and its predecessors as well as its relationship to the party, see Ronald Hingley, *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations 1565-1970,* New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1970.

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It needs to be stressed that the position of the Soviet security organs, and principally the KGB relative to the party, is a special one unmatched by any other Soviet institution, including the military. As the party's praetorian guard, the KGB has been allowed, without interruption, to penetrate every facet of the Soviet system, domestic or foreign. This penetration extends to the military as well as to the KGB's sister services, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. The KGB deploys its own armed forces—border guards, 9th Directorate troops, signal troops—and may extend this control to the internal security troops of the MVD, together comprising military forces of at least half a million men *independent* of Marshal D. F. Ustinov's Ministry of Defense. In foreign operations, the KGB clearly takes precedence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, itself also subject to KGB penetration and co-optation of its personnel. KGB Chief Yu. V. Andropov, a Brezhnev confidante of long standing, is a voting member of the Politburo and reportedly one of the six or seven permanent members of the Defense Council, an elite inner group frequently rumored to be the true locus of central decision-making.[3] Hence, when examining the KGB, we are dealing with something beyond just another state institution or another competitor in some interest-group model. The party without the KGB simply would not be the party as we know it.

UNFORTUNATELY, few scholars have paid the party-KGB phalanx the serious and in-depth attention it clearly merits. Many treatises on Soviet politics and the Soviet system either ignore the security and intelligence apparatus or relegate it to the cursory coverage befitting a subject not open to meaningful scholarly inquiry. Furthermore, the specialized writings on the topic are quite sparse. For instance, there has yet to appear a definitive history of the Soviet intelligence and security services, notwithstanding commendable surveys such as Ronald Hingley's *The Russian Secret Police* or the valuable contributions of Robert Slusser.[4] Since the publication of Barron's *KGB* in 1974, in fact, output on the subject has increased only slightly, and a lot of this has come from outside the academic community.

One fine exception to this generally dismal state of affairs is Lennard Gerson's *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia.* This superior inquiry deserves inclusion on required reading lists for Soviet history and government courses. Among the several conclusions one may draw from Gerson's research, two merit highlighting for present purposes. First, the author convincingly demonstrates that productive analysis of the Soviet secret police is possible from open and available sources. Too often the argument is proffered that the very nature of the subject inhibits meaningful inquiry, for the data are buried in party/KGB archives, destroyed, or manipulated according to the changing interpretations of Soviet historiography. While these are real limitations which render the scholar's task especially onerous, Gerson has shown that it can be done and done well. The pertinent Soviet party and state documents and memoir literature which he has surfaced in themselves provide the necessary points of departure for still further lines of investigation.

Second, Gerson has meticulously chronicled the Leninist roots of party/state–directed terror as an institutionalized instrument of party control. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has so poignantly witnessed, *katorga* and *Gulag* were not mere aberrations attributable to the whims of a *vozhd'* (Stalin) who betrayed the noble ideals of a new era of history ushered in by Lenin.[5] Gerson concludes that it was "during the formative years of Bolshevik rule, when violence and terror were extolled by men of theory and freely indulged in by men of action, [that] they had imprisoned and executed thousands upon thousands to preserve the Bolshevik monopoly of power. For this they earned the sincere gratitude of the Party's leaders" (p. 274).

Internal repression and the dynamics of party-police interaction constitute but one facet of the activities of the Soviet security organs. Intelligence, espionage, covert action, disinformation and deception undertakings, and counterintelligence are others, and they are dealt with in the rest of the works under review. Gordon Brook-Shepherd elucidates the workings of the Soviet power elite and its foreign operations by retelling the odysseys of several Soviet officials who defected to the West before World War II. *The Storm Petrels* focuses on five prominent Soviet defectors, ranging from Boris Bajanov, who had been Stalin's personal assistant and secretary to the Politburo before he left the USSR in 1928, to Alexander Orlov, one of the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officers ever to flee the system. Though each of the defectors—Bajanov, Georges Agabekov, Grigoriy Bessedovsky, Walter

[3] For information on the Defense Council, see John J. Dziak, *Soviet Military Doctrine and Power,* New York, NY, National Strategy Information Center, 1981; and Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR,* 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981.

[4] See Hingley, op. cit.; Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, *The Soviet Secret Police,* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1975.

[5] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag Archipelago,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1979.

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Krivitsky, and Orlov—wrote his own memoirs, Brook-Shepherd relies more on hitherto unpublished Western official sources and, in the case of Bajanov, on a lengthy personal interview.

The result is an intriguing tapestry of vignettes. Some of the most intriguing points, however, Brook-Shepherd was not able to follow up on. There is a possibility, for example, that Bessedovsky was "turned back" to Soviet service, especially in the immediate postwar years in Paris, where the KGB's I. I. Agayants (later to head the KGB's new Disinformation Department) was operating (p. 105).[6] Bessedovsky's trail simply disappeared in the French Riviera during the early years after the war. Similarly, Orlov hinted tantalizingly that a Ukrainian faction of the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU) had intrigued, with possible army complicity, against Stalin before both the military and the police were savaged in the purges of the 1930's, but he would say no more. An intelligence officer to the end, he revealed only what he wished and took the rest with him when he died in April 1973.

Nevertheless, Brook-Shepherd's account has the highly readable style of an accomplished journalist. Its major drawback from a researcher's perspective is the lack of bibliography and pertinent citations.

IN THE STUDY of Soviet intelligence and security services, defector testimony provides some of the most telling detail available, especially on operational specifics. Much of this information has become available as published testimony before various governmental commissions and Congressional hearings. The rest has appeared in the form of memoir literature, although this seems to have had an impact only well after the events described. Many of the early defectors from the security or state *apparat* were disillusioned revolutionaries, themselves participants in the drama of the construction of the Soviet state. More recent arrivals have manifested a different type of disillusionment, coming as they have from an ensconced elite long since purged of early doubters. They have also brought with them experiences honed in the milieu of post-Stalin developments.

Former KGB Captain Alexei Myagkov's *Inside the KGB* may strike some readers at first as merely another exposé by a disaffected insider. Yet an appreciation of *where* in the KGB Myagkov worked and a careful reading of his narrative as well as of the documents he brought with him reveals this book to be one of the more significant contributions to the literature on Soviet intelligence. Myagkov was an officer of the KGB's Third Directorate, the successor to the Soviet military counterespionage organs known as SMERSH and counterintelligence watchdog over the Soviet military. To this reviewer's knowledge, he is the only defector since the immediate postwar years from within the Third Directorate.

The Third Directorate, among other things, runs in the military what the Second Chief Directorate does in the rest of Soviet society—an intricate informant network. The organizational means for this activity are known as Special Departments, and it was in one of these units in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany that Myagkov worked from 1969 until his defection in early 1974. His service in this capacity provides insight into the nature of the day-to-day interaction of the KGB and the military, the superior position of the former, and the mandatory system for unmasking enemies within the ranks of the Soviet armed forces.

In addition to the operational aspects of Myagkov's KGB duties, his book provides glimpses into the functioning and privileges of the Soviet elite, including the party's "nomenclature" system within the armed forces and the attendant overlap of privilege, bribery, and the second economy. What emerges from his brief memoir is a compact case study of how the party, the military, and the KGB function in mutually beneficial symbiosis, and this in spite of the frictions generated by KGB penetration of the armed forces. Myagkov's microcosmic view adds valuable KGB-party-military detail to the broader phenomenon of an established self-perpetuating elite first scrutinized by that early believer-turned-dissident, Milovan Djilas.[7]

Myagkov's perspective is essentially one from the bottom up—i.e., that of a former enlisted man who moved into the operational levels of the KGB as a junior officer. In this sense, it is the tactical-operational perspective of the raw material of the party's "action arm." A more "strategic" panorama is provided by Vladimir Sakharov's *High Treason*. The son of a well-connected KGB father, Sakharov was a member of the Soviet aristocracy, thereby enjoying both privilege and access. Membership in such an elite helped provide Sakharov entrance to the Institute of International Relations in preparation for service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to that most desired perquisite, foreign travel. Though not a KGB officer, Sakharov was a co-optee. His father's influence was used to ensure that this institutional connection progressed no further, even after the KGB had pressed young Sakharov to integrate as a KGB reg-

[6] On Agayants, see also Barron, op. cit.; and Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972.

[7] See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974.

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ular. Still, Sakharov served the KGB—not uncommon for many, if not most, Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel overseas.

Sakharov's activities in the Middle East were first mentioned in John Barron's *KGB,* not long after Sakharov's defection to the US in 1971. *High Treason* adds intimate detail, ranging from Sakharov's connections to elite KGB and party families, to the Soviet penetration of Abdel Nasser's Egypt and KGB/GRU operations involving guerrilla and terrorist groups in the Middle East. Like Oleg Penkovskiy,[8] Sakharov was a defector/agent-in-place, having been recruited by the US some time (undisclosed) before his actual flight in 1971.

High Treason is the first account since Alexander Kaznacheyev's *Inside a Soviet Embassy* to provide working details on the structure and operations of Soviet intelligence residencies abroad.[9] Confirming the continued preeminence of the KGB over the Foreign Ministry both in Moscow and abroad, Sakharov adds other information pointing to an enhanced role in foreign affairs for certain higher party organs. Specifically, B. N. Ponomarëv's International Department of the Central Committee, besides having a central role in foreign policy formulation, is a critical player in policy execution. Sakharov observes that International Department representatives at important foreign posts outranked both the KGB resident and the ambassador, serving as *the* senior Soviet authorities overseeing all activities, whether diplomatic, subversive, or intelligence. Some analysts, like Leonard Schapiro, have long held that Ponomarëv's department and not the Foreign Ministry is the true locus of foreign policy.[10] Sahkarov's revelations support this contention and indicate another dimension to the Department's activities: on-site supervision of all Soviet intelligence, subversion, disinformation, and other covert action operations.

When viewed in the context of the reorientation of the KGB's role initiated by Khrushchev and KGB chief A. N. Shelepin in late 1958, such a situation is not all that surprising. The objective of these two men was to refocus the secret police along the lines initially established by Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy—i.e., to return it to being an action instrument of the party, fulfilling party objectives and responding to party direction. Indeed, that appeared to be the primary rationale for the appointment of Shelepin and the dropping of General I. A. Serov (who moved to the GRU) as head of the organization. A clean leadership break was made to prepare the KGB for the more sophisticated operations mandated by Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy. While this step made good foreign policy sense, it may, of course, have been a foolish internal political move, for both Shelepin and his handpicked successor, V. Ye. Semichastnyy, were among the plotters of Khrushchev's downfall in 1964.

AT ANY RATE, the changes begun in 1958 ushered in a new phase of KGB foreign operations. Concurrent with the appointment of Shelepin was the selection of Colonel I. I. Agayants—who, as noted earlier, had run disinformation operations in Paris—to head the new Disinformation Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Although the Soviets had for years carried out centrally directed deception and disinformation activities—the highly successful "Trust" operation of 1922–27 was an almost textbook example[11]—the institutionalization of such a function portended more and better-organized efforts. By the time of Agayants's death in 1968, he had been a KGB general for several years; and by the early 1970's, the Disinformation Department itself had been bureaucratically upgraded to the level of Service ("Sluzhba A"). Both developments were clear indicators of the accomplishments and weight of Agayants and his organization.

Further signs of an intent to conduct a full range of "active measures" came in March 1978 with the creation of the Central Committee's International Information Department, under the direction of Leonid Zamyatin, Brezhnev intimate and former chief of the press agency TASS. In the same year, the KGB itself was formally redesignated the KGB of the USSR and thereby relieved of its titular subordination to the Council of Ministers. Thus, Brezhnev not only has continued the reorientation that Khrushchev set in motion in 1958 but has strengthened it by fashioning a party conglomerate composed of the International Department, the International Information Department, and the KGB itself. The board of directors of the "active measures" *apparat* are all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, or Central Committee, and include such prominent figures as Brezhnev, M. A. Suslov, Andropov (also KGB chief), Ponomarëv, K. V. Rusakov, and Zamyatin.

Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, issued in 1980 by the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, deals with the results of these post-Khrushchev de-

[8] See Oleg Penkovsky, *The Penkovsky Papers,* London, Collins, 1965.

[9] Alexander Kaznacheyev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma,* Philadelphia, PA, Lippincott, 1962.

[10] Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976-1977, pp. 41-58.

[11] On the "Trust" operation, see Geoffrey Bailey, *The Conspirators,* New York, NY, Harpers, 1960; S. L. Voytsekhovskiy, *Trest—Vospominaniya i documenty* (The Trust—Recollections and Documents), London, Ontario, Zarya Publishers, 1974.

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velopments—specifically, the role of both propaganda and covert action in Soviet foreign policy. It includes a study and testimony on Soviet "active measures," plus documentation on Soviet or Soviet-inspired forgeries, by the Central Intelligence Agency and testimony by Ladislav Bittman, former deputy chief of the Czech intelligence service's Disinformation Department. The document is highly useful on several counts. It provides valuable specifics on the centralized party-KGB phalanx for conceiving and executing/overseeing broad covert action and propaganda initiatives. There are several excellent case studies of Soviet action—e.g., against US production of neutron weapons and the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces. It contains important analysis of the increase in Soviet bloc forgeries aimed at discrediting the US and allied countries, as well as facsimiles of many of the forged materials. Finally, the testimony of Bittman places such "active measures" in the context of broader objectives and operations of Soviet bloc foreign policy. In sum, *Soviet Covert Action* is one of the more valuable additions to the small body of dependable literature treating Soviet intelligence and merits careful reading by those interested in that realm of Soviet foreign policy which transcends traditional diplomacy.

The last work under consideration, Harry Rositzke's *The KGB: The Eyes of the People,* is the only study of those reviewed here produced by a former US intelligence officer. Rositzke began his intelligence career in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then spent the bulk of his service in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the operational side, "viewing the KGB in action both at home and abroad" (p. x).

The book is also the most difficult of the items under review to come to grips with. It seems to abound with stark declarations such as the jacket characterization of the KGB as the "world's best intelligence organization," or—more troublesome—robust assertions such as "it [the KGB] is a straightforward, secret service, even in its more devious and deceptive practices" (p. ix); or "organized ethnic and religious minorities face the KGB with the least problem of security control" (p. 254). The problem with such statements is that they are, at the least, debatable and merit much more in the way of explication, rationale, and convincing supporting development.

While the KGB qualifies as one of the most pervasive and powerful *security* services the world has ever seen, this reviewer would hesitate to characterize it as the world's best *intelligence* organization. To be sure, it is probably the largest single intelligence service, but a judicious comparison with others, including smaller intelligence services such as the Israeli organization, is warranted before any sweeping conclusion can be drawn about the quality of its efforts.

Moreover, the fact that the KGB, unfettered by many of the governmental, constitutional, and societal checks imposed on Western services, has a unique mandate, argues against characterization of it as just a "straightforward secret service." Differences in degree ultimately add up to differences in kind. Although KGB officers are not giants of capability, the position of their service in the Soviet system imposes far fewer restraints on them in both internal and international operations, than intelligence officers in constitutionally limited systems face.

Essentially an anecdotal treatment, Rositzke's *KGB* includes many fascinating cases from before World War II as well as from the contemporary period, yet a connective theme is difficult to pinpoint because of skips in chronology, case flashbacks, and undeveloped assertions which do not build a compelling narrative. This is an interesting work, but it leaves too many loose ends.

IN CONCLUSION, one may say that despite some of the fine contributions discussed above, there is much more work that needs to be done on the Soviet intelligence and security services. To supplement the necessarily sporadic information that is available from the infrequent "petrels," solidly researched inquiries are essential. This is especially the case with regard to the original formation and role of the political police under Lenin. George Leggett's forthcoming volume on the CHEKA is most welcome in this respect and promises to be a solid complement to Gerson's book.[12]

However, later periods also deserve further scrutiny, especially relative to the role of the KGB within the party-state structure. Indeed, a case can be made for examining the party and police apparatuses together rather than as entirely separate institutional entities. For example, Brezhnev has staffed the security services with close party associates from earlier days (Andropov, S. K. Tsvigun, G. K. Tsinev, V. M. Chebrikov, and others in the KGB; N. A. Shchëlokov and the late V. S. Paputin in the MVD). Moreover, because the chairman of the KGB, the party's "action arm," is a member of the Politburo and reputedly a Defense Council member as well, the KGB today appears to be in a stronger postion than at any time since Stalin's death and the fall of L. P. Beriya, yet it achieved this

[12] [George Leggett's, *The CHEKA: Lenin's Political Police,* was released by Oxford University Press after this essay-review was written—Eds.]

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status under and through Brezhnev and not through any free-wheeling maneuverings of its own. Brezhnev, it would seem, has successfully carried the reorientation begun by Khrushchev to its logical end—the shaping of a faithful servant of the party and a partner for the party in pursuit of the party's objectives.

Psychiatry and the Soviet State

By Harvey Fireside

ALEXANDER PODRABINEK. *Punitive Medicine.* Ann Arbor, MI, Karoma Publishers, 1980.

SIDNEY BLOCH AND PETER REDDAWAY. *Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry Is Used to Suppress Dissent.* New York, NY, Basic Books, 1977.

P.S. GRIGORENKO. *The Grigorenko Papers.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

VICTOR NEKIPELOV. *Institute of Fools: Notes from the Serbsky.* New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980.

LEONID PLYUSHCH. *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography.* New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

TATYANA KHODOROVICH, Ed. *The Case of Leonid Plyushch.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

WESTERN CHARGES that Soviet psychiatry has been corrupted by the political bias of its practitioners rest on hundreds of well-documented cases over the past decade. Alexander Podrabinek inscribes 200 names on a "white list" of inmates of the "special" psychiatric hospitals whose only crime was political or religious dissent. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway's "register of victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse" runs to 210, half of them supplementary to Podrabinek's list. From these and other sources, such as the London-based human rights organization Amnesty International, it is possible to estimate that between 1,000 and 2,000 persons are being forcibly treated in institutions for the criminally insane to "cure" them of their urges for free expression.

There are upwards of a dozen "special" hospitals, or psychoprisons, operated by the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Conditions in these institutions resemble the worst snakepits of the psychiatric dark ages. In addition, there is an extensive network of "ordinary" hospitals and local clinics to frighten would-be dissenters into conformity.

What all these facilities have in common is that they are run under the cover of "socialist legality." Their experts examine a suspect referred to them by the "security organs," routinely supply a diagnosis of psychopathy, paranoia, or "creeping schizophrenia" to justify a judicial determination of legal nonresponsibility, and order a new inmate to be drugged into stuporous submission. The dissident's trial is conducted in absentia, so that he has no opportunity to offer a plea that his supporters might publicize and relay to the West. His eventual release is made contingent on a recantation of offending opinions stigmatized as "reformist delusions."

The existence of punitive psychiatry was revealed to the West in June 1970, when the noted biologist Zhores Medvedev was detained at the Kaluga mental hospital for his "schizophrenic" concern with political reforms. It was immediately recognized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as a metastasis of the cancerous Gulag archipelago of Stalin's time. "Servile psychiatrists who break their Hippocratic oath," observed Solzhenitsyn, "are able to describe concern for social problems as 'mental illness,' can declare a man insane for being too passionate or for being too calm, for the bright-

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ness of his talents or for his lack of them." His conclusion:

It is time to understand that the imprisonment of sane persons in madhouses because they have minds of their own is spiritual murder, a variation on the gas chambers and even more cruel; the condemned suffer torments more fruitful and prolonged.[1]

As Bloch and Reddaway point out, the Medvedev case illustrates the practice of civil commitment. This procedure is covered by secret directives of the Ministry of Health entitled "On the Immediate Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Persons Who Are a Social Danger," issued in 1961 and revised in 1970. Even a general practitioner's order suffices to place someone in a psychiatric hospital, but a panel of three specialists must approve the commitment within 24 hours. Detention is usually at an "ordinary" facility, where care is appreciably better than at the psychoprisons. However, what strikes an observer as liable to abuse is a procedure that deprives a person of his freedom without a court hearing, especially one that stretches a definition of social danger to cover the writing of reformist proposals.

In criminal commitments, a suspect is first arrested by "investigative organs," of the ordinary or secret police, and charged with an offense—in the case of dissidents, generally Articles 70 or 190/1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (or their equivalents in the codes of non-Russian republics), which deal with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Then "expert commissions" of three psychiatrists determine whether the person is accountable for his offense. In most cases, these panels diagnose the suspect mentally ill after a perfunctory interview and have their recommendations for compulsory treatment in a psychoprison accepted by a court, which routinely turns down defense motions for examinations by independent experts. The hub of this operation is the Serbsky Institute for Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow, where the most prominent cases are processed, under the direction of Dr. Georgiy V. Morozov.

IN THE SPRING of 1971, Vladimir Bukovskiy, who had survived two rounds of psychiatric imprisonment himself in the 1960's for his human rights activities, appealed to Western psychiatrists to evaluate the dossiers of six dissidents who had undergone compulsory treatment in the psychoprisons. Threats of a Soviet walkout persuaded the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) meeting in Mexico City later that year to table discussion of the abuses detailed in the Bukovskiy materials. Soon thereafter, Bukovskiy faced a Moscow court, which sentenced him to seven years of imprisonment and five years of internal exile, among other things for "slandering" a system that, he alleged, put healthy persons into institutions for the criminally insane. The following year, the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on Bukovskiy's data. It took another six years for the WPA, at its Honolulu meeting in August 1977, to pass a resolution officially condemning "the systematic abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the USSR."

The most dramatic of Bukovskiy's files dealt with P. S. Grigorenko, a highly decorated major general and 34-year veteran of the Red Army. It is clear from the documents comprising *The Grigorenko Papers* that criminal commitment was reserved for Grigorenko in order to deny such a prominent dissenter a judicial forum for his views. How else could the authorities explain to the Soviet public that such a distinguished military figure and party member had become a leader of groups dedicated to "Leninist reforms" of the system?

Grigorenko's first brush with the psychiatrists came in the wake of his untimely critique of Nikita Khrushchev's policies. The experts at the Serbsky Institute disposed of his case in April 1964 by diagnosing "paranoid development of the personality with reformist ideas arising in the personality, with psychopathic features of the character and the presence of symptoms of arteriosclerosis of the brain." His wife, Zinaida, recounts asking the KGB officials in charge of the case, "When did my husband go out of his mind?" Their answer: "The illness is a subtle one, not everyone would notice it. But his ideas . . . are socially dangerous." To her request for an open trial at which Grigorenko's sanity could be defended, they replied, "A sick person is not tried."

Not long after the ouster of Khrushchev, Soviet authorities reviewed the writings of Grigorenko that had gotten him into trouble. Their comment:

Presented here is the same thing as in Brezhnev's report, only shorter and more clearly. The trouble with Grigorenko is not that he said it, but that he said it one and a half years earlier than the party said it.

In the spring of 1965, the general with a supposedly incurable condition found himself discharged and stripped of his rank, his pension, and his party card. As chairman of the Cybernetics Department at Frunze Military Academy, Grigorenko had published more than 60

[1] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Open Letter," June 15, 1970, in Zhores and Roy Medvedev, *A Question of Madness*, New York, NY, Knopf, 1971, pp. 135–36.

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works on tactics and decision-making. Now he was forced to make his living as a loader on a construction project. After hours, however, Grigorenko during the next four years became the single person who most "inspired the different groups within the Democratic Movement," according to Reddaway, "a writer and signer of cogent petitions, the forthright leader of the crowds barred from political trials, rebuffing provocations and once even dragging a KGB ruffian off to the police station to report him."

Once more the regime marked Grigorenko for psychiatric oblivion. The trap was laid in May 1969, when he was lured to Tashkent, supposedly to assist in the defense of Tatar activists demonstrating for the right to return to their Crimean homeland, from which they had been exiled by Stalin.

But in a surprisingly "businesslike and friendly" interview, a commission headed by Professor F. F. Detengof found Grigorenko "painfully and sufficiently aware of the situation which has developed for him." After confirming the acuity of the subject's mental faculties, the experts found him free of "symptoms of mental illness" and concluded that "in what he did he was of sound mind."

What this case tells us about the Soviet system is that dissidents are more likely to be earmarked for processing via the psychiatric than the judicial route if they are internationally known and articulate figures, if their critiques are couched in Marxist-Leninist terms that cannot be easily written off as Western-inspired, and if they are steadfast in their protests. Their nonconformist behavior can then be accommodated by the amorphous theories of the doyen of Soviet psychiatry, Andrey V. Snezhnevskiy, whose symptomology includes a "mania for truth-seeking," "obsessive reformist delusions," and "persistent religiosity." The experience of Grigorenko indicates, however, that independent specialists at a sufficient remove from Moscow's influence do not necessarily accept these politically loaded criteria.

The scope of professional independence narrows within the confines of the Serbsky Institute, where, as Victor Nekipelov suggests, the MVD's presence is decisive. It was here that Grigorenko was shipped from Tashkent and the judgment of his mental competence reversed, on the basis of a 20-minute interview. He was examined by a panel of experts, including Drs. Morozov and Daniil Lunts, head of Section 4 (reserved for political cases), who subsequently exchanged his white coat for the uniform of an MVD colonel. Their conclusion, couched in jargon, was that Grigorenko be consigned to an institution for "especially dangerous criminals" since he refused to recant his critique of what he perceived as social injustices:

Reformist ideas have taken on an obstinate character and determined the conduct of the patient; in addition, the intensity of these ideas is increased in connection with various external circumstances which have no direct relation to him, and is accompanied by an uncritical attitude to his own utterances and acts. . . . Because of his mental condition Grigorenko requires compulsory treatment in a special psychiatric hospital, as the paranoid reformist ideas described above are of obstinate character and determine the conduct of the patient.

It is useful to go into the case of Grigorenko at some length for several reasons. His experiences are paradigmatic of hundreds of less prominent persons caught in the toils of the psychoprison system. Moreover, his case is one of the best documented, and the official findings enjoy the distinction of having been reviewed and controverted by Soviet and American experts.

The first public disagreement by a psychiatrist in the USSR with the Serbsky diagnosis came from a young Jewish doctor in Kiev, Semën Gluzman, in 1971. He was joined in a review of the dossier by two other psychiatrists who remained anonymous. The three concluded that "Grigorenko is not suffering from mental illness" and went on to indict "the practice of isolating political dissenters without publicity by confining them to psychiatric hospitals." The regime's response was to arrest Dr. Gluzman on charges of "anti-Soviet propaganda" and to sentence him to seven years of strict-regime labor camps, followed by three years of "internal exile," a sentence that he began to serve in 1979 at Nizhnyaya Tavda, in a remote corner of Siberia.

The second refutation of the Serbsky diagnosis was offered in 1979 by three US psychiatrists, including Dr. Alan Stone, president of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). They reexamined Grigorenko, then a 72-year-old refugee in New York, through an "unusually elaborate" set of tests and interviews. Their findings, published in *The New York Times Magazine* of May 13, 1979, amounted to a total reversal of the clinical picture painted by the official Soviet experts: "Where they claimed obsessions, we found perseverance; where they cited delusions, we found rationality; where they identified psychotic recklessness, we found committed devotion, and where they diagnosed pathology, we found health."

A RARE GLIMPSE into the inner workings of the Serbsky Institute is provided by Victor Nekipelov, a pharmacist with some medical train-

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ing who spent two months at this "well-feathered cuckoo's nest" in 1974 undergoing psychiatric evaluation for crimes including the writing of verses allegedly "defaming the Soviet state and social system." His description of the staff and other inmates provides graphic corroboration of Grigorenko's account, although his companions are not fellow dissidents but ordinary criminals trying to escape the horrors of prison camps for the fantasized luxuries of mental hospitals.

Nekipelov thus reminds us that the major task of Soviet forensic psychiatrists is to ferret out such malingerers, while the certification of politicals is a subsidiary concern. In both of these assignments, the Serbsky staff seems ready to jettison its medical ethics, as it loosens the tongues of inmates with truth serums, spies on them through informers, and even employs female doctors to seduce them out of their feigned catatonic stupors.

Where Podrabinek and Bloch and Reddaway set up "blacklists" of villainous physicians, however, Nekipelov finds the majority of the staff motivated by simple self-interest rather than sadism, scrambling for the extra pay and perquisites due their MVD-related chores. His convincing picture reveals these psychiatric bureaucrats unconcerned about larger issues, as "twice a month, they line up compliantly at the same cashier's [window] as the prosecutor and his investigators."

Nekipelov himself became one of the rare small fry to slip through the nets of the Serbsky, his certificate of mental competence, he believes, a by-product of the Western campaign against Soviet abuses. A concerted international campaign was also responsible for the release of Leonid Plyushch from 30 months in the Dnepropetrovsk psychoprison. His memoir, *History's Carnival,* recounts how at age 25, a "convinced Marxist" graduate of Kiev State University, and a cyberneticist at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, he came to ask embarrassing questions—regarding Stalinist survivals, a state that had become "alienated from all classes," and a nationalities policy that was cast in the "tsarist pattern." As with Grigorenko, the regime rolled out its psychiatric big guns, until the Serbsky Institute's specialists finally obliged with their standard diagnosis: sluggish schizophrenia, with "ideas of reformism that have turned into a mania of inventiveness in the field of psychology." The latter gibe was a reference to Plyushch's collaboration with his wife in a mathematical analysis of game theory.

The Plyushch case materials published under the editorship of Tatyana Khodorovich contain moving letters to his wife and two small sons which give ample evidence of the sanity and fortitude that kept him from betraying his ideals through a full round of psychiatric tortures. He found himself drugged into a convulsive state, gasping for breath, yet out of some atavistic spring of courage refusing to sell out his friends or convictions. When his wife was moved by his suffering to suggest that he try to pacify his overseers by tendering a token apology for his *samizdat* essays as a "deviation from the norm," Plyushch roused himself from his torpor sufficiently to mutter, "I won't write anything for them."

The political abuses of psychiatry in this case are clear. They are reflected in the pressures the Committee for State Security (KGB) brought to bear on Mrs. Plyushch. If she would only stop publicizing the case, officials told her, her husband "would be given smaller doses of drugs." Unprofessionalism is also evident in the predetermined diagnosis of the psychiatrist who admonished Plyushch, "You couldn't adapt to a situation, you risked your own and your family's life, so you must be abnormal." When Plyushch contested this logic by citing the example of the early Bolsheviks who had taken their share of risks, the medical rejoinder was: "So, you consider yourself the equal of Lenin—that is the grandiose feature of your condition."

IN THEIR EXCELLENT survey of Soviet practices, Bloch and Reddaway show that it was relatively simple through the mid-1970's to turn international attention to such prominent cases as those of Medvedev, Grigorenko, and Plyushch. After their eventual release, however, the regime seems to have decided to make lesser-known dissenters the objects of psychiatric repression with a lower profile. About these new victims, the major source of information has become the unofficial Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, organized in 1977 by Podrabinek, at the time a young Moscow paramedic. The group's 24 "Information Bulletins" have supplemented Podrabinek's pioneering study, *Punitive Medicine,* to document the continuing victimization of religious and political nonconformists.

Here we read of Valeriya Makeyeva, a 50-year-old Russian Orthodox nun, at the Kazan psychoprison for "engaging in prohibited trade" by selling for charity some belts embroidered with the 90th Psalm; of Mikhail Zhikharev, an engineer in his seventh year of confinement at Chernyakhovsk psychoprison for having "defamed the Soviet state and social system" by his manuscript on modern history, entitled "The Great Swindle"; of Anatoliy Ponomarëv, an activist engineer in his sixth round of psychiatric internment at Leningrad, whose doctors

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tell him that the complaints he submits about prison conditions are proof of his illness. These bulletins also attest to the silencing of the witnesses—in August 1978, of Podrabinek, whose writings cost him a five-year sentence of "internal exile," converted in June 1980 to three years at hard labor; more recently, of Nekipelov and then of the five remaining commission members, the mathematician Vyacheslav Bakhmin, the radiologist Dr. Leonard Ternovskiy, the metalworker Feliks Serebrov, the computer scientist Irina Grivnina, and the psychiatrist Dr. Anatoliy Koryagin, all sentenced in June 1981 to seven years of labor camp and three of internal exile.

The fate of these witnesses resembles that of other dissenters affiliated with the Helsinki watch groups. If their repression arouses dismay in human rights circles, the Soviet regime seems unfazed by bad Western publicity at this low point in the politics of détente. However, by its recent award of a distinguished fellowship to Dr. Gluzman and its establishment of an ethics committee to refer allegations of abuse to the WPA for investigation, the APA appears determined not to let its Soviet colleagues off the hook.

The initial reaction of the Soviet psychiatric association to Western charges was highly defensive, as Dr. Paul Chodoff pointed out in *Psychiatric News* in the fall of 1979.[2] He noted, however, that the Soviet group did not carry out its threat to withdraw from the WPA after its condemnation at Honolulu, nor has it broken off its relations with the APA. Indeed, Dr. Chodoff speculated, the Western critique may have led to slippage in the leading status of Dr. Snezhnevskiy, perhaps even curbed the most egregious abuses committed in the name of his theory. While it is premature to descry a significant turn away from psychiatric repression in the USSR, in Dr. Chodoff's opinion the international campaign against it has sensitized specialists in every country to the social forces that may subvert their discipline.

[2] Paul Chodoff, "Abuse of Psychiatry—Two Years Later," *Psychiatric News* (Washington, DC), Oct. 19, 1979, p. 2.

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Moscow, Havana, and Africa

By Kenneth Grundy

MORRIS ROTHENBERG. *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power.* Coral Gables, FL, Advanced International Studies Institute, University of Miami, 1980.

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT, Ed. *Communism in Africa.* Bloomington, IN, and London, Indiana University Press, 1980.

WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE et al. *Cuba in Africa.* Special volume of *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh, PA), January and July 1980, Parts 1 & 2.

WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE. *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959–1980.* Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 13. Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

MILENE CHARLES. *The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement.* Washington, DC, University Press of America, 1980.

ARTHUR J. KLINGHOFFER. *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980.

COLONEL GAD W. TOKO. *Intervention in Uganda: The Power Struggle and Soviet Involvement—Reflections of a Ugandan Exile.* UCIS Occasional Working Paper Series, No. 1. Pittsburgh, PA, University Center for International Studies, 1979.

THE RECENT renewed and intensive interest of the Soviet Union in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World has understandably prompted sharp divisions among Western analysts. This current debate, like similar debates of earlier years, has revolved chiefly around the question of whether Soviet foreign policy is motivated by a grand design/master plan or is more properly to be understood as a series of responses to opportunities posed by instability and unrest in selected parts of the non-Communist world. The books under review, on Soviet and Cuban policies in Africa, afford a useful basis for addressing this issue. Of equal importance, they provide insight into the reasons for past successes and failures of Communist policies on the continent and factors affecting the future prospects for such policies.

WITH THE OVERTHROW of Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Modibo Keita in Mali in the last half of the 1960's, Soviet policy in Africa seemed to have reached a post-independence nadir. For roughly the next decade, the Soviet Union nearly faded from the African picture. It continued tendering minimal economic assistance to diverse governments. It maintained a presence in a few states, especially Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Guinea, Nigeria, and Somalia, and among liberation movements fighting Portuguese colonial rule, the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith, and Pretoria's forces in Namibia and South Africa. But it was hardly a vigorous and active policy befitting a major power with global reach.

Then in the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union suddenly returned to Africa with apparent purpose and determination. The military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, the intensifying struggle growing out of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, and the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie's somnambulant and insensitive regime in Addis Ababa provided openings seldom matched in world affairs. Leonid Brezhnev did not fail to act. It appeared as though the Soviet Union might elbow the West out of whole regions of Africa and might harness the renewed momentum of the nationalist and revolutionary movements still struggling to achieve indigenous rule in Southern Africa.

Some observers immediately saw—indeed still see—a pattern to Soviet policy, not just in Africa but throughout the world. They perceived Soviet policy in the Third World to reflect a "grand design" for the eventual victory of the world Communist system and the demise

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of the capitalist order. Others, less preoccupied with East-West power relations, contended that the USSR was merely taking advantage of local conditions, or "targets of opportunity" as they are called. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 afforded ammunition to those of the grand design orientation, while the apparently reactive Soviet policies in Angola and Mozambique provided argument to the "targets of opportunity" school of thought.

My own view is that Soviet foreign policy has been complex and multifaceted, reflecting the USSR's status as a major global power increasingly capable of projecting that power beyond the confines of the Communist world. Vernon V. Aspaturian expressed it well in the pages of this journal when he wrote: "Soviet policy amounts to something less than a master plan (grand design) or a five- or ten-year plan (global strategy), yet it is something much more than a sequence of responses to targets of opportunity."[1] As a major world power, the Soviet Union does indeed respond to local opportunities, especially in the Third World. But it is also capable of creating some of its own opportunities, and it occasionally initiates policy *de novo,* even when opportunities would appear to be limited or absent.

In Africa, it seems to me that the Soviet Union is less inclined toward an overarching master plan and more toward a responsive, pragmatic strategy. A good many Western analysts, as well as those in power in South Africa, do not share this view. They see Russian guile in every act. For example, a recent article in the monthly of the South African Defense Force states:

In the case of South Africa, Soviet strategic, political and military considerations are equally balanced. Without direct or indirect control over South Africa, Moscow's Africa policy is ultimately doomed. The consolidation of its conquests on the continent hinges on the realization of this fundamental objective.

The Soviets are convinced that only the Republic of South Africa has the potential to act as the hub of a Soviet-controlled sub-continent, if not the whole of Africa.[2]

I, too, see Russian guile. But much of the initial alarmist reaction reminds me of Metternich's distrustful remark on hearing that the Russian ambassador had died: "I wonder why he did that?" Similarly, I perceive Soviet expansionist tendencies, yet I do not agree that such tendencies show that the USSR has been operating according to a grand design in Africa.

There is a close affinity between grand design analysis founded on an alleged ideological single-mindedness of Marxist-Leninists in the Kremlin and that founded on geopolitics. According to the latter approach, a hard look at maps provides ex post facto empirical evidence of a grand design. For example, Soviet behavior in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, is said to demonstrate the Soviet intention of cutting the West off from the Persian Gulf by a pincers squeeze play.

An early expression of this variation of the grand design school of analysis appeared after the Soviet success in Angola. It argued:

An analysis of the Soviet approach toward Africa or any other region of the Third World must therefore take into account the Soviet view of the global balance. Moscow insists that the correlation of world forces has shifted dramatically in Soviet favor. It insists, moreover, that this shift will continue. . . . The Soviets insist that the national liberation movement in the Third World is one of the decisive factors in the global revolutionary process and, consequently, that the contest between socialism and capitalism in Third World arenas will have a decisive influence on the final outcome of the broader struggle. . . . The keynotes of the Soviet campaign in Africa over two decades have been patience, adaptability and the progressive manifestation of effective power. . . . They have recognized in military assistance the most expedient wedge for expanding their own influence. And they have selectively targetted those countries and regions that represent the key points of economic (and therefore political) leverage, particularly against the raw material suppliers of the industrialized world, from which they can press their conflict strategy into the rich and critical regions on the southern tip of the continent.[3]

Although it may be possible to find a pattern to Soviet activities in a continent like Africa, this is rationalizing after the fact. In some cases, Soviet activities have indeed focused on key economic points or raw material suppliers. But do Equatorial Guinea, or Uganda, or Congo (Brazzaville), or Mali, where the Soviet Union has at one time or another been significantly involved, fall into either category?

The Soviets have had policy failures too. They have had difficulties with Ahmed Sékou Touré's government in Guinea, and they do not have carte blanche in Angola or Mozambique. Their role in the Horn is not altogether clear either. In short, the USSR is not invincible, nor

[1] "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1980, p. 1.

[2] "Moscow's Africa Policy Doomed without RSA Control," *Paratus* (Pretoria), March 1981, p. 18.

[3] Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow over Africa,* Miami, FL, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976.

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is it continually outsmarting the Africans or the West.

Without denying the calculating nature of Soviet policy in Africa, I would argue that the USSR's strategy and tactics have been flexible and pragmatic, while its general goals and analytic framework have been shaped by an ideological/philosophical mind-set which can, nevertheless, alter over time. The view that policy must be based on either ideology or interest creates a false dichotomy. Ideology is intimately related to interest, for it helps to shape a group's perceptions of interest. And a state's behavior is determined not only by the objective reality of its environment but also by its decision-makers' perceptions of that environment and their vision of their material and ideal interests in a particular sociopolitical setting. Thus, ideology continually impinges on policy not in the sense of a grand design or a "guide to policy" for the day-to-day conduct of affairs, but for reasons related to the diverse functions that an ideology performs in foreign policy. These functions include provision of a set of transcendental objectives, provision of a system of knowledge, provision of a framework for higher rationalization to justify policy, provision of a symbol of continuity and legitimacy, and, finally, provision of a system of communication. Ideology is, in this fashion, pervasive even when its adherents are operating "pragmatically" or responding to initiatives originated by others.

WHILE grand design models were particularly characteristic of the first wave of political response and analytic discussion in the mid- and late 1970's, today pure expressions seem to be less frequent among Western analysts. This judgment is supported by the books under review, comprising what one might regard as a second generation of studies of (as opposed to reactions to) heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. Only in Mose L. Harvey's foreword to Morris Rothenberg's *The USSR and Africa* is the theme sounded. Harvey regards Soviet machinations in Africa as "an ominous new pattern of Soviet aggressiveness" (p. v), in which Africa is a testing ground for Soviet strategies and tactics, a contemporary analogue to Mussolini's Ethiopia or Hitler's Spain. According to Karen N. Brutents, Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—Harvey goes on—this is part of a "total offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them" (quoted on p. viii).

As a group, the books under review tend to be more contemplative and analytic than earlier materials. Virtually all the contributions to the collection edited by David Albright, *Communism in Africa,* reflect a sober yet not despairing tone. This is the best book of the lot, uniformly serious and blessed with a high level of scholarship, insight, and hard-headed analysis. The special issues of *Cuban Studies* and William LeoGrande's monograph offer useful discussion of the policy and role of Cuba in Africa. Milene Charles's *The Soviet Union and Africa* is an analysis of "Bolshevik Plans for Africa" and of Soviet policy since Khrushchev, plus a collection of articles and speeches from Soviet journals. Although the analysis is weak and poorly translated, the documents are quite informative. Unfortunately, they are dated—the latest having appeared in 1972.

The Angolan War, by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, is a thorough narrative of Soviet and Cuban policies in 1975 and 1976 that caused Western officials to begin to question the very nature of détente. Klinghoffer focuses on causality and policy implementation rather than formulation. Objectives, strategy, and tactics are examined in detail and on multiple levels, from local to global. For instance, how did factional divisions within the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the rivalries among the three Angolan nationalist movements, larger relationships involving Lisbon and its decolonization efforts, regional African linkages, continental politics, and finally global issues affect, and how were they affected by, Soviet policy? By setting forth and then debating contending explanatory hypotheses (sometimes advanced too simplistically), the author attempts to arrive at a rational understanding of policy.

Morris Rothenberg prefers a country-by-country organization in *The USSR and Africa.* There are chapters dealing with Angola, the Horn, Zaire, Rhodesia, and Namibia, among others, leading to "the supreme target," South Africa. He seems committed to the defense of the regime in Pretoria, "one of the few cornerstones remaining in support of the U.S.-Western global strategic edifice" (p. 273). The strength of this clearly written study in the cold war tradition lies in its thorough exposition of Soviet ideology regarding Africa and African problems, based largely on a careful reading of the Soviet press.

Colonel Gad W. Toko's account of Soviet "intervention in Uganda," by which he means Soviet relations with Uganda, is best when it deals with his own firsthand observations. He spent more than two years in the USSR, and he later became commander of the Ugandan air force, a position he held until Idi Amin forced him into youthful retirement and then exile. Toko is quite good on the mechanics of military assistance, but some of his broader perspec-

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tives are suspect. For example, he posits that "with the development of modern technology, Africa no longer has military importance in the big power clash" (p. 89). Moreover, to label Soviet policy in Uganda as "intervention" seems to go a bit far. That the Soviets sought to influence national officials and governments is beyond question, if hardly shocking in the post–World War II era. But if one applied the same yardstick of assessment to Western programs of military assistance and sales that Toko does to the Soviet program, one would have to condemn many of them as well.

At the same time, the volumes under consideration demonstrate that Soviet policy in Africa remains a subject of controversy. Klinghoffer, for example, juxtaposes conflicting interpretations and explanations—in the process illustrating well how an argument can be loaded by the assemblage of selected facts. David Albright, in his concluding chapter similarly seeks to sum up the literature by drawing attention to "majority" and "minority" opinions. Moreover, the books here show that even though opinions and interpretations may appear crystallized, we cannot pretend that the definitive word is in. Jiri Valenta, in his contribution on "Soviet Decision-Making in Angola" (Albright, p. 117), suggests that the sort of analysis of bureaucratic politics and organizational behavior that Graham Allison advances in *Essence of Decision*[4] would be useful in assessing Soviet policy, but it is clear from his discussion that the level of knowledge in at least the West on this subject is inadequate to the task. Until we understand more about Soviet motivations and Soviet policy processes, much must be left to speculation.

[4] *Essence of Decision*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

MOST OF the authors in these volumes believe that the Communist powers, and notably the USSR and Cuba, have basically been taking advantage of local problems in Africa, rather than putting into practice a grand design. Indeed, they see Africa as ranking fairly low on Moscow's list of geopolitical priorities. Nevertheless, they recognize that neither appraisal means that the Kremlin sees Africa in isolation. Although particular Soviet actions in Africa may be the result of local African factors, these actions are also informed by a larger, global viewpoint. Moscow, for example, is wary of Chinese and American maneuverings, and it wonders how such matters will affect the USSR. Policy planners in the Kremlin may even have an ideal scenario, a global want list, though this falls well short of a design, a blueprint for action.

These same authors hold that the USSR in Africa need not be cause for panic, but they likewise highlight factors which can hardly be reasons for rejoicing in the West. Such factors include the increased violence in Africa, the lessened respect for territorial boundaries, the Soviet Union's penchant for exploiting crises, and the assertive roles of Soviet and Cuban military forces in Southern Africa.

A number of circumstances, as the books under review attest, have contributed to higher overall levels of violence in Africa. Major developments of a conflict nature have taken place in the Portuguese territories, in the Horn, and in Rhodesia. The Communist states correctly perceived that the United States did not want to become directly involved in escalating local wars, that therefore the West would not mount a concerted response, and that China would not be able to retaliate. Moreover, for a variety of reasons Cuba was in a position to devote more energy to its African policies.

In light of these conditions, Moscow and Havana, each for its own considerations, leaped at invitations to assist. To be sure, their first responses were cautious. Both (the USSR more than Cuba) sought compliance with the Alvor agreements calling for a coalition government in Angola until the West and its clients jeopardized such a trilateral transition to independence. Yet it is a moot point as to who was responsible for internationalizing the civil war, and arguments on this score are unproductive.

In the Horn, Moscow and Havana also at first pushed for a collaborative settlement, involving a "socialist" federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. But it was not to be. Encouraged by the failure of the West to resist militarily in Angola, the Soviet Union and Cuba saw fewer risks and greater potential gain in the Horn. Thus, when Somali forces sought to employ arms to validate their long-standing claim to the Ogaden, the USSR and Cuba intervened to help the Ethiopian government.

FROM A POSITION of eclipse in Africa, then, both the USSR and Cuba have emerged as potent actors on the continent. Moreover, as Arthur Jay Klinghoffer puts things (in overly dramatic fashion), Angola and Ethiopia have already joined Yalta and Vietnam as "pulsating schizoid facets of the Western political psyche" (p. 1).

To be sure, Colin Legum questions the extent of at least Soviet attainments. He writes (Albright, p. 34): "Judged in terms of overall Soviet strategic objectives, Africa has not afforded the USSR any conspicuous successes thus far." Is this judgment because the USSR has no ports to call its very own, no governments in its hip pocket, no completely reliable allies in black Africa?

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If these are to be the measures of success, then few great powers can boast of foreign policy accomplishments. To my mind, such criteria are too demanding.

One might, perhaps, make a stronger negative case with respect to Cuba. Too close an association with the USSR has imposed significant costs on Cuba in terms of attitudes of much of the nonaligned movement. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a heavy burden to bear, indeed. Yet even here the weight of the evidence lies on the positive side.

What is particularly interesting, of course, is the explanation for the success of recent Soviet policy in Africa. In the first place, Moscow has understood the situations in African countries such as Angola and Ethiopia and has not allowed itself to be deflected or distracted by strictly ideological considerations. It has been especially sensitive to regional and local issues. Analysts who insist on a grand design miss the trees for the forest.

In Angola, for example, Soviet leaders saw the appeal of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) as ethnically based and looked upon that organization as a creature of Zaire. As for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), they believed that it and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, had historically been political chameleons. Moreover, they viewed both groups as sustained by US assistance. As a consequence of these perceptions, Soviet leaders, when South Africa directly entered the civil war in support of UNITA, realized that there was no way that UNITA and the FNLA could succeed in competition with the MPLA, especially in the broader African arena.

The situation in the Horn is less clear-cut, yet still indicative. Although Moscow did provide significant amounts of arms to Somalia in the early 1970's, it hedged its support of Somali irredentism. In 1977, however, Washington set in motion a train of events, by first appearing to approve and later rejecting Somalia's irredentist efforts in the Ogaden, on which it was neither prepared nor willing to follow through. Moreover, while Somali claims to the right of self-determination in the Ogaden, like the claims of the Eritreans, are nationalistically valid, Mogadishu's attempt to redraw the boundaries of sovereign states by force—boundaries made sacrosanct by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—rendered Somali claims unsupportable for Africa's leaders. A locally popular cause, in short, was regionally threatening. In the short term at least, Moscow read correctly the message from Africa, although intervention in behalf of Ethiopia may prove costly for the USSR and its allies over the longer haul.

Second, Soviet policy in Africa has been successful in recent years because it has had a new thrust. It has been founded on geopolitical considerations and pursued largely by military means (see especially the Toko revelations), with an emphasis on response to crises generated by particular local African issues. Ideological links and economic ties have been downgraded. In fact, the USSR is virtually out of the business of economic aid to Africa. Soviet policy, in sum, is long on hardware but short on long-term economic development assistance.

Such a policy may eventually have adverse consequences for the USSR. "You can't eat guns," one Equatorial Guinean mused.[5] For the present, however, Moscow has derived considerable benefits from it.

Third, Soviet triumphs in Africa have owed much to the USSR's association with Cuba. The Cuban government has been keen on opening up its own Third World base, and the Cuban armed forces have been eager for an activist role. It matters little whether Cuba has been a proxy, a client, or an agent of the Soviet Union, or whether Cuba has pursued its policy independent of the Soviet Union. Their interests and orientations have been sufficiently close at this historical juncture so that their policies have been supportive and nearly coterminous. As Edward Gonzalez puts it, these policies have been "largely congruent, but not entirely so" (Albright, p. 230). Both countries have sought to support movements and parties ideologically akin to their own ruling parties (although they accept these parties just as "vanguard parties" of "socialist orientation"). Only with respect to Eritrea and to the backing of intraparty opponents of the MPLA leaders have differences between Cuba and the USSR manifested themselves even temporarily.

Finally, in at least the Angolan and Ethiopian episodes, Soviet triumphs resulted in part from the behavior of the USSR's opponents, particularly the United States. Administrations in Washington not only were politically hamstrung and unwilling to pay the full price of intervention, but also made moves of an inept and tentative sort. Norman Mailer once wrote that "a story flies best when it has a hero for one wing and a villain for the other."[6] If this is so, then the story of Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia must crash, for the heroes and the villains are hard to find.

AS FOR the prospects for the USSR in Africa, several considerations pertain. To begin with, the Soviet Union and Cuba are on the continent because some African leaders want them there, so the Soviet presence

[5] *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), May 27, 1981.
[6] *Saint George and the Godfather*, New York, NY, New American Library, 1972, p. 17.

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is tied to its acceptability to African leaders. To be sure, in some cases where the two Communist powers have substantial forces on the ground, they might choose to stay when their hosts no longer want them. In Angola, for example, they are in a strong position to instigate a coup against an MPLA government that might request their departure. Nevertheless, such instances are few in number.

Africa, however, continues to undergo transition. Everything changes, and nothing changes. African leaders profess to want change, yet many resist it. They race for a finish line that recedes into the distance. Can any great power, and the Soviet Union in particular, build a solid base there?

Because of the endemic instability, governmental changes, and shifts of policy, Colin Legum finds that "the Soviet encounter with Africa is much more likely to continue to be marked for some time by shifts of 'alliances' rather than to produce a solid base of Soviet influence, let alone control" (Albright, p. 24). There is much wisdom in what Legum writes, although it must be hedged with contingencies. There seems to be a self-adjusting factor in African affairs. Africans, even "scientific socialists," do not want to be dominated by outsiders. They may appear in rhetoric to prefer fraternal socialists to not-so-fraternal "imperialists," and they may have called upon the USSR and Cuba to offset what they sensed were negative external threats and meddlings. But they may also some day wish to counter Soviet influence through Western and African assistance.

If there has taken place in the "correlation of forces" in Africa a change as profound as the Kremlin seems to think, then the situation of the West becomes difficult indeed, but my own view is that such is not necessarily the case. The changes that have occurred are neither automatically in the USSR's favor nor irrevocable. These shifts, among other things, have brought to power governments closer to a popular African image of people's rule than those that preceded them. This development is not an inevitable plus for the Soviet Union. Certainly, the turn of events in Zimbabwe has not ushered in pro-Soviet leaders or chased away the West. A socialist Robert Mugabe may be, but this commitment has not kept him from making some very positive overtures to the US. He said in an interview with the US Public Broadcasting System shortly before independence that since the Anglo-American proposals,

we have no cause to quarrel with the United States. I think their position or their stance has been very correct. We have welcomed their involvement behind the scenes in the whole exercise at Lancaster House. We have welcomed their participation in the election exercise. . . . We are poised, ourselves, for better relations with the United States.[7]

Ultimately, one's reading of the Soviet role in Africa hinges on the confidence one has in the African peoples and their leaders. If one's view is largely short on faith, then one is inclined to see the Soviet Union as a new colonial power, consolidating its position, digging in for a prolonged occupation, and making trouble for everyone. However, if one has a greater measure of optimism about the basic good sense of Africa's peoples and leaders, then one is drawn to the conclusion that Africans will not allow the Soviet Union to become indispensable.

[7] "MacNeil/Lehrer Report, March 24, 1980" (Washington DC), WNET-TV and WETA-TV, 1980.

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Doing Business with China

By David L. Denny

JOHN W. DEPAUW. *U.S.-Chinese Trade Negotiations.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1980.

HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN and WALTER STERLING SURREY, Eds. *A New Look at Legal Aspects of Doing Business with China.* New York, NY, Practicing Law Institute, 1979.

COLINA MACDOUGALL. *Trading with China: A Practical Guide.* London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980.

JANE RAM, Ed. *Business in Today's China.* Hong Kong, published for the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong by the South China Morning Post, 1980.

LIU CHAOJIN and WANG LINSHENG. *China's Foreign Trade: Its Policy and Practice.* San Francisco, CA, and Hong Kong, China Translation and Publishing Service, 1980.

JULIE MUNRO, Ed. *The China Phone Book & Address Directory,* 1981 Edition. Hong Kong and Menlo Park, CA, China Phone Book Co., 1981.

THERE CAN be no doubt that the foreign trade of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has changed considerably since the death of Mao Zedong and the demise of the "gang of four" in the fall of 1976. Under policies established in 1979 and 1980, foreigners can now set up joint-equity manufacturing and service-oriented enterprises; foreign firms are allowed to explore and develop China's natural resources; and several "special economic zones" have been promoted where foreign investors are encouraged to use Chinese land, labor, and resources for export production. By mid-1981, Chinese officials were reporting that 22 joint ventures had been approved and that foreigners were cooperating in more than 400 projects with a total capital investment of more than $1.5 billion.[1] All of these developments, it need hardly be noted, stand in sharp contrast both to the earlier Maoist emphasis on self-reliance and to the practices of most other Communist countries.

Yet, there is also no doubt that the growth of China's foreign trade has not always matched expectations, either Chinese or foreign. Initially, the more liberal trade policies were greeted with enthusiasm. In the course of 1978, for example, China began negotiations for so many multi-billion-dollar projects that there was speculation among foreigners that China would buy several hundred billion dollars worth of plant and equipment and go into debt by as much as a hundred billion dollars. Even though these expectations were dashed by the economic retrenchment policies introduced by the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978, the interest in doing business in China remains high. In fact, John DePauw warns against the vain and naive pursuit of that old illusory "China market":

> *The kerosene sellers of yesterday perhaps have their counterparts in the soft drink salesmen of today. All are transfixed by the thought of hundreds of millions of Chinese customers.* (DePauw, p. 2)

Everyone involved in the mini-industry of providing advice to would-be China traders will recognize the grain of truth to this point.

On the other hand, overoptimism may not constitute the only danger at the present time. In fact, the greater immediate danger may be that the public perception of China's cutbacks may convince foreign business people that China is retreating to an autarkic, closed-door policy. While China's readjustment has forced sellers of complete plants, machine tools, and technology and equipment for the iron and steel and petrochemical sectors to drastically reduce their marketing goals, Chinese corporations have nonetheless been actively engaged in buying

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[1] See "Foreign Investment Welcomed for Six Big Projects," *Cheng Ming Jih Pao,* (Hong Kong), July 29, 1981, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 3, 1981, p. W/2.

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foreign technology and equipment for a wide range of other industries and have been relying on foreign sources for unprecedented amounts of agricultural products and industrial raw materials.[2]

Given the persistence of such widely varying expectations, it is useful to examine recent developments in China's foreign trade system. One does so with some trepidation, for China is still going through a period of considerable experimentation, in which the limits of the possible, or even the permissible, are not clear. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for making the effort. Fortunately, a number of recent books will help us gain a better perspective on the question.

WHATEVER ONE'S VIEWS of the future, there is no better way to understand China's present economic problems and future trade potential than a careful reading of accounts by those most active in the China market. The books under review contain a large number of articles by authors with a great deal of practical experience on subjects as varied as the mechanics of receiving Chinese delegations and the ins and outs of financing, advertising, insuring, and shipping products to and from China. A number of thoughtful articles deal with the historical background of China's current foreign trade policies.

The volume edited by Howard M. Holtzmann and Walter Sterling Surrey is the most up-to-date and comprehensive book on recent legal developments. It is a collection of articles that will be useful not only to corporate lawyers, but also to the average business person. Articles by David Buxbaum, Jerome Cohen, Victor Li, and Stanley Lubman examine trends in China's legal system. Several other articles deal with dispute resolution, trade finance, and taxation. A useful article by Surrey and Stephen Soble discusses the laws and treaties affecting US-China trade. The book's 25 appendixes present most of the important US-China bilateral agreements and protocols signed up to the summer of 1979.

The book edited by Colina MacDougall admirably fulfills its goal of presenting a "practical guide" to the tricky business of doing business with China. It has articles by Christopher Howe on "Why China Needs Trade," Nicholas Ludlow on "Market Information," Nicolas Wolfers on "Financing," Philip Snow on "Receiving Delegations," A. H. Cave on "Importing," C. M. O'Connor on "Shipping," A. Lagopus on "Insurance," and many more. It is perhaps the most up-to-date and detailed book of its kind now available.

The volume published by the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong covers much of the same ground, though somewhat less comprehensively and "practically." Nevertheless, it is well worth reading for the perceptive views of China traders long based in Hong Kong. In describing the foreign trade of Guangdong Province, for instance, John Kamm not only treats the reader to his encyclopedic knowledge of present-day Guangdong but also examines Guangdong's relationships with foreigners as far back as 1517. W. K. Szeto, who has attended more than 30 Guangzhou (Canton) fairs describes some of the social and business peculiarities of these fairs. Daniel Tretiak writes briefly but thoughtfully on decentralization. Jerome Cohen, Owen Nee, and Jack T. Huang present an initial analysis of China's Joint Venture Law. Melinda Liu discusses the role of the overseas Chinese (who are "back in favor") in China's foreign trade. M. W. Searles, a US business executive with wide experience in Asia, writes on the frustrating and time-consuming process of conducting business negotiations with China.

The book by John DePauw presents a fascinating case study of a computer sale (by Control Data Corporation) to China. Its reader will learn that to export sophisticated products, obtaining US government approval can be even more frustrating than negotiating a final contract with China's foreign trade organizations.

The book by Liu Chaojin and Wang Linsheng is a new species of the "doing business with China" genre—a book on China's foreign trade by two of China's leading foreign trade experts. For that reason alone, it is welcome and noteworthy.

Finally, the *China Phone Book* has become the single most valuable English-language address and telephone directory of China's confusing organizational structure.

This review will not attempt to distill any "business advice" from these volumes. Rather, it will focus on what they tell us about four important questions concerning China's foreign trade and economic policies: (1) the quantity and quality of information from Chinese sources, (2) the degree of decentralization of China's foreign trade system, (3) the impact of the growing body of Chinese foreign trade law, and (4) the degree to which China has been willing to adopt "international standards and practices."

INFORMATION from China has improved dramatically in recent years, in both quality and quantity. One source is official publications. Such

[2] China currently emphasizes purchase of technology and selected pieces of equipment for existing enterprises. The most prominent transactions that have involved US firms include Beijing's purchase of drill-bit technology from the Hughes Tool Company and its purchase of technology and equipment to produce turbine generators and boilers from Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse. For elaboration, see the author's "U.S.-China Trade: Is the Pessimism Exaggerated?" *Business America* (Washington, DC), June 15, 1981, pp. 3–7.

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documents as reports on the annual plan, official criticisms of the inefficiencies of China's planning system, and the State Statistical Bureau's annual economic reports make available a great volume of detailed data on the Chinese economy and foreign trade.

Another source is Chinese officials and economists. Increasingly accessible, they are now much less hesitant to express their own opinions (as opposed to official policy), to criticize other Chinese officials or organizations, and to give foreigners advice and information that only a few years ago might have been considered state secrets.

Chinese officials are accessible through a variety of channels. One is their own writing and lecturing. Liu and Wang, for example, offer a rather thorough and up-to-date account of China's foreign trade inspection practices (in the process they describe the functions of a new and still largely unknown company, CHINSPECT). In their discussion of China's financial policies, they make the interesting observation that the Bank of China will now "under certain conditions" provide 30-to-120-day letters of credit in order to finance imports of Chinese products. Liu and Wang also provide a few tidbits on China's foreign trade planning—the State Planning Commission (SPC) formulates the general goals; the Ministry of Foreign Trade draws up a concrete plan for implementation of these goals and submits it to the SPC; and after approval by the State Council, the plan is ready for implementation.

Another channel is contacts, both formal and informal, with foreign governments and institutions. For example, the detailed information on China's tax system in the Holtzmann and Surrey volume comes out of a month-long seminar sponsored by Harvard University's International Tax Program. Holtzmann's article on dispute resolution in the same volume has references to a number of articles by and interviews with Chinese officials.

Such contacts continue to expand. Even a partial listing will illustrate the extent of the recent exchange of ideas between Chinese and foreign officials and scholars. A number of leading US management experts have lectured at a Management Training Institute in Dalian (Dairen), China, in a program cosponsored by the US Department of Commerce and the Chinese State Science and Technology Commission. There have been a series of exchanges between the Chinese Patent Office and the US Patent and Trademark Office, and Chinese patent officials have spent several months at training programs in the United States. A few US economists have done research in Chinese economic research institutions. In April 1981, in Hangzhou, leading Chinese and US economists exchanged views on the international economic situation. A number of Chinese economists have come to the United States to take part in conferences, to lecture at universities, or to do extended study and research. Several informative interviews with Chinese officials have appeared in the Western press.[3]

Yet another channel is contacts with foreign business representatives, with whom Chinese foreign trade officials have been much more forthcoming in recent years. For example, Kamm cites a case in which a Guangdong Province official told foreigners the amount of funds to be allocated to one of China's new special economic zones (Ram, p. 12). Liu describes the informal bridges between various levels of the Chinese bureaucracy and the overseas Chinese, whose commercial activities are facilitated because "they know the right people—a must in the initial confusing phase when flowchart lines of Chinese foreign trade organizations seem to criss-cross and loop around like so much aimless spaghetti" (Ram, p. 207). Representatives of China's ministries and factories now occasionally take the initiative and call on foreigners in their hotel rooms—a far cry from the times when foreign business representatives used to wait days for appointments with any Chinese official. Indeed, one US lawyer and long-term resident of Beijing told this reviewer about how he marveled at the large numbers of low-level Chinese officials in his Japanese neighbor's hotel room night after night. The attractions were simple but effective—foreign movies in comfortable surroundings. Partly as a result of decentralization (see below), Chinese officials at various levels—those of enterprises, local governments, and even foreign trade corporations—have become increasingly willing to tell foreign business representatives (particularly "old friends") of specific products they would like to procure.[4]

Despite the increasing volume of information from China in recent years, however, there is still a great lack of information about certain questions. One such question is China's foreign trade plans and objectives, where the information available remains sketchy, unsystematic, and generally unauthoritative. Chinese negotiators are still extremely vague about the precise use of the products they are purchasing, a characteristic that often makes it difficult or even impossible

[3] See the highly informative interviews with Vice Premier Bo Yibo and Li Kaixin, director of the State Bureau of Supplies, in *The China Business Review* (Washington, DC), November-December 1980, pp. 9–19.

[4] It should be noted, however, that information from the higher-level Chinese officials who must approve such transactions is much more difficult to obtain.

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to prepare detailed sales offers. Searles's statement that "the Chinese are reluctant to lay out their requirements in detail early on, in order to retain the maximum flexibility" remains true (Ram, p. 140). Open tenders are not used—unless required by foreign aid projects. China's import and export plans are still kept secret, and requests for authoritative assessments of Chinese economic priorities generally have been rejected. Finally, while Chinese organizations have become much more aggressive in marketing their commodities through short-term trade missions and long-term commercial representatives stationed abroad, business people still complain about their passive "take it or leave it" approach to selling.

Another question is the structure of China's foreign trade system. The emergence of new organizations, and changes in the responsibilities of old ones, have far exceeded the ability of either Chinese or foreign efforts to keep track of them. As one experienced China trader puts it, "a particularly frustrating aspect of trading with China has been not knowing how China's foreign trade structure is organized or who one's Chinese trade counterparts are" (DePauw, p. 11). Indeed, as DePauw remarks, "even Chinese telephone directories were considered to be classified information, [since they] revealed too much about the Chinese governmental structure" (DePauw, p. 44). It should be noted, however, that in the past year foreigners have been able to obtain telephone books and that the Chinese have recently announced plans to publish directories of their various institutions and organizations.

Chinese official reticence about clarifying the foreign trade structure has at times even resulted in the conveying of misleading impressions on matters of some consequence. The book by Liu and Wang affords a case in point. The fact that China's industrial ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Metallurgical Industries) played an active role in foreign trade (see below) was well known as early as the last half of 1978 and certainly was widely publicized outside of China throughout 1979. Nevertheless, in their lectures given in August 1979, Liu and Wang asserted that only the Ministry of Foreign Trade had the authority to export directly (Liu and Wang, p. 25). This assertion may have been true in a narrow sense, but it does not adequately reflect the reality of the time (1978 and 1979), when, in fact, Chinese ministries were negotiating many important foreign trade projects. Nor do Liu and Wang even touch the question that was on the minds of foreign business executives: What kinds of projects must I negotiate with the foreign trade corporations, and which can I negotiate with local levels of government, factories, and the national industrial ministries?

In sum, China has provided more and better information on its organizations and their responsibilities, but the improvement has come slowly, unsystematically, and sometimes grudgingly. As Ludlow graphically documents (MacDougall, pp. 15–45), foreign businesses will have to gather most of their information on the organization of China's foreign trade from a miscellany of material furnished by foreign governments, trade magazines, Western academics or reports, and trade groups such as the National Council for US-China Trade and the Japan External Trade Organization. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the demand for such information will best be met not by Chinese publications but by the painstaking efforts of those who compile such publications as the *China Phone Book* and the *China Business Manual, 1981* (an impressive new work published by the National Council for US-China Trade).

There are many reasons why China has made such uneven progress in satisfying the intense foreign curiosity about its foreign trade plans and objectives. One is the "traditional desire of the Chinese bureaucracy to maintain secrecy within its own hierarchy." [5] Foreign business persons continue to be frustrated by their inability to obtain information that would help them understand China's decision-making process and realistically evaluate their prospects for doing business in China.[6] Another factor is the rapid changes that China's policies and institutions have undergone in the past five years. These changes would stymie the best intentions of a forthcoming bureaucracy. On occasion, even well-placed Chinese officials have found it impossible to describe with confidence China's current plans and organizational responsibilities.[7] Ironically, as the next section indicates, many of these changes were intended to "open up" the foreign trade system and make a much larger number of Chi-

[5] John DePauw's paraphrase (DePauw, p. 43) of Michel Oksenberg. See Michel Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy," *The China Quarterly,* (London), Vol. 57, 1974, pp. 1–39.

[6] In November 1980, the present writer accompanied a US delegation to China which tried very hard to clarify the process by which sales of technology to Chinese foreign trade organizations are approved. On several occasions, Chinese officials told us that information on the approval process involved China's internal decision-making, was not relevant to foreign business representatives (since Chinese organizations all know from whom to obtain approval), and in any event could not be revealed to foreigners.

[7] In November 1980, a US delegation to China pressed a Ministry of Foreign Trade official on the question of which Chinese organizations are responsible for procuring foreign technology. The customary response was "it is difficult for me to give a detailed answer for the moment because the system is just in change." The experimentation and organizational flux that then characterized (and still does) China's foreign trade system is described in E.P. White, Ed., "Whom to Contact and Why?" *U.S.A. and China: Technology and Patents Sale and Licensing,* Stamford, CT, Licensing Executives Society, 1981, Chap. 3.

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nese economic units accessible to foreign business.

CHINESE OFFICIALS over the last two years have introduced significant modifications in their previously highly centralized foreign trade system. As in the Soviet Union and other centrally planned economies, nearly all foreign trade decisions and contacts with foreign business representatives were previously handled by a small number of foreign trade corporations within the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The move to make the system more flexible and less monopolistic resulted from the intention of the leaders to put more emphasis on foreign trade, their willingness to entertain entirely new policies on long-term cooperation with foreign firms, and their conclusion that the previous system was "stifling national economic activity" (Lubman, in Ram, p. 174). Chinese end users and local levels of government, as Lubman indicates, had also apparently manifested discontent with having to channel all of their foreign trade activities through bureaucrats who, except for commercial negotiating experience, were largely devoid of technical expertise (Ram, p. 175).

The willingness to experiment with a somewhat more pluralistic system, of course, extends well beyond the foreign trade sector or even economic affairs. Daniel Tretiak alludes to a "loosening up" in the Chinese system generally (Ram, p. 50). This "loosening up," which has waxed and waned over the last few years, has had an impact on China's educational system, artistic community, and even the Communist Party itself. Chinese officials of many different persuasions have inveighed against the social, cultural, and political ramifications of inflexible and monolithic central organizations. As recently as November 1980, a Ministry of Foreign Trade official told a US delegation that "China used to have a monopoly system, but competition today is good—today there is room for all kinds of competition in China, competition even between the provinces and the central government." [8] The official's immediate subject was economic policy, but his remark could have applied to a wide range of other topics.

Three types of decentralization policies in the area of foreign trade can be distinguished. First, a substantial portion of the foreign trade which remained under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was delegated to the local branches of the foreign trade corporations. Business persons found that they no longer needed to go to Beijing to negotiate or sign contracts with the head branches. In some cases, it seemed that the branch offices (e.g., the Shanghai branch of the Textiles Import and Export Corporation) operated almost autonomously. Thus, foreign firms have been able to take advantage of competition among various branch offices—particularly at the Guangzhou Fair.

Second, local governments were granted authority to set up their own foreign trade corporations. As a result, the branch offices of the national foreign trade corporations acquired a dual responsibility (both to Beijing and to local officials), and it is clear that they have begun to take local interests much more seriously. Similar powers were granted to local levels of government to make decisions about joint ventures, technology acquisition, and foreign investment.

Finally, China's industrial ministries, and their subordinate corporations and factories, have become directly involved in foreign trade. Previously, China's end users participated in discussions only as shadowy and generally nameless figures that sat in on negotiations conducted by the foreign trade corporations. This situation has changed drastically. At the present time, foreign business persons regularly contact end users. Some ministries have even set up companies whose sole purpose is to arrange foreign transactions on behalf of their ministries.

The immediate result of these new policies has been confusion. Business persons who had been complaining for years about their inability to identify and contact their end-user counterparts, now complain that they do not know with whom to deal or how to assess the authority of the various Chinese organizations.

An example will illustrate the problems. As early as January 1979, analysts following China trade speculated that all or most ministries would quickly set up their own foreign trade corporations (Lubman in Surrey and Holtzmann, p. 164). By then, foreigners were dealing directly with ministries and were being told by the officials of the ministries that the industrial ministries themselves would soon have authority to determine contract provisions and even sign foreign trade contracts. In late 1978 and throughout 1979, foreign companies were approached by different end users, foreign trade corporations, and local levels of government. A substantial degree of competition among Chinese organizations was often apparent. In some cases, the relationship between two Chinese organizations became so impaired that they would not even attend the same banquet. One of the most common queries was: "Do I endanger my relationship with X (e.g., China National Technical Import Corporation) if I seek to do business with Y (e.g., the Ministry of Metallurgical Industries)?"

[8] The author's notes from a November 1980 meeting with Ministry of Foreign Trade officials.

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It was not until early 1981 that an official Chinese source provided a list of 15 ministerial import and export companies that had official approval to engage in foreign trade.[9] Unfortunately, the article, which appeared in the journal of the "semi-official" China Council for Promotion of International Trade, did not contain any details about the process whereby these companies had obtained authority to engage in foreign trade. Nor did it explain why other ministerial companies were apparently still not allowed to complete foreign transactions. Since the number of ministerial corporations on the list is far lower than the number that have, in fact, been actively conducting discussions with foreign companies, many questions remain unanswered. Why, for example, does the list fail to include one ministry, (the Ministry of Light Industries) that publicly announced the formation of its import-export corporation? Similarly, why does it omit other ministries that have reportedly signed foreign trade contracts.[10] Finally, why does this list, which is almost identical to a highly authoritative list of 17 companies put out in 1980 by a Hong Kong organization with close ties to Beijing (see the next section), have two fewer companies on it than the earlier one?

A more basic reason for the confusion about the authority of ministerial and local Chinese organizations to conduct direct foreign trade is that, notwithstanding decentralization, there continues to be a high degree of central control over foreign trade decisions and a total centralization (in principle at least) of foreign exchange. Whatever else "decentralization" means, it does not mean that Chinese organizations can make foreign trade decisions without regard to higher authority. Most, if not all, foreign trade decisions must be approved by local or national planning authorities (either the State Planning Commission or the Import-Export Control Commission), and even when an enterprise earns some foreign exchange for its "own use," the money must be deposited with the Bank of China and will not be disbursed unless the transaction has the approval of the planners.[11]

Thus, while foreign business persons appreciate their present access to Chinese end users, that appreciation has been significantly tempered by the fact that the Chinese decision-making process has, if anything, become much more complicated. Decentralization has, in general, not given greater final authority to end users and local levels of government, but it has made their involvement in foreign trade decisions considerably more important and obvious.

The decentralizing efforts have also had a number of negative consequences, and these have resulted in pressures for recentralization. Competition among local governments and local branches of the foreign trade corporations brought about price-cutting tendencies, so central authorities have now curtailed these by reimposing national control over the export of certain commodities. There has been an obvious slowdown in the granting of approval to additional ministries and provinces to conduct their own foreign trade. Finally, some foreign companies which have been negotiating with China's ministries or factories have been informed, without explanation, that their final negotiations will be conducted in the traditional manner by the Ministry of Foreign Trade's foreign trade corporations. The current retreat from decentralization is officially attributed to the need to ensure that economic reforms will not interfere with the more important task of economic readjustment.

Early examples of these recentralizing trends can be found in the books under review (particularly in Lubman's article in the Ram volume). But they became more pronounced throughout the latter part of 1980, and they were further accelerated by a December work conference of China's senior leaders. Since this conference, Beijing has emphasized the need for strong central control over prices, construction, investment, and foreign exchange.

Despite such trends, however, China is still officially committed to decentralizing its foreign trade. Examples of reforms and further reports of China's flexible foreign economic relations have continued to appear throughout 1981. For instance, the January issue of *China's Foreign Trade* described a few recent foreign trade decentralization reforms in more detail than has been available heretofore.[12] When the strengthened controls over foreign exchange were described in March 1981, a responsible Chinese official noted that "at present some of the foreign exchange is distributed for use at various localities, enterprises and departments in pro-

[9] See Zhong Wen, "Reforming the Structure of China's Foreign Trade," *China's Foreign Trade*, (Beijing), No. 1, 1981, pp. 2, 3.

[10] One ministry that does not even have an export and import corporation has signed contracts with foreign firms without any apparent involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Unfortunately, its authority turned out to be less complete than expected. This became clear when higher Chinese authorities forced the ministry to renegotiate contracts to secure final approval.

[11] See "Foreign Exchange Control Must Be Centralized and Unified," *Renmin Ribao*, (Beijing) Feb. 27, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 12, 1981, pp. L/4-5.

[12] In addition to providing the names of 15 ministerial import-export corporations authorized to conduct foreign trade, the article stated that "the head offices of the National Corporation now handle only a few, important commodities. Some head offices no longer directly engage in direct export."

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portion to their respective foreign exchange earnings." [13] In early June, the State Council announced that "special policies and flexible measures adopted by the Chinese government since 1979 for Guangdong and Fujian have yielded good results" and would be further expanded.[14] Finally, according to the report of a Hong Kong newspaper with close ties to Beijing, Deng Xiaoping addressed a meeting on July 3, 1981, at which he "advocated making active use of foreign investment to speed up the pace of construction." Deng was said to have warned that "it is impermissible to indulge in bureaucratic practices" and argued for "an extremely enthusiastic approach on this matter." He concluded that "it is necessary to relax the policies *a bit* to speed up the process." [15]

In short, despite significant measures to recentralize in late 1980 and throughout 1981, it appears that China's present leaders still are committed to modifying many aspects of the previously monolithic and inflexible foreign trade system. Nevertheless, the long-term future of China's economic reforms will depend on what results they produce over the long haul and whether the resistance of entrenched bureaucrats and politicians to them persists. Furthermore, a thorough decentralization may, as Tretiak emphasizes, conflict with the "profound, natural commitment of the Chinese state towards centralization" (Ram, p. 49), and as he concludes, "it is unclear if the leadership is truly prepared for all the implications of its actions" (Ram, p. 49).

CHINA'S LEGAL drafters and legislators, in less than two and a half years of intensive activity, have erected a formidable set of criminal, civil, and foreign trade laws. A recent speech by one of China's leading legal specialists, Ren Jianxin, cited the enactment of the Joint Venture Law, three laws and implementing rules on income taxation for individuals and joint ventures, regulations on special economic zones and labor management, foreign exchange regulations and the registration of foreign residents of Beijing.[16] These laws, mostly promulgated after 1979, Jerome Cohen's "Year of the Law" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 139), appear to indicate that Beijing continues to intend to construct a comprehensive body of formal laws and regulations.

Clearly, the renaissance of the legal system stems in part from the need to assure foreign business firms that they will have recourse to courts and arbitration if they so desire. However, as Cohen, Li, and Lubman (in Holtzmann and Surrey) all emphasize, the new foreign trade laws must also be seen in the context of a much more general reintroduction of a formal system of law that appears to have the strong support of most of the country's senior leaders. Their stress on a codified system of rules and regulations reflects the present Chinese revulsion against the arbitrary and undisciplined approach to decision-making and justice that characterized the Cultural Revolution.

Despite the heroic efforts of China's lawmakers over the past two years, however, foreign business persons seeking to do business in China continue to have problems with China's emerging legal system. To begin with, China's legal system is still incomplete—even by Chinese definitions. For example, after the Joint Venture Law was passed, there was a common complaint that it was only a statement of principle and would need to be fleshed out with a comprehensive set of specific laws dealing with the problems of taxation, labor, foreign exchange, management of the joint venture, industrial property protection, and so on. Although much has been done to meet these criticisms and Ren Jianxin has indicated that several other laws on specific topics are now being readied, it will be some time before the promulgation of all the relevant laws.

More significant is the fact that the Chinese approach to drafting laws is remarkably unstructured and informal. By Western standards, the resultant laws are often quite vague. In the final analysis, the really key problems are left in the hands of an ill-defined administrative apparatus. A look at the foreign trade authority of China's industrial ministries will illustrate these points.

Formalization and publication of laws in China tend to follow a lengthy period during which the proposed legislation is subject to experimentation. During such periods, Chinese sources usually are not very forthcoming with details about the proposed new laws and regulations. Stanley Lubman describes this process in general terms and concludes (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 137) that Chinese authorities are reluctant to entrust "the legal system with the power to lead or guide social change . . . [as a result] . . . change has preceded formalization by law. Moreover, the newness of the current

[13] "Foreign Exchange Control Must Be Centralized," loc. cit., p. L/4.

[14] "State Council Convenes Meeting on Decisionmaking," *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1981, p. K/2.

[15] "Deng Xiaoping Stresses Speeding Up Import of Foreign Investment," *Wen Wei Pao* (Hong Kong), July 30, 1981, p. 1, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 3, 1981. Emphasis added. At this writing, there is no additional information about the meeting. Thus, the report must be treated as somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, the general tone of the alleged remarks is consistent with most of the information about China's foreign economic policies in mid-1981.

[16] Ren Jianxin, "China's Foreign Economic and Trade Law Work Is Progressing" (mimeographed), Beijing, China Council for Promotion of International Trade, January 1981.

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state of Chinese developments suggests that the new rules and regulations will only be tentatively established." Such has been the case with respect to the formation of rules over the foreign trade authority of China's industrial ministries.

As has been emphasized in previous sections, China's ministries have been actively meeting, negotiating contracts, and even signing contracts with foreign firms since 1978. But until quite recently, there has been no official or even semi-official description of the allowable scope of the foreign trade activities of the industrial ministries (particularly vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Trade's foreign trade corporations). Indeed, there has been a good deal of doubt (in part fostered by officials of the foreign trade corporations) as to whether industrial ministries had any authority at all to undertake final contract negotiations. As we have seen, when Chinese officials have discussed this issue, they have generally retreated to explanations so out of date or confusing as to be unhelpful.

The first reasonably comprehensive and presumably authoritative version of China's policy was not even published in Beijing. Rather, it appeared in a publication put out by an organization in Hong Kong known to have close connections with authorities in Beijing.[17] It listed 17 companies (in contrast to the 15 companies listed a few months later by a Chinese publication) that had the right to export items produced by their own ministries. More important, the accompanying "Provisional Regulations Governing Export Licenses" clarified some, but not all, of the most essential questions. For example, the regulations stated that except for the listed 17 companies, all other Chinese entities must obtain specific approval from the Ministry of Foreign Trade before exporting.

Characteristically, the regulations were labeled "provisional"—a standard Chinese practice to indicate that the new law should be considered experimental and subject to change. In the past, however, economic activities in China have been carried out for years under laws and regulations labeled "provisional."

Foreign business persons are still awaiting official confirmation of the foreign trade authority of industrial ministries. As pointed out in previous sections, an article in the semi-official magazine *China's Foreign Trade* has confirmed the essence (but not the details) of the system reported in the Hong Kong press. More recently, at least one ministerial company (the Import-Export Company of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry) cited legal documents that give the ministry the right to conduct foreign trade.[18] Presumably, the ministry did so to overcome doubts about its legal authority to engage in foreign trade. To date, however, the details of the new law have not been made public by an authoritative Chinese source.

Nor would the publication of a new law by an authoritative Chinese source end all the important questions. As noted earlier, Chinese laws tend to be vague by Western standards and to leave many important questions for resolution by policy-making units such as the State Council or by lower-level bureaucrats. Sometimes, they neither specify what organization has authority to make the final decision nor describe the basis for the judgment. As Cohen puts it in his discussion of criminal law, "despite the evident purpose of the draftsmen to circumscribe the power of the police, prosecuters, jailers and judges, the laws inevitably lodge enormous discretion in those who will administer them" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 151).

The "Provisional Regulations for Export Licensing" published unofficially in Hong Kong reflect this tendency of Chinese lawmakers to leave enormous room for administrative interpretation and discretion. Article Two gives approved corporations the right to "conduct such export business as specified within the scope of their business." However, the regulations contain no description of this "scope," nor do they suggest how an industrial ministry's "scope of business" is determined. In informal discussions, Chinese officials have indicated that a ministry is not free to export all the commodities that it produces, but it is not clear how the dividing lines are drawn in the innumerable gray areas that must occur daily.[19]

The uncertainty about which Chinese organization is allowed to export what commodity creates difficulties for foreign firms. It has not been uncommon for Western business representatives to invest enormous energy and resources in negotiating contracts only to find out that the parties with whom they have been dealing have exaggerated their ability to gain higher-level approval for their proposed transaction.

This sparseness and lack of specificity of Chinese foreign trade law

[17] "Provisional Regulations Governing the Export License System of the Administrative Commission on Import and Export and the Ministry of Foreign Trade" (Full Text), *China Economic News* (Hong Kong), Summer 1980, pp. 3–7.

[18] A *Renmin Ribao* advertisement on July 12, 1981, p. 8, stated: "Founded in January 1980, China Metallurgical Import and Export Corporation (CMIEC) is a corporative organization enjoying all due legal status, evidenced by license (No. GSQJ-010005) and legal documents of operation certificates (Nos. GSQZ-0070/0083) issued by the General Administration of Industrial and Commercial Management of the People's Republic of China."

[19] A US delegation was told in a November 1980 interview with the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry that MMI could export commodities (through its export-import company) if it could (1) develop new types of minerals that had never been exported before or (2) increase the amounts of exportable minerals beyond those committed to the China National Minerals and Metals Import and Export Corporation (under the Ministry of Foreign Trade).

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are, of course, only symptoms of the much more fundamental problems with which Chinese legislators, politicians, and social scientists are now struggling. The legal authority that China's economic units will eventually obtain must closely reflect the degree of decision-making authority that Chinese planners are willing to concede to the enterprises. At the present time, China's leaders are trying to graft some measure of decentralized flexibility onto an economy that everyone assumes will continue to be dominated by central directives. This is a highly complex and, some would even say, foredoomed undertaking. While such issues may seem abstract, they are in fact intimately linked to the question of what kinds of contracts a foreign firm can sign with various types of Chinese organizations.

The articles by Li and Lubman in the Holtzmann and Surrey volume will be useful to those who want to understand why the legislative process will not be smooth. As these authors point out, there will be personnel problems, resentment from the party and the bureaucracy, inconsistent objectives, and, last but not least, the traditional Chinese preference to depend on the benevolent administration of vague but generally accepted moral precepts. As Li puts it:

The argument is that more laws do not make for a better and more harmonious society. On the contrary, the emphasis on law makes people more litigious and loophole happy, and also diverts attention away from the more important work of moral education. (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 85.)

NOTHING HAS SYMBOLIZED China's changing foreign trade policies and practices more than its often-repeated commitment to "normal international commercial practices." Chinese economic officials can now consider a wide range of previously unacceptable policies and practices, including receipt of foreign aid and credit, cooperation with foreign companies in the exploration and development of China's natural resources, and long-term foreign trade contracts. In addition, Chinese officials have clearly been willing to consider modifications in China's traditional methods of doing business and writing contracts—in such matters as dispute resolution, letter-of-credit practices, and business facilitation (e.g., offices for Chinese organizations abroad and for foreign companies in China).

As noted above, however, it is difficult to gauge the precise extent of the changes. Clearly, many of China's commercial practices have changed substantially—if only in the sense that there are few, if any, areas in which foreign businesses need feel constrained from pushing aggressively for their own "standard practices." Chinese officials now at least are willing to listen to suggestions and make their decisions on "pragmatic" rather than "ideological" bases. Yet the Chinese have not adopted Western business ways overnight, and their actual practices have changed decidedly less than their rhetoric concerning "standard commercial practices."

Space does not permit a full discussion of the varied issues related to "standard commercial practices." We shall therefore concentrate our attention on two important questions—dispute resolution and negotiating behavior.

Dispute resolution is an example of a commercial practice where the difference between Chinese customary usage and "normal commercial practice" has narrowed in recent years. Nevertheless, it must be said that despite considerable changes in Chinese practices in this area, the resolution of trade disputes with Chinese organizations continues to be done in a manner quite different from that in most countries.

Chinese tradition acknowledges that disputes will occur between parties involved in economic transactions. However, it assumes that the main interest of both parties is in a long-term, friendly relationship. Therefore, Chinese practice emphasizes that it is necessary for both parties to resolve differences voluntarily and harmoniously. As Lubman puts it: "The Chinese have a record of energetically avoiding not only litigation but any third party participation having overtones of adjudication" (Ram, p. 191). As a consequence, nearly all contracts with Chinese organizations still commit the parties to attempt to settle disputes through "friendly negotiations" without outside involvement.

Should the two parties be unable to agree among themselves, Chinese tradition first looks to outside conciliators to help the two parties resolve their dispute.[20] As it is employed in resolving both domestic and foreign disputes in China, conciliation is voluntary and nonbinding. Holtzmann quotes Chinese officials as saying: "The FTAC [now the FETAC—the Foreign Economic Trade and Arbitration Committee] makes no concrete proposals, we only help the parties to analyze the facts and legal liabilities. We ask them to go back and to try to reach an amicable settlement among themselves" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 286).

Western tradition (and that of the Soviet Union), of course, is quite different. In this tradition, it is not par-

[20] According to Ren Jianxin, "Conciliation has a long tradition and history in China. A great number of civil disputes have been solved through conciliation in the Chinese law courts." See his "China's Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee," *China's Foreign Trade*, No. 2, 1981, p. 4.

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ticularly unusual for disputes over contract matters to be resolved by objective third-party adjudication of the issues. Moreover, adjudication by a third party does not necessarily carry a negative connotation, and as long as both parties have faith in the fairness of the system, economic disputes do not have to lead to a rupture of economic relationships.

With Chinese and Western traditions and practice in mind, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) agreed in 1977 to a new mechanism of "joint conciliation" to resolve disputes arising out of US-China trade. The agreement calls for both the CCPIT and AAA to appoint arbitrators who will help the disputing parties establish the facts of the case, narrow the range of disagreement, and suggest possible compromises. However, arbitrators have no authority to impose their wishes on the principals.

Holtzmann gives a fascinating and detailed account of how this agreement was used in 1977 to resolve an important commercial dispute between a US firm and a Chinese foreign trade corporation. It is clear that during the conciliation process, many differences of approach arose. The US side moved quickly to name its conciliator, tried to schedule early conciliation sessions at a neutral site, volunteered detailed procedural rules for the conciliation, and submitted a lengthy legalistic brief presenting the US company's side. The Chinese side, on the other hand, did not name its conciliator until the conciliation process had begun, delayed the formal start of the conciliation until the differences had been narrowed substantially, declined to meet on neutral territory, rejected formal procedural rules, and presented its views of the facts of the case briefly with relatively short references to supporting evidence. In summarizing differing US and Chinese attitudes in this case, Holtzmann states that "the Chinese are reluctant to adopt specific procedural rules which might limit flexibility, while the Americans are more comfortable if they know the procedural rules in advance" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 329).

It is still unclear whether the AAA-CCPIT agreement will produce a useful mechanism for dispute resolution. Although the first case was successfully resolved and although both the AAA and CCPIT are promoting the agreement, the fact remains that this mechanism has been employed in only one other US-China trade dispute. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in early 1981 one of China's leading authorities on foreign trade law again called attention to the contribution that this mechanism of dispute resolution could make in the future.[21] Moreover, in 1980 the Chinese "further developed" this method of dispute resolution in an agreement with the French National Institute of Industrial Property. According to the agreement, "joint conciliation" will be used to resolve disputes arising from industrial property transactions.[22]

Despite the strong Chinese preference for "friendly negotiation" or "conciliation" to resolve contract disputes, Chinese contracts typically allow for arbitration should these other methods fail. However, until recently, Chinese organizations have had a very strong bias in favor of using China's own arbitral body, FETAC, or an arbitral body in the country of the defendant. As Holtzmann points out, both of these practices fall short of the "recognized international practice of third country arbitration" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 331).

On the other hand, Holtzmann supports Chinese officials who emphasize that "China's rules of arbitration procedure are basically the same as prevail internationally." He points out that the amount of time spent on settling a case through friendly consultation or conciliation is similar in China and other countries (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 327) and that China follows standard international practice in refusing to enforce arbitral awards when it has reason to believe that there has been a lack of procedural fairness or a violation of public policy (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 341). Moreover, he notes that the rules of Chinese arbitration commissions "are clearly similar to the arbitration rules of arbitration commissions established in various other socialist countries" (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 327).

Nevertheless, in a very basic sense, Chinese arbitration procedures are unique. Arbitrators are committed to trying to resolve disputes without imposing an arbitrated settlement. Holtzmann cites information provided by the FETAC that more than 90 percent of the cases brought to arbitration bodies are settled by friendly negotiations and conciliation (Holtzmann and Surrey, p. 255). While it is not unusual to see the same general phenomenon outside China, the proportion of disputes that are settled voluntarily by the Chinese is remarkably high.

By far the most important change in China's policies with respect to resolving disputes with foreign parties is that Chinese organizations have increasingly been willing to agree to arbitration clauses calling for arbitration in third countries on the basis of the procedures of the body conducting the arbitration. Holtzmann reports that an AAA delegation was assured of this policy orally several years ago, and more recently the

[21] ibid.
[22] ibid.

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director of the CCPIT's Legal Affairs Department, Ren Jianxin, has written that "it is not unusual to specify in the contracts that arbitration is to be carried out in a third country."[23] US business people with experience in trade with China have confirmed this trend, and published contracts with such clauses are available.[24]

There can be little doubt that this is a change of considerable importance. Unquestionably, China is interested in increasing the number of its trading partners rather than simply relying on "old friends." More important, Chinese negotiators probably have found that in large and complex undertakings (particularly those involving foreign investment and long-term trading relationships), most foreign firms have been unwilling to get deeply involved without ultimate resort to impartial arbitration of disputes.

Despite this very significant change, Chinese policies toward arbitration cannot yet be called "normal commercial practices." Chinese authorities remain highly reluctant to allow the law of the third country to govern normative questions. Thus, if there is an arbitration in Stockholm under the Swedish tribunal's procedural rules, the Chinese side can still argue that Chinese normative law should govern since the contract was signed in China.

More significant, the Chinese still can be expected to resist vigorously actual resort to arbitration. In fact, despite all of the intense interest in this subject, legal specialists in this field have been unable to provide details of any case that actually went to third country arbitration.

The reasons for the apparent lack of use of third country arbitration may have something to do with the fact that it has only recently become easier to obtain. More important, however, is that foreign companies have generally found their Chinese counterparts arguing that the two sides should not proceed to arbitration since "friendly negotiations" have not yet failed—after all, the Chinese contend, "we are still negotiating!" For this reason, some lawyers are beginning to advise their clients to try to obtain a clause in the contract that would automatically trigger arbitration after a reasonable period of "friendly negotiations."

Chinese negotiating behavior is in some ways substantially different from that of other states. Foreigners invariably describe negotiations as time-consuming, repetitive, and very thorough. Some have found the experience highly frustrating. As Searles points out, foreign accounts of negotiating with the Chinese are replete with mention of "states of agitation," "serious erosion of relations and confidence," and other phrases that could well have come from a textbook on neurotic behavior (Ram, p. 141). Others have come away highly suspicious of Chinese motives, questioning whether the Chinese were negotiating in good faith or seeking merely to learn as much as possible about foreign technology. In cases such as these, Chinese negotiating behavior is clearly a problem.

One can point to several possible explanations for such negotiating behavior. One is the traditional Chinese way of doing things. For example, after surveying many business experiences with China, DePauw compares Chinese negotiating tactics to psychological ploys used in Chinese chess and even war and statecraft: "In Chinese chess, the object is not to capture an opponent's pieces directly, but gradually to surround and isolate them" (DePauw, p. 51). He notes Henry Kissinger's feeling of a "combination of awe and impotence at so much discipline and dedication" and suggests that foreign business representatives likewise may feel a "combined sense of awe, frustration and even impotence" (DePauw, p. 149). Searles, too, notes that the more relaxed Chinese view of time pressures gives the Chinese considerable psychological and negotiating advantages (Ram, p. 141).

Obviously, Chinese history, culture, and psychology have some effect on the Chinese negotiating style. But it would be imprudent to place too much emphasis on this explanation. For example, DePauw's own survey data tend to contradict the remarks quoted above. Of his respondents, 58 percent said that the Chinese did not play a "waiting game," and 53 percent replied that the Chinese "did not use time as an instrument to gain commercial advantage" (DePauw, p. 53). Even those who believed that the Chinese used time as a negotiating tactic reported that the waiting time was "for the most part, not longer than a few days to a few weeks" (DePauw, p. 53). While DePauw contends that "the Chinese thrive on the whipsaw technique" (playing one company off against its competitors), his respondents apparently were not forced to make more than their normal concessions on price (DePauw, p. 71). Seventy-nine percent reported that "in the end, they were satisfied that they had obtained the best possible deal" (DePauw, p. 79).

A more immediate and obvious explanation for Chinese negotiating behavior is Chinese unfamiliarity with foreign technology. For example, China probably uses a more time-consuming and unscientific method of evaluating foreign technology because of the scarcity of skilled technicians and the lack of adequate laboratory equipment and

[23] Ibid.

[24] For an example of such an arbitration clause, see *U.S. and China Technology and Patent Sale and Licensing*, Stamford, CT, Licensing Executives Society, 1981, p. 127.

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computers. To a certain extent, the time spent in technical negotiations is, from the Chinese point of view, a necessary and economical substitute for sophisticated laboratory testing.

Yet another explanation is the complexity of the institutional setting. As previous sections have emphasized, China's foreign trade bureaucracy has become much more complicated in the last few years, and Chinese officials themselves have at times not been in a position to define exactly how decisions are made and how approvals for contracts are obtained. At the same time, China's economic policies and priorities have changed dramatically, adding yet another unknown to a highly confusing and fluid situation. Over and above that, China's economic decisions are still made by a horrendously complex but loosely organized bureaucracy to which "all matters, regardless how trivial, have to be submitted for approval" (DePauw, p. 21).

For this reviewer, emphasis on the complexity and indeed the inefficiency of the bureaucratic setting affords greater insight into the time-consuming, repetitive, and stop-and-go character of negotiations with China than is conveyed by the alternative view of an omniscient, carefully tuned, and well-oiled Chinese bureaucracy all geared up to make the business person feel "awed, frustrated and impotent." Regardless of the explanation, however, Chinese negotiating habits and patterns are so deeply ingrained that they will change only slowly and only after many more years of interaction with the international business community.

RECENT CHANGES in China's foreign trade policies and practices have not changed the basic character of the system that Mao's successors inherited. While data on China's economic performance are more readily available, it is still difficult to gain access to many high-level economic officials and to obtain authoritative information about how decisions are made. The main levers of economic control (prices, investment, and foreign exchange) remain tightly under the control of the central planners. Many new laws have been promulgated, but their provisions make clear that in many cases the crucial problems will be left to the discretion of vaguely defined "responsible authorities." Finally, China's present commercial practices in most respects bear more than a family resemblance to Chinese policies since the 1950's.

This lack of fundamental change will not be surprising to those who have been following the difficulties that other centrally-planned economies have had in introducing far-reaching reforms. Nevertheless, the Chinese reforms have already significantly changed the way that China carries out its foreign trade. The impression that one gets from reading these books is a great fluidity of institutions and policy, certainly not "the more things change, the more they remain the same." Chinese leaders are quite self-consciously groping for methods to improve the working of a highly complex and cumbersome machine. They are not dismantling the whole machine, but they have been willing to remove fairly substantial components and replace them (at least experimentally) with anything that works. Where this approach will lead in the long run cannot be forecast. In the immediate future, however, it is clear that business people will continue to be confronted by an ever more complex but accessible foreign trade bureaucracy, and that Beijing will continue to experiment with new institutional arrangements that will draw foreign business firms into even more intimate, complicated, and long-term arrangements with China's economic organizations.

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